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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates children’s comprehension of demonstratives, such as this 
and that in English. As deictic spatial expressions, the interpretation of demonstratives is 
context-dependent: a proximal demonstrative (e.g., this) picks out the entity near the speaker, 
while a distal demonstrative (e.g., that) picks out the entity apart from the speaker; crucially, the 
entity-speaker distance is determined by the speaker’s perspective, which varies across contexts. 
Studies have shown that children tend to be non-adult-like when comprehending demonstratives 
uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective from their own (e.g., Clark & Sengul, 1978; 
Zhao, 2007). To better understand children’s comprehension of demonstratives, this dissertation 
explores (i) the cognitive factors which might hinder children’s adult-like knowledge, and (ii) the 
language-specific factors which might improve children’s demonstrative comprehension.  
This dissertation first discusses Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive Function (EF) and 
how the development of each may hinder children’s comprehension of demonstratives. 
Successful comprehension of demonstratives requires the listener to incorporate the speaker’s 
perspective, in which cognitive abilities may play a role. It has been suggested that children’s 
non-adult-like demonstratives may be related to their still-developing ToM (de Villiers, 2007) 
and EF (Nilsen & Graham, 2012).  Two experiments directly tested this hypothesis with English-
speaking and Chinese-speaking children, respectively. Both experiments utilized two 
demonstrative comprehension linguistic tasks, and two cognitive tasks measuring ToM and EF, 
respectively. The results from both experiments suggest that children’s successful 
comprehension of demonstratives may be related to their ToM development, but not EF.  
This dissertation then examines whether a language-specific morphological 
representation of demonstratives may interact with children’s comprehension in a way that 
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prevents them from committing non-adult-like comprehension. Demonstratives in Mandarin 
Chinese are of particular interest because they typically occur with classifiers. Classifiers are 
semantically dependent on their associated referents; interestingly, classifiers are known to 
facilitate adults’ sentence processing (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Wu,  Kaiser, & Andersen, 2009). Thus, 
this dissertation examined whether and to what extent the classifier may improve Chinese-
speaking children’s demonstrative comprehension. Results reveal that the classifier semantics 
improves children’s demonstrative comprehension, particularly when the classifier semantics 
itself is sufficient to identify the referent.   
In sum, the results of the studies discussed in this dissertation suggest that both cognitive 
factors and language-specific factors play an important role in children’s demonstrative 
comprehension. 
 
 
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I cannot believe that I am finally at this stage, writing acknowledgements for my 
dissertation. This work could not have been done without many people’s help. I deeply 
appreciate everyone who has been there for me on the long journey toward getting my degree.  
My profound and sincere appreciation first goes to my advisor Dr. Utako Minai for her 
guidance and encouragement, not only on the process of working on the dissertation, but also 
adjusting my life here as an international student. She is like a ‘mom’ that takes good care of me 
in every aspect. I feel very lucky to be her first Ph.D. student and learned a lot from her about 
being a good researcher. My deepest gratitude also goes to my committee members, Drs. Alison 
Gabriele, Cliff Pye, Andrew McKenzie, and Yan Li. I am grateful for their insightful comments 
and thought-provoking discussions. Dr. Alison Gabriele is one of the best teachers that I have 
had in my life. Her guidance and encouragement have also been very important throughout the 
whole process. She guided me to look at the same results from different point of view, and let me 
know that I am on the right track. Dr. Cliff Pye has pushed me to think deeper and deeper about 
the issues. Although his questions are tough, I enjoyed discussions with him. Dr. Andrew 
McKenzie has been very helpful in the discussion of the core semantics aspect of my project. 
Thanks to him I finally digested the hardcore papers on semantics.   
My research was supported by the University of Kansas Dissertation Fellowship. I am 
grateful for this financial support for my research. I would also like to thank the children, parents 
and staff in the preschools here in Lawrence and in Taiwan who allowed me to conduct on-site 
data collection for this dissertation. I would also like to thank members of the Developmental 
Psycholinguistic Lab at KU, and Yu-Li Chung at National Chiayi University in Taiwan, for their 
help in data collection in the preschools. My gratitude also goes to Dr. Jenny Kuo and Dr. Shu-
vi 
Ping Gong at National Chiayi University who helped me recruit adult participants. Both 
professors not only helped me on my research, but have also provided me lots of support and 
encouragement since I decided to go into linguistics.  
I am indebted to all the members of the Research on Acquisition and Processing Group 
for their insightful discussions on my work. Particularly, comments from Dr. Robert Fiorentino, 
Dr. Alison Gabriele, and Lamar Hunt III have helped me to shape the early design of this 
dissertation. I also want to thank my fellow classmates: Adrienne Johnson, Bea Lopez Prego, 
Bobo Yan, Ethan Skinner, EunSun Tark, Goun Lee, Hyunjung Lee, Jiang Liu, Jie Liu, Jon 
Coffee, Jose Aleman Banon, Kate Coughlin, Kelly Berkson, Lauren Covey, Maria Martinez-
Garcia, Quentin Qin, Saad Aldosari, Steve Politzer-Ahles, Wenchi Yeh, and Yu-Fu Chien.  
I am indebted to my dear Taiwanese friends at KU, YuPing Hsu and Michelle Liu. 
Without their friendship, I would not have been able to complete my work. I thank you for 
always being there to listen, for cheering me up and encouraging me during the darker days, and 
celebrating with me during the bright ones. YuPing has not only been there for me emotionally, 
but also helped me by drawing the pictures used in the tasks. Michelle has been my workout 
buddy when I am stressed out while writing my dissertation.  
Finally, I extend my heartfelt thanks to my family: my father, Tsung-Hsien Chu, mother, 
Mei-Ling Yeh, brother, Scott Chu, sister-in-law, Rolin Yang, and cousin, Debby Yeh. They have 
always been very supportive of the decisions I have made, including studying abroad and going 
to academia. I appreciate their unconditional support, love and trust in me.   
 
  
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT   .......................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES  ........................................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF TABLES  ......................................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. The interaction between language and cognition ............................................................ 3 
1.2. The interaction between language acquisition and language-specific properties ........... 9 
1.3. The organization of the dissertation .............................................................................. 12 
CHAPTER 2. THE NATURE OF DEMONSTRATIVES ...................................................................... 14 
2.1. Deixis ............................................................................................................................ 15 
2.1.1. The definition of deixis ............................................................................................ 15 
2.1.2. The meaning representation of deixis ...................................................................... 17 
2.1.3. The categories of deixis ........................................................................................... 20 
2.2. Semantic-pragmatic analysis on demonstratives .......................................................... 21 
2.2.1. Semantic distinctions of demonstratives ................................................................. 21 
2.2.2. Theoretical analysis ................................................................................................. 22 
2.2.3. Pragmatic analysis: the use of demonstratives ........................................................ 26 
2.3. What children need to know about demonstratives ...................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 3. DEMONSTRATIVE COMPREHENSION AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: CROSS-
LINGUISTIC INVESTIGATION ................................................................................... 34 
3.1. The acquisition of demonstratives ................................................................................ 34 
3.1.1. Egocentric bias ........................................................................................................ 35 
3.1.2. Salience bias ............................................................................................................ 44 
3.2. Language development and cognitive development ..................................................... 47 
3.2.1. Theory of Mind and language ................................................................................. 47 
3.2.2. Executive Function and language ............................................................................ 52 
3.3. The relationship between comprehension of demonstratives and cognitive development
 ....................................................................................................................................... 55 
3.3.1. Demonstrative comprehension and Theory of Mind ............................................... 56 
viii 
3.3.2. Demonstrative comprehension and Executive Function ......................................... 57 
3.3.3. A cross-linguistic perspective on Theory of Mind and Executive Function ........... 61 
3.4. Experiment 1: Child English ......................................................................................... 62 
3.4.1. Participants .............................................................................................................. 62 
3.4.2. Tasks ........................................................................................................................ 63 
3.4.3. Procedure ................................................................................................................. 71 
3.4.4. Results and discussions ........................................................................................... 72 
3.4.5. Summary of Experiment 1 ....................................................................................... 82 
3.5. Experiment 2: Child Chinese ........................................................................................ 83 
3.5.1. Participants .............................................................................................................. 83 
3.5.2. Tasks ........................................................................................................................ 84 
3.5.3. Procedure ................................................................................................................. 85 
3.5.4. Results and discussions ........................................................................................... 86 
3.5.5. Summary of Experiment 2 ....................................................................................... 97 
3.6. General discussions on demonstrative comprehension and cognitive development .... 97 
3.6.1. The role of language background in the comprehension of demonstratives: a cross-
linguistic examination .............................................................................................. 98 
3.6.2. Comprehension of demonstratives and Theory of Mind ....................................... 105 
3.6.3. Comprehension of demonstratives and Executive Function ................................. 106 
3.6.4. Comprehension of distal demonstrative ................................................................ 109 
CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC PROPERTY ON DEMONSTRATIVE 
COMPREHENSION: CHILD MANDARIN AS A TESTING CASE ................................. 111 
4.1. Demonstratives in Mandarin Chinese ......................................................................... 112 
4.1.1. The role of the classifiers in demonstrative phrase ............................................... 113 
4.2. Chinese classifiers ....................................................................................................... 117 
4.2.1. The classifier system in Mandarin Chinese ........................................................... 118 
4.2.2. Classifiers as a cue in adults sentence processing ................................................. 122 
4.2.3. Children’s acquisition of classifiers in Mandarin Chinese .................................... 126 
4.3. Children’s use of semantic cues in language comprehension: can they utilize the 
semantics of the classifier in Chinese demonstrative to improve their comprehension?
 ..................................................................................................................................... 131 
4.4. The present study ........................................................................................................ 133 
4.5. The experiment ........................................................................................................... 140 
4.5.1. Participants ............................................................................................................ 141 
4.5.2. Tasks ...................................................................................................................... 141 
ix 
4.5.3. Procedure ............................................................................................................... 158 
4.5.4. Results ................................................................................................................... 159 
4.5.5. Summary of the results .......................................................................................... 169 
4.6. General discussions ..................................................................................................... 170 
4.6.1. The nature of training effect .................................................................................. 170 
4.6.2. The role of classifiers in demonstrative comprehension ....................................... 178 
4.6.3. Understanding children’s processing of semantics and pragmatics: hints from a 
follow-up study with adult speakers of Chinese .................................................... 183 
4.6.4. The role of Executive Function in the Implicit Training ....................................... 189 
CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................... 193 
5.1. Demonstrative and cognitive development: Why do children exhibit egocentric 
interpretation of demonstratives? ................................................................................ 193 
5.1.1. Summary of the findings ....................................................................................... 193 
5.1.2. Discussion .............................................................................................................. 194 
5.2. Demonstrative and language-internal factor: What can help children overcome the 
egocentric interpretation of demonstratives? .............................................................. 201 
5.2.1. Summary of the findings ....................................................................................... 201 
5.2.2. Discussion .............................................................................................................. 202 
5.3. Concluding remarks and remaining issues ................................................................. 206 
APPENDIX I: TRIAL TABLE FOR THE JUDGMENT TASK ............................................................. 209 
APPENDIX II: FULL SCRIPT OF THE HIDING GAME ................................................................... 210 
APPENDIX III: TRAIL TABLE FOR THE CLASSIFIER COMPREHENSION TASK .......................... 211 
APPENDIX IV: THE CLASSIFIER PRODUCTION TASK ................................................................ 212 
APPENDIX V: TRIAL TABLES FOR THE JUDGMENT TASK .......................................................... 214 
REFERENCES  ....................................................................................................................... 216 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The interaction between language and cognition ............................................................ 5 
Figure 2. Situation demonstrating the contrastive use of demonstratives ...................................... 7 
Figure 3. The domains of the appropriate uses of each demonstrative ......................................... 31 
Figure 4. The task setting used in Webb and Abrahamson (1976): Fig. 4a presents the Same 
Perspective condition while Fig. 4b presents the Different Perspective condition. ..... 36 
Figure 5. Task setting used in Clark & Sengul (1976): Fig. 5a illustrates the Speaker Beside 
condition while Fig. 5b illustrates the Speaker Opposite condition. ........................... 38 
Figure 6. The task setting used in Tanz (1980) ............................................................................. 44 
Figure 7.  Sample picture in referential communication task in Nilsen and Graham (2009). ...... 54 
Figure 8. Experimental setting in Act-out Task (E = experimenter; C = Child). ......................... 64 
Figure 9. Sample pictures in Judgment Task ................................................................................ 66 
Figure 10. Match conditions in the Judgment Task ...................................................................... 67 
Figure 11. Mismatch conditions in the Judgment Task ................................................................ 67 
Figure 12. Sample pictures in the Hiding Game ........................................................................... 69 
Figure 13. Sample trails in DCCS (switch from color to shape) .................................................. 70 
Figure 14. Sample trials in DCCS (switch from shape to color) .................................................. 71 
Figure 15. Right-branch structure (Li, 1998; Huang, Li, &Li, 2007; N. Zhang, 2012) .............. 115 
Figure 16. Left-branch structure (Hsieh, 2008a; Tang, 1990) .................................................... 115 
Figure 17. Tree structure of pronominal demonstrative phrase in Chinese ................................ 117 
Figure 18. Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context ............................................................................. 137 
Figure 19.  Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context .......................................................................... 138 
Figure 20. The experimental workspace for the Act-out Task ................................................... 146 
xi 
Figure 21. The visual stimuli in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context ..................................... 149 
Figure 22. The visual stimuli of the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context .................................. 150 
Figure 23. The visual stimuli of the Control Context ................................................................. 153 
Figure 24. The design of the Experimental Group in the Judgment Training Task ................... 156 
Figure 25. The design of the Control Group in the Judgment Training Task ............................. 156 
Figure 26. Sample visual contexts for Classifier Mismatch item in Experiment Condition ...... 184 
Figure 27. Sample visual context for Demonstrative Mismatch item in Experiment Condition 185 
Figure 28. Sample visual contexts for (a) Match and (b) Mismatch items in Demonstrative Only 
Condition.................................................................................................................... 186 
Figure 29. Sample visual contexts for (a) Match and (b) Mismatch items in Classifier Only 
Condition.................................................................................................................... 187 
 
xii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Percentages of the correct comprehension on this and that with different perspective 
setting ........................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 2. Percentages of the correct responses on this and that with different perspective setting 39 
Table 3. Percentages of the correct responses on this and that from de Villiers and de Villiers 
(1974). .......................................................................................................................... 40 
Table 4. The number of subjects who achieved adult-like performance ...................................... 45 
Table 5. The percentages of correct responses on this and that with English-speaking children 
(%(SD)) ........................................................................................................................ 73 
Table 6. The percentages of the correct responses in the Judgment Task by English-speaking 
children and adults (% (SD))........................................................................................ 74 
Table 7. English-speaking children’s percentages of correct responses in each condition in the 
Judgment Task by age groups (% (SD)) ...................................................................... 77 
Table 8. The ratio of English-speaking passers and failers in Theory of Mind task (numbers of 
children/total number of children) ............................................................................... 79 
Table 9. The ratio of English-speaking passers and failers in Executive Function task (numbers 
of children/total number of children) ........................................................................... 80 
Table 10. Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients with English-speaking children (rs (p)) ....... 81 
Table 11. Percentages of correct responses in Act-out Task by Chinese-speaking children and 
adults (%(SD)) ............................................................................................................. 86 
Table 12. Percentages of correct responses in Judgment Task by Chinese-speaking children and 
adults (%(SD)) ............................................................................................................. 88 
xiii 
Table 13. Percentages of correct responses in each condition from Chinese-speaking children 
with different age group (% (SD)) ............................................................................... 89 
Table 14. Percentages of Chinese-speaking passers and failers in Hiding Game (numbers of 
children/total number of children) ............................................................................... 91 
Table 15. The percentages of Chinese-speaking passers and failers in DCCS (numbers of 
children/total number of children) ............................................................................... 93 
Table 16. Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients with Chinese-speaking children (rs (p)) ...... 95 
Table 17. The ratio of passers and failers in Theory of Mind task (numbers of children/total 
number of children)...................................................................................................... 99 
Table 18. The ratio of passers and failers in Executive Function task (numbers of children/total 
number of children)...................................................................................................... 99 
Table 19. 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA ....................................................................................................... 101 
Table 20. Target objects that go with the selected specific classifiers ....................................... 143 
Table 21. The mean percentages of correct responses in Classifier Comprehension Task (% (SD))
.................................................................................................................................... 159 
Table 22. The mean percentages of correct responses in the Act-out Task (% (SD)) ................ 162 
Table 23. Descriptive results in the Judgment Training Task by adult controls......................... 163 
Table 24. Descriptive results in the Judgment Training Task by children ................................. 164 
Table 25. Results on the 2 by 3 Mixed ANOVA ........................................................................ 165 
Table 26. The ratio of passers and failers in Executive Function task (numbers of children/total 
number of children).................................................................................................... 168 
Table 27. Children’s individual response patterns in Judgment Training Task ......................... 172 
xiv 
Table 28. The mean percentage of correct responses of Mismatch items in Pre- and Post-training 
Blocks ........................................................................................................................ 179 
 
1 
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The current dissertation investigates factors that interact with children’s language 
comprehension. Young children often exhibit non-adult-like comprehension when computing the 
meanings of linguistic expressions. Two central goals in first language acquisition research are to 
understand why children’s comprehension of some linguistic expressions are non-adult-like and 
to understand what can help children exhibit an appropriate interpretation of those challenging 
linguistic expressions. I explore these two goals by investigating extra-linguistic cognitive 
factors, which might be the factor that hinders children’s adult-like knowledge, and factors 
internal to linguistic expressions, which might be the factors that rescue children’s non-adult-like 
comprehension, with a particular focus on children’s comprehension of demonstratives (e.g., this 
and that in English). Each factor will be discussed in depth.  
Two accounts have been proposed to interpret children’s non-adult-like comprehension. 
One claims that children difficulty is due to their lack of linguistic knowledge while the other 
one argues that children have the intact linguistic knowledge, but their adult-like comprehension 
is hindered by other factors such as their still-developing cognitive abilities. The current 
dissertation supports the first account. In particular, I would argue that children may need to have 
adult-like cognitive abilities to achieve adult-like comprehension, using their linguistic 
knowledge properly. As children are developing their language, their cognitive abilities are still 
under development as well. Therefore, children’s non-adult-like interpretations may be hindered 
by their still-developing cognitive abilities. In an effort to support the argument discussed above, 
the first goal of the dissertation is to examine the interaction between language and cognition.  
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The second goal of this dissertation is to explore whether there may be specific linguistic 
factors that could potentially rescue children from errors in comprehension. The representation 
of a particular linguistic expression often varies cross-linguistically. This raises a question 
regarding how children may use linguistic properties in representations that are specific to the 
language they are acquiring as their first language, and whether these language-specific 
characteristics may facilitate children’s comprehension or interact with children’s 
comprehension in a negative direction. Hence, investigating how children use language-specific 
characteristics in their language comprehension may shed light on the potential linguistic factors 
that boost or hinder children’s language comprehension, which may not be observed with 
children acquiring a language that doesn’t have this specific linguistic property. 
Taken together, the current dissertation assesses both cognitive factors (children’s non-
linguistic cognitive development) and linguistic factors (language-specific characteristics in 
representation of a linguistic expression) that may potentially impact children’s language 
comprehension. To achieve the two goals, I investigated children’s comprehension of 
demonstratives (e.g., this and that in English) as a testing case for the following reasons. First, 
the interpretation of a demonstrative is context dependent. Thus, successful comprehension of 
demonstratives requires not only the linguistic knowledge of the meaning of these words, but 
also the non-linguistic cognitive abilities to incorporate the necessary contextual information. 
Thus, investigating children’s demonstrative comprehension speaks to whether and to what 
extent children’s cognitive development may have an impact on their demonstrative 
comprehension. Second, the representation of demonstratives varies across languages. For 
example, in English the demonstrative this and that are monomorphemic words, while in 
Chinese the demonstratives are represented as a morphological complex , which contains the 
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words corresponding to this and that, and another set of morphemes called classifiers, 
morphemes that categorize the associated nouns based on the semantic domains the nouns denote.  
Because of this morphological complexity, I refer to Chinese demonstratives as demonstrative 
phrases throughout this dissertation. As Chinese demonstrative phrases (e.g., zhe-ge (this-CLgen 
‘this’) and na-ge (that-CLgen ‘that’)) contain an additional linguistic device, investigating the role 
of classifiers in Chinese demonstrative comprehension allows me to explore whether and to what 
extent the language-specific properties interact with children’s comprehension of demonstrative 
phrases. In what follows, I will discuss these two research issues in detail.  
 
1.1. The interaction between language and cognition 
The relationship between language development and cognitive development has been the 
subject of debate for decades, since Slobin (1973). Recently, research has started to focus on the 
relationship between children's language comprehension and cognitive development (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1986; Y. T. Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Mazuka, Jincho, & Oishi, 2009).  It has been 
suggested that children’s ability to utilize their linguistic knowledge may be related to their 
cognitive development. This recent discussion can refer back to the earlier works, such as 
Slobin’s (1973) framework, which proposed that the sequence of the acquisition of linguistic 
properties is constrained by children’s cognitive abilities. He first assumed that children have 
intact linguistic knowledge; however, due to the limitation of their cognitive abilities, their 
linguistic performances may still be non-adult-like. He argued that cognitive development is a 
“pacesetter” (p. 184) for language development and pointed out that there are three 
circumstances in which cognitive ability is prerequisite for language development. First, children 
mastering the semantics of the linguistic expressions interacts with their cognitive development. 
4 
Children need to develop the concept and understand it before they are able to express and 
comprehend the concept using linguistic expressions
1
. The second circumstance in which 
cognition is a prerequisite is when children produce or process the linguistic expressions. The 
third circumstance is about the memory storage of the linguistic rules. Both the second and the 
third circumstances are related to the capacity and processing rules which children, as well as 
adults, possess in order to process and produce languages; these could also be conceptualized as 
“operating principles” (Slobin, 1973, p.194) or some universal strategies children need to follow 
to develop their grammatical structures. In sum, children’s ability to express cognitive concepts 
requires appropriate cognitive abilities, and their ability to process linguistic expressions rapidly 
also requires adult-like cognitive resources. Therefore, the interaction between language and 
cognition is described as the following: “the child … scans linguistic input to discover meaning, 
guided by certain ideas about language, by general cognitive-perceptual strategies, and by 
processing limitations imposed by the constraints of operative memory” (Slobin, 1973, p.208). 
There are three possibilities regarding how language and cognitive may interact with each 
other (c.f. Gopnik and Meltzoff,  1986): (i) general cognitive development might be related to the 
development of particular language development (e.g., Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & 
Volterra, 1979); (ii) general language development might be related to the particular sets of 
cognitive abilities (e.g., McCune-Nicolich, 1981); (iii) particular language development might be 
related to a particular sets of cognitive abilities (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1984). Slobin’s 
framework of the interaction between language and cognition may belong to the third possibility, 
                                                 
1
 Note that Lust (2006) also suggests that children’s acquisition of semantics and pragmatics need to be 
discussed with their cognitive development. 
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in which a particular aspect of language such as semantics might be related to a particular set of 
cognitive abilities. The relationship between the two domains may resemble the following figure.  
 
Slobin stated that some cognitive ability is prerequisite for language comprehension. The 
argument is built on the basis of the assumption that children have the intact linguistic 
knowledge; however, children need to have the appropriate cognitive abilities to correctly utilize 
their knowledge when either producing linguistic expressions or comprehending the linguistic 
expressions.  
Recently, Mazuka et al. (2009) and Huang and Snedeker (2009) elaborated on Slobin’s 
proposal. Slobin proposed that (i) children need to grasp the concept before utilizing their 
linguistic knowledge, and (ii) children’s linguistic performance is constrained by their cognitive 
processing limits, with a particular focus on memory issues. Mazuka et al. (2009) and Huang and 
Snedeker (2009) focused on the cognitive processing limits that hinders children’s adult-like 
processing, but their view of cognitive abilities relevant to language processing is not necessarily 
limited to memory. They postulated that children’s still-developing cognitive abilities may 
interfere with their language processing. That is to say, the reason that children exhibit non-
adult-like language comprehension may be related to their still-developing cognitive ability, such 
as Executive Function that contains a set of cognitive abilities that controls a variety of 
processing capacities in addition to memory, to execute the processing procedure.  
Cognitive 
abilities Language 
comprehension 
Figure 1. The interaction between language and cognition 
6 
The first goal of the current dissertation is to investigate children’s language 
comprehension in relation to their cognitive abilities, examining a set of cognitive abilities that 
may interact with children’s language comprehension in a way that makes children’s 
comprehension non-adult-like. In particular, I examined whether children’s successful/non-
successful language comprehension would be related to their cognitive ability that allows them 
to (i) understand the concept underlying the linguistic expression, and (ii) execute the meaning 
computation procedure when comprehending some linguistic expression that requires the 
incorporation of extra-linguistic information. The current dissertation focuses on children’s 
demonstrative comprehension, which has been suggested as the domain in which children often 
exhibit non-adult-like interpretations (E. V. Clark & Amaral, 2010; E. V. Clark & Sengul, 1978; 
Tanz, 1980; Wales, 1984; Webb & Abrahamson, 1976).  
Let me first review the basic characteristics of demonstratives. Demonstratives are place 
deixis that pick out an individual from the speech context with respect to the aspect of space 
(Diessel, 2012; Fillmore, 1997). English demonstratives, for instance, have two-way distance 
distinctions. The proximate demonstrative this picks out an object near the speaker while the 
distal demonstrative that picks out an object distant from the speaker (E. V. Clark & Sengul, 
1978; Diessel, 1999; Lyons, 1975; Murasugi, 1986). Crucially, the speaker-object distance is 
determined by the speaker’s perspectives, which vary across contexts (E. V. Clark & Sengul, 
1978; Diessel, 1999, 2012; Lyons, 1977; Murasugi, 1986). The following dialogue exemplifies 
the contrastive use of demonstratives. Imagine a situation in which Speaker A and Speaker B are 
sitting apart from each other in a room, and a teddy bear is placed in front each of them (See 
Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Situation demonstrating the contrastive use of demonstratives 
 
Then, consider the following conversation as in (1) between Speaker A and Speaker B:  
 
(1) A: I don’t want this teddy bear anymore. Can I have that teddy bear? (Pointing at the 
teddy bear in front of B) 
B: (Pointing at the same teddy bear) This one? But you already have that one. (Pointing 
at the teddy bear in front of A) 
 
In (1), Speaker A uses this referring to the teddy bear in front of him, while he uses that referring 
to the teddy bear apart from him. Therefore, in order to successfully comprehend Speaker A’s 
utterances, not only must Speaker B know that this is a proximate demonstrative and that is a 
distal demonstrative, but he must also know that the proximal-distal contrast that is created here 
is based on the perspective of Speaker A, the speaker of the utterance. If Speaker B fails to 
incorporate Speaker A’s orientation, he may associate this with the object near himself and 
associate that with the object distant from himself, which does not match what Speaker A means 
to express. Indeed, the proximal-distal contrast based on Speaker B’s perspective will associate 
this and that in a reversed way, as reflected in Speaker B’s utterance. In Speaker B’s utterance, 
the teddy bear in front of Speaker A is referred to as that teddy bear which was referred to as this 
teddy bear in Speaker A’s utterance, while the teddy bear in front of Speaker B is referred to as 
Speaker A Speaker B 
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this teddy bear which was referred to as that teddy bear in Speaker A’s utterance. As illustrated 
in this example, to appropriately interpret demonstratives, children not only need to understand 
the distance contrast between this and that, but also need to incorporate the speaker’s perspective 
to calculate the distance of the object.      
The discussion above is limited to the scope of the two-way distance distinction of a 
demonstrative system in English.  Some other languages have three-way (e.g., Turkish;  Özyürek, 
1998) or even four-way distinction (e.g., Quileute; Diessel, 1999), and the distinction between 
the demonstratives is not always restricted to distance contrast (e.g., visibility, uphill/downhill, 
etc; Diessel, 1999; 2012). For instance, Turkish has three demonstratives: bu, o, and şu, in which 
bu is a proximal demonstrative and o is a distal demonstrative, but şu is neutral to distance yet 
requires the speaker to examine whether the listener’s visual attention is fixated on the referents, 
as the use of şu needs to be under the circumstances in which the listener’s attention is not 
allocated to the intended referent (Küntay & Özyürek, 2002, 2006). The additional feature of the 
third demonstrative şu may be challenging for children, as it did not encode distance; rather it 
requires the speaker to incorporate the listener’s perspective. Indeed, Küntay & Özyürek (2002, 
2006) have shown that even for 6-year-old Turkish-speaking children, their production of the 
third demonstrative şu is not like adults, whereas their production of the other two 
demonstratives is on par with adults’. This indicates that while children are able to use the two 
demonstratives bu and o, which encode a distance distinction, they did not seem to associate the 
absence of the visual attention on the referents with the production of the third demonstrative şu.  
Although the third demonstrative şu seems to create extra difficulty in acquiring a three-
way demonstrative system in Turkish, I argue that children’s non-adult-like use of su may be 
accounted for by the same hypothesis that attributes it to their development of the ability to 
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correctly infer others’ mental statues, including perspective and attention allocation. The 
challenges both come from the incorporation of the interlocutor’s perspective, which is different 
from children’s own. Importantly, demonstratives are place deixis in which the center of the 
referent point is located at the speaker’s orientation. Therefore, the speaker’s perspective is 
crucial to correctly comprehend demonstratives (Diessel, 2014), regardless of the semantic 
feature the demonstratives encodes in the languages. Thus, children acquiring two-way or three-
way demonstrative systems may share the same difficulty incorporating the speaker’s 
perspective. 
Taken together, to better understand children’s acquisition of demonstratives, this 
dissertation particularly focuses on children’s comprehension of demonstratives, examining 
whether children’s comprehension of demonstratives uttered by a speaker who has a different 
perspective from the children’s own would be related to their cognitive development. Children’s 
successful comprehension of the demonstratives requires the ability to establish the speaker’s 
perspective appropriately, which may suggest an adult-like cognitive ability would play a role in 
children’s demonstrative comprehension. Results of this study may advance the understanding of 
why children show difficulties in interpreting demonstratives and may reveal the source of the 
potential difficulty.   
 
1.2. The interaction between language acquisition and language-specific properties 
The second goal of this dissertation is to investigate how the language-specific 
characteristics may interact with children’s language comprehension. To achieve this goal, 
demonstratives also provide an ideal ground to consider the language-internal factor that may 
interact with children’s language comprehension. The premise is that demonstratives are 
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represented differently across languages (Diessel, 1999). Consider English demonstratives in (2a) 
and their translation in Mandarin Chinese in (2b), to start out: 
 
(2) a.  This cat. 
b. zhe  zhi     mao. 
  this  CLanimal  cat 
  ‘This cat.’ 
 
As illustrated in (2), demonstratives in English are represented by a single morpheme, whereas 
demonstratives in Chinese, such as zhe and na, typically are accompanied with an additional 
morpheme, classifier (C. T. J. Huang, Li, & Li, 2009), constituting a morphological complex that 
works on par with English mono-morphemic demonstrative as a whole phrase. I will refer to the 
words zhe and na as demonstratives and the morphologically complex expression of 
demonstratives in Chinese shown in (2) as demonstrative phrase throughout this dissertation. 
The Chinese demonstrative phrase is an interesting testing case because of its 
characteristics shown in (2b). First of all, the classifier in the demonstrative phrase is obligatory 
in most of the contexts (C. T. J. Huang et al., 2009; Tang, 2007; N. N. Zhang, 2012). Second, 
and most importantly, the classifier needs to agree with the semantic category of the denotation 
of the following noun. Consider the example (3).  
 
(3)  zhe/na   zhi    mao/* waitao 
 this/that  CLanimal  cat/*jacket 
 ‘This/that cat.’ 
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-Zhi is the classifier that classifies ‘animals’; the noun that the classifier –zhi is associated with 
requires an animal as its denotation. As shown in (3), the demonstrative phrase with -zhi can 
properly accommodate the noun mao (‘cat’) that denotes a kind of animals, but not the noun 
waitao (‘jacket’) that denotes a kind of outfit, because the denotation of this noun is not 
semantically compatible with the semantic property of the classifier -zhi.   
Such a semantic characteristic of classifiers may thus interact with the comprehension of 
demonstrative phrases in Chinese. There are two possibilities of how language-specific 
properties, such as the semantics of classifiers, may interact with children’s comprehension. One 
possibility is that the language-specific properties may facilitate children’s language 
comprehension, whereas the other is that the language-specific properties may hinder children’s 
successful language comprehension. Before explaining each possibility in more detail, it is 
worthwhile to note that Chinese-speaking children as young as three and four are known to 
acquire some basic classifiers. Many studies have shown that children have the knowledge of 
semantic dependency between a classifier and its associated noun  (Chien, Lust, & Chiang, 2003; 
Erbaugh, 1986; Gong, 2010; Hu, 1993; H. Liu, 2008; I. Y. Tsai, 2008). Additionally, 
psycholinguistic studies on adults have revealed that classifiers are useful anticipatory cues for 
the semantic category of the upcoming nouns during sentence processing (C.-c. N. Hsu, 2006; 
Wu, Kaiser, & Andersen, 2009; Wu, Luo, & Zhou, 2014), indicating that classifiers may be a cue 
that facilitate sentence comprehension. Keeping this line of research in mind, let me now turn to 
each of the possibilities for the role the classifiers may play in demonstrative comprehension. On 
one hand, given that children acquire some of the basic classifiers, children may be very likely to 
take advantage of the classifier in the Chinese demonstrative phrase to successfully comprehend 
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demonstrative phrases even when the demonstrative phrases are uttered by a speaker with a 
different perspective. On the other hand, as classifier semantics is suggested to be available to 
children during language processing, the extra information provided by the classifier may require 
extra processing resources when comprehending demonstrative phrases in Chinese. 
Consequently, the extra processing burden of classifiers in demonstrative phrases may 
potentially negatively affect children’s demonstrative comprehension. In the current dissertation, 
I predict that when comprehending demonstrative phrases in Chinese, children may use classifier 
semantics to help them identify the correct referent for demonstratives. 
On the basis of the discussion above, the second goal of the current dissertation is to 
explore the role of the classifier in Chinese demonstrative comprehension to shed light on 
whether and how the language-specific property may interact with children’s language 
comprehension. Particularly, if children already have the intact knowledge of those language-
specific properties, the dissertation seeks to determine whether children can take advantage of 
those properties to boost their language comprehension. 
 
1.3. The organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the nature of demonstratives 
by reviewing theoretical literature. Chapter 3 presents the studies examining the first goal of the 
current dissertation. I will first review the acquisition studies on demonstrative comprehension 
and then discuss studies the relationship between language and cognition. Following the 
literature review, I will present two experiments that examined the relationship between 
children’s demonstrative comprehension and their cognitive abilities. Chapter 4 presents the 
study examining the second goal of the dissertation. In this chapter, I will first review the 
13 
structure of demonstrative phrases in Chinese and then provide a detailed discussion on 
classifiers. I will also review studies showing children’s acquisition of the semantics of 
classifiers. Following the review, I will report one experiment examining the role of classifier 
semantics in Chinese-speaking children’s demonstrative comprehension. Last, Chapter 5 
summarizes the experimental results reported in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and provides a broader 
discussion on how the results could shed light on the cognitive factors and linguistic factors that 
interact with language comprehension.  
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Chapter 2. THE NATURE OF DEMONSTRATIVES  
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical background on demonstratives, and 
from these discussions to determine which characteristics of demonstratives children need to 
know in order to interpret demonstratives appropriately. The first section of this chapter 
concentrates on the characteristics of deixis. Demonstratives are place deixis that specify the 
location of an entity in the context of use. Thus, to better illustrate the characteristics of 
demonstratives, I will start with the definition of deixis and introduce issues semanticists deal 
with to present the meaning of deixis. The second section of this chapter will turn to the semantic 
and pragmatic analysis of demonstratives. I will show that in terms of semantic features, the 
distance distinction in demonstratives, such as the near and far distinction, is the most frequently 
used in world languages. For instance, one demonstrative picks out an entity near the speaker 
while the other picks out the entity apart from the speaker. With respect to pragmatic uses, I will 
focus on the discussion of the deictic uses. In the final section of this chapter, I will summarize 
the discussion points and present two components children need to know to successfully 
comprehend demonstratives. The studies in the current dissertation will examine children’s 
ability to use those two components that interact with (i) their cognitive ability and (ii) their use 
of the language-specific linguistic properties.  
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2.1. Deixis 
2.1.1. The definition of deixis 
The term deixis
2
 refers to the context-dependent linguistic expressions that are situated, 
or ‘anchored’ in Fillmore’s term, in the location and time of the speech (Fillmore, 1997; Rauh, 
1983). Deixis picks out the referents within the domain (e.g., the location of the speech) in which 
it is uttered. Therefore, deixis is also called ‘indexical’ as it serves as a ‘pointing’ function 
linguistically. Some examples of deixis are listed in (4).  
 
(4) a. personal pronouns such as I, he, and she 
b. demonstratives such as this and that 
c. adverbial place deixis such as here and there  
 
As stated by Lyons (1977): 
 
“By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes 
and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context 
created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a 
single speaker and at least one addressee”  (Lyons, 1977, p. 637). 
 
Deixis serves as an ‘index’ to the referent, in which the referent could be identified or located 
within the ‘here-and-now’ spatiotemporal frame, where the speaker and his/her interlocutor are 
located at the moment of the utterance is being delivered.  
                                                 
2
 The terms deixis and deictic expressions are used interchangeably in the dissertation.  
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The speaker’s location at the time of utterance plays a crucial role for the appropriate 
interpretation of deictic expressions. Typically, the deictic expressions are used to relate to things 
from the speaker’s point of view. In a conceptual spatiotemporal coordinate system, the 
speaker’s orientation is at the center of the system (Diessel, 2014; Lyons, 1977), or deictic center 
(Diessel, 1999, 2012). Therefore, in a canonical deictic context, the identification of the referent 
is determined in relation to the speaker’s location at the time of utterance. Since the speaker is 
the center of the reference point, the referent does not remain constant across all uses. This 
aspect of deixis is also known as shift of reference (E. V. Clark, 1978). In language 
communication, the role of the speaker shifts from one participant to another as the conversation 
proceeds. Since typically the speaker is the reference point, the reference point needs to be 
reestablished when the speaker’s role shifts. In such a case, if different speakers used the same 
deictic expression I, the referent each expression picks out may be different. For instance, if 
Speaker A said ‘I like ice cream’ and Speaker B said the same sentence, ‘I like ice cream’, ‘I’ 
uttered by Speaker A picks out Speaker A as the referent whereas the ‘I’ uttered by Speaker B 
refers to Speaker B rather than Speaker A. Therefore, from the listener’s perspective, s/he needs 
to reconstruct the speaker’s perspective as the uses of these expressions are dependent on the 
situation of the speaker in terms of where and what time they delivered the utterance (Rauh, 
1983). It is also worthwhile to note that the deixis in the embedded clause also needs to refer 
back to the speech context. For instance, if a speaker uttered ‘John said I like ice cream’, the ‘I’ 
in the embedded clause refers to the speaker of this sentence instead of the subject in the matrix 
clause, which here is John. This example once again shows the importance of indexicals to find 
the referent in the speech context.    
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In addition, like the pointing gesture, deixis not only serves as the ‘indexical function’ 
that is used to point to objects, persons, events, and activities within the specific location and 
time (Rauh, 1983), but also serves to direct the interlocutor’s attention (Diessel, 2014; Kaplan, 
1989; Lyons, 1977). Since deixis draws listeners’ attention to the intended referents, deixis also 
establishes the joint attention between the speaker and the listener. Thus, an appropriate 
interpretation of deixis requires the establishment of a shared perspective toward the intended 
referents. In other words, as an index that attempts to direct listener’s attention, the appropriate 
interpretation of deixis requires the listener to establish a shared representation of the 
spatiotemporal system with the speaker.  
To summarize, the use of deixis is situated to the location of speaker at the time of the 
speech; crucially, the speaker’s perspective determines the reference point. This shows that the 
use of deixis is context dependent; in other words, deixis could not be interpreted without 
considering the context. Therefore, in order to understand the speaker’s ‘intention’ to the referent, 
the listener needs to establish shared view of the spatiotemporal system and reconstruct the 
message based on the speaker’s perspective.  
 
2.1.2. The meaning representation of deixis 
As discussed above, deixis is a context-dependent expression that serves as an index to 
the person, location or time within the situation the speaker is situated. Thus, unlike proper 
names, the referent of deixis is not constant; rather, it is anchored to the context to pick out a 
concrete referent. However, the incorporation of contextual information to represent the meaning 
of deixis has long been a challenging issue in semantics. The traditional analysis suggests that 
deixis is an incomplete expression which presents as a free variable that picks out the individual 
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each time (cf. Burge, 1974). With this analysis, it may be possible to take the context into 
account as deixis will point to different individual depending on the context. However, the 
analysis cannot distinguish between the two sentences below, as discussed in Kaplan (1977, 
1989) and Burge (1974). In particular, the truth value of these two sentences may not be equal.   
 
(5) I am here now. 
(6) Joleen is in Lawrence on December 4, 2014. 
 
Between (5) and (6), sentence (5) is true in all situations. The speaker who utters sentence (5) 
will be in all circumstances at the place of the time of utterance. Suppose I am the speaker who 
uttered (5), then sentence (5) can be rephrased as in (6) by replacing the deixis ‘I’, ‘here’ and 
‘now’ with ‘Joleen’, ‘Lawrence’, and ‘December 4, 2014’. However, (5) does not have the same 
meaning as (6). Although (6) describes the situation at this very moment, the truth value of (5) 
and (6) may not be equal. As (5) is always true in any circumstances, rephrasing (5) as in (6) 
may not remain true all the time as one of the propositions of (6) may be easily falsified if it does 
not exist. As pointed out by Levinson (2004), the problem of deixis is that sentences containing 
deixis does not have proposition because proposition is the meaning a sentence that does not 
change over the context.  
Kaplan (1977, 1989) attempts to address this issue. He proposed two different concepts to 
represent meanings, namely ‘content’ and ‘character’. ‘Content’ refers to the proposition of the 
sentence dependent on the context. ‘Character’ refers to the basic properties of the sentence that 
does not change over the context; to put it differently, the definition of ‘character’ is the semantic 
rules or functions that guide the identification of the referent in all contexts. He argues that 
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‘content’ and ‘character’ are better representations of meaning in dealing with the traditional 
definition of sense and denotation. The classic example for sense and denotation is the ‘morning 
star’ and ‘evening star.’ These two expressions have different sense in that one might think that 
the morning star is the star that rises in the morning, while the evening start is the star that rises 
in the evening; however, they have the same denotation, in that they both refer to the planet 
Venus. However, when applying sense and denotation to indexicals, the issue illustrated in (5) 
and (6) emerges. Consider (5) again. The denotation of ‘I’ is ‘Joleen’, me as the speaker. 
However, ‘I’ could have a different denotation in different contexts, which creates problems with 
the sense of ‘I’, because the sense in this case could not determine its referent. The ‘content’ and 
‘character’ then can accommodate this issue, in which ‘content’ replaces ‘sense’ while ‘character’ 
replaces ‘denotation’. The character is a function or semantic rule that applies to the context to 
get the content of the sentence. For instance, the ‘character’ for the personal pronoun ‘I’ is the 
speaker; that is, the personal pronoun always picks out whoever is speaking as the referent. Then, 
as a function, when fitting in the context (for instance, the context of the utterance (5) above), the 
function would return the content, or the referent of ‘I’, which is ‘Joleen’. But as the speaker may 
change across situations, the ‘content’ would be different depending on the different situation. 
That is, ‘I’ may pick out different individuals in different situations. As demonstrated in this 
example, the character thus accommodates the phenomenon in which the deixis picks out 
different referents in different contexts. In other words, the character and the content incorporate 
the context appropriately when representing the meaning of deixis.   
Although this account was later criticized thoroughly (see review in Starr, 2010), this is 
one example showing that what the semanticists and philosophers are trying to capture is the 
context-dependent meaning of deixis. The current study does not attempt to address this 
20 
theoretical challenge. The crucial argument within this analysis is that the semantics of deixis is 
largely depends on the speech situation or the context. 
 
2.1.3. The categories of deixis 
Fillmore (1997) identified five types of deixis, including person deixis (e.g., personal 
pronouns such as I, you, and s/he), place deixis (e.g., adverbial place deixis such as here, there, 
and demonstratives such as this, that), time deixis that express the time of delivering utterance 
and/or time of receiving the utterance (e.g., today, tomorrow), discourse deixis that picks out 
individuals within prior/subsequent linguistic context (e.g., deixis that is used anaphorically), and 
social deixis that encodes the social relationships. Among the five types of deixis, the current 
study particularly focuses on place deixis. In English, as well as Chinese, there are two kinds of 
place deixis. One is the adverbial place deixis such as here and there in English or zhe-li (this-
inside) and na-li (that-inside) in Chinese. The adverbial place deixis points to the place, or the 
location. The other one is demonstratives such as this and that in English or zhe-ge (this-CLgen) 
and na-ge (that-CLgen) in Chinese. Demonstratives are slightly different from adverbial place 
deixis in that demonstratives point to the object located in the location rather than the place itself. 
Therefore, H. H. Clark (1973) suggested that each demonstrative could be further rephrased as 
‘the object here’ and ‘the object there.’ Between the two kinds of place deixis, demonstratives 
are the particular interest in the current study.  
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2.2. Semantic-pragmatic analysis on demonstratives 
2.2.1. Semantic distinctions of demonstratives 
Demonstratives as place deixis have two crucial features. First, as discussed above, for all 
deictic expressions including demonstratives, the uses of demonstratives are situated to the here-
and-now context with the speaker’s location of the utterance at the time as the deictic center. The 
second important feature of demonstratives as place deixis is that they encode space information. 
Diessel (1999) conducted a typological analysis regarding how space information is encoded in 
world languages. He categorized the semantic distinctions of demonstratives into four categories, 
(i) distance, (ii) visibility, (iii) elevation (e.g., up/down), (iv) geographical (e.g., uphill/downhill, 
upriver/downriver), and (v) movement (e.g., toward). Among these distinctions, distance 
distinction is most frequently used in world languages and is suggested to be acquired earliest 
(Diessel, 2006). Typically, the distance distinction has a two-way distinction, which is proximal 
and distal. Some languages, such as Spanish and Japanese, have three-way distinction, and some 
have even more ways (e.g., four-way distinction in Quileute, Diessel, 1999). The current 
dissertation focused on languages that have two-way distinction, such as English and Chinese.  
English has two demonstratives: this and that. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
Online, this is defined as a thing or a person that is nearby or nearer than other things in the 
space and time or even in thoughts whereas that is defined as “properly denoting the more distant 
of two things, but often vaguely indicating one thing as distinguished from another.” This 
indicates that although that is a distal demonstrative, it may also vaguely refer to objects in the 
context. I will come back to this point when discussing the meaning representation of 
demonstratives in the next section. Like English, Chinese also has two demonstratives, a 
proximal demonstrative and a distal demonstrative. In the Chinese WordNet online dictionary 
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(C.-R. Huang & Hsieh, 2009-2010), zhe-ge is defined as a subject that is relatively closer to the 
speaker while na-ge is defined as a subject that is relatively distant from the speaker. It is also 
worthwhile to note that like the English that, na-ge in Chinese could also pick out any entity 
within the contexts. In sum, based on the definitions discussed above, both English and Chinese 
have two demonstratives and these two languages implement the two-way distance distinction. 
Thus, the two demonstratives are distinguished from each other based on the distance of the 
entity to the speaker. One demonstrative is proximal and the other is distal, but the distal 
demonstrative is also argued to vaguely indicate an entity in the physical context.   
In what follows, I will review the theoretical analysis of demonstratives regarding how the 
meaning of demonstratives is represented. Since the theoretical analyses were mainly conducted 
on English, I will provide the analysis of English only.  As Chinese, like English, also has two-
way distinction in demonstratives, I assume that the theoretical aspects of Chinese 
demonstratives are the same as English.  
 
2.2.2. Theoretical analysis 
As mentioned previously, the meaning representation of deixis requires the incorporation 
of the context regarding the speaker’s location of the time of speech event. As spatial deixis, 
demonstratives also require the incorporation of the speaker’s orientation to represent its 
meaning, and particularly for demonstratives, the meaning representation requires the 
incorporation of the distance information in order to tease apart the two demonstrative words. 
Lyons (1975) represents the meaning of demonstratives by means of the semantic features. Five 
features were identified, including [+D], [±entity], [±person], [±proximate], and [±distal]. [+D] 
stands for deictic, which aims to represent the context information; in this case, the context is the 
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physical context that at the speaker’s orientation point. Both [±entity] and [±person] are used to 
describe the particular category of deixis. The distance distinction is represented by [±proximate] 
and [±distal]. Using these features, Lyons represented the meaning of this and that as in (7).  
 
(7) this [+D, +entity, −person, +proximate] 
that [+D, +entity, −person, −proximate, +distal]  
 
The meaning representation as shown in (7) captures the meaning of this as a deictic expression 
that picks out an entity that is nearby, whereas the meaning of that is a deictic expression that 
picks out an entity that is not nearby, but instead some distance away. The main distinction 
between this and that is in the proximity contrast, that is, whether the entity is proximate or not. 
In other words, the difference between this and that is proximal and non-proximal rather than 
proximal and distal or distal and non-distal. The reason Lyons used proximity contrast is because 
the non-proximal term also implies a distance with respect to the speaker, while keeping the 
distal contrast to distinguish between the two different meanings of that. Recall that according to 
the Oxford Dictionary, that denotes an entity apart from the speaker but may also vaguely 
indicate an entity’s presence in the context. Lyons argues that there are indeed two different 
meanings for that, which provides an account for the dictionary meaning defined in the 
aforementioned Oxford Dictionary. Among the two meanings that represents, one is referred to 
as strong, which is argued to contrast with the meaning of this, and the other is referred to as 
weak, which points to entities vaguely without making a distance contrast with this. The strength 
of the term is labelled with subscript. That1 is the weak term and that2 is the strong term. The 
meaning representation of each that is shown in (8).  
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(8) Weak term: that1[+D, +entity, −person, −proximate, −distal] 
Strong term: that2 [+D, +entity, −person, −proximate, +distal] 
 
As presented in (8), the strong term that2 contrasts with this, in which the meaning representation 
is the same as in (7). Recall that the main difference between this and that2 is the proximate 
feature. While this has [+proximate] feature, that2 has [−proximate] feature. The additional 
feature [±distal] is used to distinguish between the two different meanings of that. As presented 
in (8), while the strong that2 has [+distal], the weak that1 has [−distal]. The combination of the 
two features [−proximate] and [−distal] to represent the weak that1 illustrates that the use of 
weak that1 only serves as a deixis which picks out an entity in the physical context without 
indicating the distance of the entity relative to the speaker. In other words, the weak that1 does 
not imply a contrast with this.  
In addition to Lyons’ (1975) analysis, Webb and Abrahamson (1976) also provided their 
own semantic analysis of demonstratives based on adults’ use and children’s developmental 
trajectory on demonstratives. They identified three features, [+Demonstrative], [±Far], and 
[+Speaker = Reference Point]. [+Demonstrative] refers to the lexical entry for the two 
demonstrative words that includes the definiteness of the lexical items. In other words, the 
feature [+Demonstrative] functions similarly to the [+D] feature in Lyons’ term, in which 
[+Demonstrative] indicates that this and that pick out an entity in the context. The feature [±Far] 
captures the proximity distinction. [-Far] is assigned to this and [+Far] is assigned to that. Webb 
and Abrahamson (1976) stated that is unmarked because the use of that can apply to a wider 
range of distance domain regardless of the distance relative to the speaker; in contrast, the use of 
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this must go with the object near the speaker. On the basis of this reasoning, Webb and 
Abrahamson argued to use [±Far], instead of [±Proximate], based on the markedness of the two 
demonstratives. This analysis is in line with the definition of that from the Oxford Dictionary 
and Lyons’ analysis. It is thus clear that the meaning representation of that may be more 
complex than the meaning representation of this. The last feature [+Speaker = Reference Point] 
captures the deictic uses of demonstratives. This feature refers to the idea that the speaker is the 
deictic center to evaluate the distance to the object. Using the three features, Webb and 
Abrahamson (1976) represented the meaning of this and that as in (9) 
 
(9) this  [+Demonstrative, -Far, +Speaker = Reference Point] 
that [+Demonstrative, +Far, +Speaker = Reference Point] 
 
As in Lyons (1975), (9) demonstrates that the difference between the two demonstratives is the 
proximity or distance contrast, in which Webb and Abrahamson used [±Far] feature here while 
Lyons used [±proximate]. Although the feature used is different, the idea that this is a proximal 
demonstrative while that is a distal demonstrative is the same; however, that could also be used 
to pick out entities in the context without considering the speaker-object distance.  
Both Lyons (1975) and Webb and Abrahamson (1976) used semantic features to 
represent the meanings of English demonstratives. As discussed above, the meaning 
representation for this is straightforward as it is a proximal demonstrative that only picks out 
entities near the speaker. However, the meaning representation for that is more complex because 
it is ambiguous (Lyons, 1975), in that it has two different meanings, and because it is unmarked 
(Webb & Abrahamson, 1976), which implies that could have a wider range of uses. Both 
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analyses point to a less straightforward interpretation of that, which is also suggested by 
Levinson (2004). This led the current research to focus on the comprehension of this, the 
proximal demonstrative.  
In the next section, I will review the pragmatic uses of demonstratives in both English 
and Chinese.    
 
2.2.3. Pragmatic analysis: the use of demonstratives 
The pragmatic uses of demonstratives can be divided into two categories: deictic and 
non-deictic. The deictic uses refer to the situation in which demonstratives pick out referents 
within the context whereas the non-deictic uses refer to other situations which include the uses of 
anaphoric, empathetic, and recognitional demonstratives (Levinson, 2004). Anaphoric 
demonstratives are used to refer to an antecedent in the prior text whereas empathetic and 
recognitional demonstratives both refer to elements outside the discourse (see detailed review in 
Levinson, 2004). The central issue in the current study is the deictic demonstratives, rather than 
the non-deictic demonstratives. The following discussions will be limited to the deictic uses of 
demonstratives.  
Levinson (2004) proposed two categories regarding the deictic uses of English 
demonstratives, namely exophoric and discourse deictic. The exophoric uses are tied to the uses 
in which the entity referred to is located within the speech context, which is the type of use that 
has been under discussion in the previous sections in this chapter. An example for exophoric use 
of demonstrative is shown in (10).  
 
(10) Give me that book. (book available in the physical context)(Levinson, 2004, p. 108) 
27 
 
The context in which (10) would be exophoric requires the referent ‘book’ to be located in the 
speech context, the situation in which the speaker was physically present and uttered this 
sentence. The exophoric demonstrative is hence situated in the here-and-now context referring to 
an object available in the physical context. Some other exophoric uses of demonstratives may 
require gestures such as pointing.  
 
(11) I hurt this finger. (Levinson, 2004, p. 108) 
 
For instance, (11) required the gestural demonstration of which finger the speaker is referring to. 
As the pointing gesture is required, this type of exophoric use also requires the referent to be 
located in the physical context. Considering the contexts where (10) and (11) are used, I can 
conclude that the basic context for exophoric demonstratives is that the object mentioned must be 
within the speech context.  
With respect to the discourse deictic uses, demonstratives within this category are used to 
refer to objects within the verbal discourse
3
; in other words, the referent is inside the text.  
Importantly, the referent is not a specific entity but rather it is the proposition expressed in the 
prior text. Let me take (12) as an example.  
                                                 
3
 Note that discourse deictic is very similar to the anaphoric demonstrative in that both of them locate its 
referent within the verbal discourse. The distinction between anaphoric demonstratives and discourse deictic 
demonstratives is that while anaphoric demonstratives referred to a noun phrase in the prior discourse, discourse 
deictic referred to a proposition. This is illustrated in the following quotation from Diessel (1999), “anaphoric 
demonstratives … keep track of discourse participants. Discourse deictic demonstratives … link the clause in which 
they are embedded to the proposition to which they refer (Diessel, 1999, p.93).” 
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(12) ‘You are wrong’. That’s exactly what she said. (Levinson, 2004, p. 108) 
 
In (12), that referred to the whole sentence ‘You are wrong’. As demonstrated in the example, 
the discourse deictic demonstrative finds its referent, which is a proposition of the prior text, 
within the discourse.  
Unlike Levinson (2004), Diessel (1999) proposed a slightly different categorization of the 
use of demonstratives, targeted at world languages. Instead of deictic and non-deictic at the 
highest categorization branch, he proposed exophoric and endophoric, and categorized all uses 
except exophoric uses into the endophoric uses, which include discourse deictic and other non-
deictic uses discussed above. Deissel’s argument for distinguishing exophoric uses from the 
others, including the discourse deictic demonstratives, is that the exophoric uses are the most 
basic uses of demonstratives from a typological perspective (Deissel, 2014). The current 
dissertation does not attempt to contribute to the categorization model. The focus under 
discussion is that both frameworks identify the exophoric uses and Deissel (2014) even 
suggested that the exophoric uses are the basic uses of demonstratives among all the world 
languages.  
The above discussions on the pragmatic uses of demonstratives mainly focus on English 
demonstratives (Levinson, 2004) and demonstratives in languages other than Mandarin Chinese 
(Deissel, 1999). Regarding the demonstrative uses in Mandarin Chinese, S. Huang (1999) also 
identified the same categories as in Levinson (2004) and Deissel (1999), but added Chinese-
specific non-deictic uses. Huang proposed eight uses of demonstratives in Mandarin Chinese: 
situational, endophoric (anaphoric, cataphoric), unavailable use, identifying, referent-introducing, 
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discourse marking, connective use, and pause marking. Among the eight uses, the situational use 
corresponds to the deictic use discussed above.    
(1) -9 1. : 
(13) zhe  shi zhongguang  liuxing  wang               (Huang, 1999, p.79) 
 this  is   Proper Noun  fashion  world 
  
 ni   suo shouting  de   jiemu    shi …  xingheyeyu 
 you  suo receive   DE  program  is  …  starlit  chat 
 
“This is Zhongguang's fashion world network. You're tuning to Starlit Chat. ” 
 
In (13), zhe (‘this’) referred to the radio station in which the speaker was at the time of speech. 
As shown in the following context, it is clear that the sentence is spoken by the host of the 
Startlit Chat program on the radio; thus, the speaker was at the radio station as he/she uttered the 
sentences. Based on the context, the demonstrative zhe is used to refer to the radio station where 
the speaker’s orientation was. From the example, Huang claims that the situational use is 
identified by whether the referent is located at the time of speech in the physical context. Recall 
that Levinson (2004) defines the exophoric demonstratives as the uses that locate the referents 
within the speaker’s spatialtemporal orientation, which is exactly the same as Huang’s situational 
use. As the definition of situational use in Huang is the same as the exophoric uses, the 
situational use identified by Huang could also be categorized as the exophoric use in Chinese, 
which will be the focus of the current study. 
In sum, both English and Chinese demonstratives have exophoric uses, which are 
suggested to be the most basic deictic use from a typological survey conducted by Diessel (1999). 
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The current study aims to test whether children are able to comprehend the exophoric 
demonstratives appropriately. In the next section, the discussions on what children need to know 
about demonstratives will be presented.  
 
2.3. What children need to know about demonstratives 
Taking all the above discussions together, demonstratives, as one of the place deixis, pick 
out entities in the speaker’s location at the time of utterance; this particular deictic use is called 
the exophoric use (Levinson, 2004; Diessel, 1999). The current study focuses on the exophoric 
use of demonstratives, particularly the use that does not require gestural to identify the correct 
referent.  
Like other deixis, the reference point of demonstratives is usually the speaker’s location. 
That is, the speaker is the deictic center to relate the referents in the context (Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 
1983; E. Clark, 1976). The speaker’s orientation, or the speaker’s perspective, is the center that 
determines the referents. Thus, as language learners, children need to be able to establish a 
shared perspective, or shared spatial representation of the situation, in order to interpret 
exophoric demonstratives appropriately.  
In addition, demonstratives also encode different semantic distinctions (Diessel, 1999). 
For the two languages the current study focused on, English and Chinese, demonstratives encode 
distance distinction (H. H. Clark, 1973; C. T. J. Huang et al., 2009; Lyons, 1975; Webb & 
Abrahamson, 1976). Lyons (1975) used both [±Proximate] and [±Distal] features to represent the 
meaning of this and that. When the two demonstratives are used contrastively, this carries the 
feature [+Proximate] while that has [-Proximate, +Distal]. This allows this to pick out the object 
near the speaker and that to pick out an object that is not near the speaker in a contrastive context 
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such as ‘I want this bear not that bear.’ Note that one may argue that could also be used to pick 
out an object near the speaker; that is, the use of that could be neutral to the distance. This 
neutral use of that is not ruled out from Lyons’ analyses as Lyons suggested that there are two 
different meanings of that. In fact, all the analysis shown above suggest that the demonstrative 
‘that’ could be either (i) used as a neutral term to serve as an indexical without pointing out the 
distance relative to the speaker or (ii) used to specify an object that is distant from the speaker, 
which is also listed entry for that in the Oxford Dictionary. This particular aspect allowed the 
demonstrative ‘that’ to be used in a wider distance domain as compared with ‘this’. The domains 
of the appropriate uses of each demonstrative are illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the appropriate domain to use this is more restricted than the appropriate 
domain to use that. This only picks out entities that are in the ‘close’, or proximate, domain 
whereas that can pick out entities that fall into both ‘close’ and ‘far’ domains; in other words, 
that can refer to any entity within the context. Given that this and that has different levels of 
restriction in the appropriate uses, Levinson (2004) suggested that the interpretation of that is 
less straightforward than this because the domain that that could use may overlap with this. Due 
to the vagueness of the use of that, the present study primarily focused on the comprehension of 
the proximal demonstrative this.  
 
Speaker that this 
close far 
Figure 3. The domains of the appropriate uses of each demonstrative 
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In order to interpret demonstratives successfully, the listener needs to evaluate the 
distance of the object relative to the speaker’s location. In other words, the listener needs to 
reconstruct the speaker’s message for demonstratives, associating this with ‘the entity near the 
speaker’ and that with ‘the entity apart from the speaker’.  
To summarize, the two key components children need to know in order to correctly 
interpret demonstratives are as follows: 
 
(14) i.  Speaker’s perspective: speaker is the center of the orientation. 
 ii.  Proximal-distal distinction: this points to the entity near the speaker while that 
points to the entity apart from the speaker.  
 
In order to appropriately pick out the referent for demonstratives, children first need to interpret 
demonstratives based on speaker’s perspective rather than their own. Second, children need to 
have the knowledge of proximal-distal distinction between the two demonstratives. Note that 
although languages do not only feature distance as the only semantic distinction that differentiate 
the two demonstratives, the proximal-distal differences seem to the most productive and 
universal distinctions among all languages (Diessel, 1999; 2014). Thus, the current dissertation 
focused on the proximal-distal distinction of demonstratives to understand children’s acquisition 
of demonstratives. 
In short, in order for children to correctly interpret demonstratives, they need to know 
that the proximal demonstrative picks out the object near the speaker while the distal 
demonstrative picks out the object apart from the speaker; crucially, the speaker’s perspective 
determines the speaker-object distance. In the next chapter, I will show that children’s difficulty 
in interpreting demonstratives lies in the incorporation of the speaker’s perspective. I will show 
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that since implementing the speaker’s perspective requires extra-linguistic abilities, children’s 
still-developing cognitive abilities may interact with their demonstrative comprehension.   
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Chapter 3. DEMONSTRATIVE COMPREHENSION AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: CROSS-
LINGUISTIC INVESTIGATION 
 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the meaning representation of demonstratives 
proposed by several scholars and discussed what children need to know in order to interpret 
demonstratives appropriately. To summarize the points in the previous chapter, I argued that 
children need to know that (i) the proximal demonstrative such as this points to an entity near the 
speaker while the distal demonstrative such as that points to an entity relatively apart from the 
speaker, and (ii) the speaker’s perspective determines the speaker-object distance.  
In the current chapter, I will first review studies that have revealed that children tend to 
exhibit non-adult-like demonstrative comprehension particularly when the speaker has a different 
perspective from the children’s own, and these studies suggest that children’s non-adult-like 
performances may be related to whether children are able to incorporate the speaker’s 
perspective. I hypothesize that children’s difficulty in incorporating the speaker’s perspective 
may be related to their still developing Theory of Mind (De Villier, 2007; Diessel, 2012) and 
Executive Function. I will report the studies with English-speaking children and Chinese-
speaking children to directly examine this hypothesis. In what follows, reviews on the relevant 
lines of research are presented following the two experiments with English-speaking children 
and Chinese-speaking children, respectively.   
 
3.1. The acquisition of demonstratives 
Children are known to exhibit non-adult-like performance when interpreting 
demonstratives (E. V. Clark & Amaral, 2010; E. V. Clark & Sengul, 1978; H. H. Clark, 
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Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; P. A. de Villiers & de Villiers, 1974; Murasugi, 1986; Tanz, 1980; 
Webb & Abrahamson, 1976; Zhao, 2007). Research to date has shown that children’s non-adult-
like performance on demonstratives falls into two different types of response patterns. The first 
type of response pattern is analyzed with respect to children’s egocentrism while the second 
response pattern suggests that perceptual saliency affects children’s responses. In the following 
sections, each type of response will be discussed at length.  
 
3.1.1. Egocentric bias 
Children tend to be egocentric while interpreting demonstratives. In particular, when 
children are interpreting demonstratives that are uttered by a speaker who has a different 
perspective, children still tend to interpret demonstratives based on their own perspective. For 
instance, if a speaker who sat far apart from a child and thus had a different perspective uttered 
sentences with demonstratives such as this, children usually failed to reach for the object near the 
speaker as the response; instead they tended to reach for the object near themselves. This 
particular response pattern has been revealed by two studies, Webb and Abrahamson (1976) and 
Clark and Sengul (1978), which will be reviewed in detail in the following.  
Webb and Abrahamson (1976) studied English-speaking children whose ages ranged 
from 3;6 to 7;6 and grouped children in two age groups: four-year-olds (3;6-4;6) and seven-year-
olds (6;6-7;6). They have shown that even seven-year-old English-speaking children exhibited 
egocentric demonstrative comprehension. Act-out Tasks were used to examine children’s 
demonstrative comprehension based on their own perspective as well as a different perspective. 
The experimental workspace of their Act-out Tasks is presented in Figures 4a and 4b.  
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Figure 4. The task setting used in Webb and Abrahamson (1976): Fig. 4a presents the Same 
Perspective condition while Fig. 4b presents the Different Perspective condition. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, children sat at one end of the table while the experimenter, who 
was the speaker, sat at different ends of the table depending on the condition. In the Same 
Perspective condition (Figure 4a), the speaker sat right next to the child and thus the speaker and 
the child shared the same perspective. In the Different Perspective condition (Figure 4b), the 
speaker sat on the opposite end of the table and thus the speaker had a different perspective to the 
child in terms of the orientation of the objects. In the task, children were shown two toys, one of 
which was located near themselves and the other of which was apart from them. Then they were 
asked to pick up one of the toys following the instruction, “Would you pick up this/that toy?”  
Note that while giving the instructions, the experimenters did not provide any gestural cues such 
as pointing and eye-gaze; instead the experimenters looked at the child directly. Thus, children 
need to rely on their knowledge of demonstratives to respond correctly. Table 1 summarizes the 
results of the study. 
 
 
4a 4b 
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Table 1. Percentages of the correct comprehension on this and that with different perspective 
setting  
 
Same Perspective Different Perspective 
this that this that 
4-year-olds 82.5 52.5 34.3 81.8 
7-year-olds 83.3 82.5 61.8 74.3 
 
 
Results of the Act-out Tasks shown in Table 1 revealed that four-year-olds are still non-
adult-like in both conditions in that they seem to select the box near themselves regardless of the 
condition. This is observed from the asymmetrical accuracy on this and that in the two 
conditions because the accuracy on items of this is higher in the Same Perspective condition, 
while the accuracy on items of that is higher in the Different Perspective condition. These 
response patterns indicate that the four-year-olds did not seem to understand the distance contrast 
between this and that. The seven-year-olds were near-adult-like in the Same Perspective 
condition, however their accuracy in the Different Perspective condition was still around 60% to 
70%. These results suggest that seven-year-olds may have the knowledge of distance contrast, 
but they may not be so successful at using the knowledge in the Different Perspective condition. 
Another study that has reported children’s egocentric bias was conducted by Clark and 
Sengul (1978), who studied English-speaking children aged 3;1 (age range: 2;7-3;5), 3;11 (age 
range: 3;6-4;4), and 4;11 (age range: 4;5-5;3). They also utilized Act-out Tasks, the settings of 
which are illustrated in Figure 5, to assess children’s demonstrative comprehension. In the tasks, 
the child sat at a table and the experimenter, who was the speaker, sat either beside the child 
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(Speaker Beside condition; Figure 5a) or opposite to the child (Speaker Opposite condition; 
Figure 5b). Two discs were placed on the table, one on the same side of the table as the child and 
the other on the opposite side; furthermore, the discs were equidistant
4
 from the child.  
 
           
Figure 5. Task setting used in Clark & Sengul (1976): Fig. 5a illustrates the Speaker Beside 
condition while Fig. 5b illustrates the Speaker Opposite condition. 
 
In the tasks, two identical toy animals were placed on each of the discs and the child was 
asked to make one of the animals move by following an instruction such as ‘Make this/that 
chicken hop’ given by the speaker. Like Webb and Abrahamson (1976), no eye-gaze cues or 
gestural cues were given when the speaker uttered the instructions. Table 2 presents the results of 
the tasks.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The distance between the child and the discs was about the child’s arm reach distance in which is around 30-
40 centimeters.  
5a 5b 
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Table 2. Percentages of the correct responses on this and that with different perspective setting 
Age groups  
(age range) 
Speaker Beside Speaker Opposite 
this that this that 
3;1 (2;7-3;5) 81 25 31 77 
3;11 (3;6-4;4) 85 38 56 88 
4;11 (4;5-5;3) 83 62 67 90 
 
As shown in Table 2, the high accuracy of items on this and relatively lower accuracy on that in 
the Speaker Beside condition, as well as the high accuracy of items on that and relatively lower 
accuracy on this in the Speaker Opposite condition, are also observed throughout the age groups, 
indicating that children aged from two to five may have exhibited egocentric demonstrative 
comprehension.  
Note that, according to the findings discussed above, children will not become adult-like 
in comprehending demonstratives until they reach six or seven years. These two studies suggest 
that children develop from egocentric non-adult-like responses to adult-like responses when 
interpreting demonstratives based on a different perspective. Interestingly, these findings were 
not consistent with the earlier experimental study in demonstrative comprehension conducted by 
de Villiers and de Villiers (1974), who studied English-speaking children aged 2;6 to 4;6. De 
Villiers and de Villiers (1974) did not elicit an egocentric response pattern from children aged 
three and above, arguing that children as young as three can be non-egocentric when 
comprehending demonstratives. However, Webb and Abrahamson (1976) argued that children’s 
successful performance in de Villiers and de Villiers’s (1974) study could be related to the task. 
Let me first review the task and the results of de Villiers and de Villiers’s (1974) study. De 
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Villiers and de Villiers used a ‘Hide-and-seek’ game to examine children’s demonstrative 
comprehension based on a different perspective. In the experimental workspace, the 
experimenter sat at the opposite position to the child and a 15 cm high wall was placed between 
them. On each side of the wall, there was a cup. In the task, children were asked to find the 
candy under ‘one of the cups,’ following the instructions such as ‘The M&M is on this/that side 
of the wall.’ Each term only appeared once and if the child failed to find the candy, it would be 
fed to a greedy monster. Results are provided in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Percentages of the correct responses on this and that from de Villiers and de Villiers 
(1974).  
 Different Perspective 
 this that 
2;6-3;0 years 50.0 80.0 
3;0-3;6 years 80.0 90.9 
3;6-4;0 years 87.5 87.5 
4;0-4;6 years 90.0 90.0 
Adults 100.0 100.0 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, only children younger than three years old showed non-adult-
like responses. Particularly, children in this age group tended to choose the item near them 
resulting in the high accuracy in items on that and lower accuracy on this. Recall that the 
experimenter is sitting on the opposite side to the child, thus, when the experimenter said ‘that’, 
the ‘that’ indicated the cup near the child. Children aged three and above were successful. De 
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Villiers and de Villiers (1974) argue that children in their study were successful because the task 
was not as complex as others; additionally, these demonstratives are highly frequent in terms of 
input and daily usage by the children themselves.  
Keeping in mind that these results were inconsistent with the other two studies (Clark & 
Sengul, 1978; Webb & Abrahamson, 1976), Webb and Abrahamson (1976) reviewed de Villiers 
and de Villiers’ study and argued that children’s successful performances occurred because the 
experimenters might have been more considerate to the children, providing gestural or eye-gaze 
cues while the other two studies controlled the extra-linguistic cues when giving instructions. 
The speaker’s eye-gaze has been suggested to be helpful in identifying objects for adults (e.g., 
Stevens & Zhang, 2013); thus, providing such extra-linguistic cues to enhance the joint attention 
between the speaker and the child is suggested to facilitate children’s ability to identify the 
object being mentioned (e.g., Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). In addition to the potential extra-
linguistic cues, the experimental design may potentially cause an interpretation problem for the 
results. De Villiers and de Villiers (1974) only tested children’s comprehension of 
demonstratives based on a different perspective; thus, whether these children understood the 
distance contrast between this and that based on their own perspective is not clear. Without 
knowing whether children have the knowledge to distinguish between this and that, the claim 
that these children can step into the speaker’s perspective when comprehending demonstratives 
is weakened. The potential factors from the task itself and the results show that children as young 
as 2;6 to 3;0 still exhibit non-adult-like responses as well, revealing that children are not able to 
consider the speaker’s perspective. This indicates that younger children in their study may still 
be egocentrically biased when comprehending demonstratives based on a different perspective.     
42 
Based on the results of the studies presented above, it seems that children may go through 
several stages to become adult-like when interpreting demonstratives. Webb and Abrahamson 
(1976) as well as Clark and Sengul (1978) proposed a three-stage developmental trajectory for 
children’s demonstrative comprehension. In the first stage, children treat both this and that 
interchangeably; more specifically, children only attribute this and that as demonstratives that 
refer to certain objects but do not distinguish between the two demonstrative words. This means 
that there is no contrast between this and that to children in this first stage. Therefore, in the Act-
out Task, children would consistently use position strategy, which means that they would choose 
the object near them, far from them, or far from the speaker, regardless of whether the speaker 
had a same perspective as them. Then, moving into the second stage, children are able to 
distinguish between this and that in terms of the object’s distance relative to themselves, but not 
relative to the speaker’s. Children in this stage are still the center of the reference point 
regardless of whether the speaker has a different orientation point. Thus, children are not able to 
incorporate a speaker’s perspective that is different from their own when comprehending 
demonstratives; rather they tend to comprehend demonstratives based on their own perspective 
resulting in an egocentrically biased interpretation. In other words, they only have the partial 
knowledge of distance contrast between this and that. That is, they can only utilize the 
knowledge of the distance contrast when demonstratives are uttered by a speaker who shares the 
same perspective with them, whereas they fail to use the knowledge when the demonstratives are 
uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective. Therefore, in the Act-out Task, children 
would be able to correctly comprehend demonstratives when the speaker shares the same 
perspective with them, but may be unsuccessful when the speaker has a different perspective. 
Lastly, in the final stage, children are able to get rid of the egocentric bias and exhibit adult-like 
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performance by employing both the distance contrast and speaker’s perspective when 
comprehending demonstratives. Therefore, in the Act-out Task, children can correctly 
comprehend demonstratives when the speaker has the same perspective and when the speaker 
has a different perspective.  
It is also worth noting that Clark and Sengul (1978) proposed two routes, child-centered 
and speaker-centered, that diverge in the second stage. The two routes differ in terms of the 
reference point children anchored to. In the child-centered route, which is the model discussed 
above, children view themselves as the center of the reference point, whereas in the speaker-
centered route, children view the speaker as the center of the reference point. Interestingly, Clark 
and Sengul reported that most children fall into the child-centered route, however although cases 
are rare, there are still children who took the speaker-centered route. This indicates that most 
children are egocentrically biased. However, for those who are speaker-centered, this route may 
be explainable from the perceptual saliency, which will be discussed in the next section.   
To sum up, children seem to go through the egocentric stage before they achieve adult-
like performance in comprehending demonstratives, although the period of being egocentric 
when comprehending demonstratives varies across studies. In the egocentric stage, children 
know that the distance between themselves and the object determines the uses of this and that, 
but they are not able to establish the reference point from the speaker’s orientation. Then, they 
move on to the adult-like stage, in which they are able to consider the speaker’s perspective as 
the reference point.  
On the other hand, it is not clear how children develop from one stage to another and 
what the potential mechanism is that is needed for children to be able to take the speaker’s 
perspective when comprehending demonstratives. One potential mechanism might be related to 
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children’s cognitive development, such as their development of Theory of Mind, as was pointed 
out by De Villiers (2007) and Diessel (2012). In the current dissertation, I hypothesize that the 
development of Theory of Mind may be the underlying mechanism that influences egocentric 
demonstrative comprehension, which will be discussed in more detail in section 3. 3.  
 
3.1.2. Salience bias 
Another type of non-adult response pattern in children’s demonstrative comprehension 
that has been observed is the salience-biased response pattern. When comprehending 
demonstratives, some children tend to pick up objects that may possibly create perceptual 
salience relative to the presence of the speaker. Therefore, instead of picking up objects near 
themselves, children may tend to pick up objects near the speakers. Tanz’s (1980) study is the 
only study that reported a robust salience-biased response pattern. In this section, Tanz’s study 
will be reviewed and discussed.  
Tanz (1980), who tested English-speaking children aged from 2;6 to 5;3, also used an 
Act-out Task to measure children’s demonstrative comprehension. As illustrated in Figure 6, in 
the experimental workspace, two identical plates were located equidistant to the child. Notice 
that instead of using the real experimenter as the speaker, Tanz used two dolls serving as the 
speakers. Each doll stood beside each of the plates throughout the task.  
 
 
Figure 6. The task setting used in Tanz (1980) 
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In the task, the child was told to close his/her eyes while the experimenter was hiding a 
penny under one of the plates. After the hiding was completed, the child was told to open his/her 
eyes and to find the penny following the instruction such as ‘This/that plate has the penny under 
it’. The doll moved while speaking, thus, children would be able to identify who was speaking. 
The results are presented in Table 4, which showed the number of subjects that achieved adult-
like performance. 
 
Table 4. The number of subjects who achieved adult-like performance 
 Correct on this only Correct on that only Correct on both this and that 
2;6-3;4 (N=9) 2 2 1 
3;5-3;11 (N=9) 4 0 3 
4;1-4;8 (N=10) 1 1 6 
4;9-5;3 (N=9) 4 0 5 
 
As can be seen, children overall were much more accurate on the items of this. 
Intriguingly, even at about five years old, half of the children still tended to be accurate only on 
items of this. This led Tanz to further analyze children’s response patterns and propose that 
children were using a  ‘perceptual strategy’ when interpreting the act-out instruction. In her task 
setting, in order to highlight the speaker’s role, one of the two dolls who served as the speaker 
was moving while it was speaking. As a result, the child may have paid more attention to the doll, 
and the plate beside the doll may have received extra perceptual accessibility. The plate beside 
the doll would then be perceptually more salient as compared with the other plate. In order to 
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exhibit adult-like interpretation of demonstratives, children thus need to inhibit their desire to 
select the more salient plate, which is considered difficult to children. Tanz thus suggested that if 
children failed to redirect their attention to the correct object being mentioned, children would 
consistently select the object near the speaker.  
It is worthwhile to note that Tanz attributed children’s non-adult-like comprehension of 
demonstratives to perceptual salience. Children first need to be able to inhibit their attention to 
the perceptually salient object and then to the correct object the demonstrative picks out in the 
context. This proposal leads me to predict that children’s ability to inhibit their attention from 
one object and switch to the other object might be related to children’s cognitive development, 
such as Executive Function (e.g., Minai, et al., 2012). The relationship between children’s 
demonstrative comprehension and Executive Function will be discussed in more detail in section 
3.3.  
In sum, demonstrative comprehension is challenging to children, especially when the 
demonstratives are uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective from the child. Children 
robustly exhibit non-adult-like performances which can be categorized into two types of 
response patterns. One of the response patterns is analyzed as egocentrically biased (Webb & 
Abrahamson, 1976; Clark & Sengul, 1978), in which children tend to select the objects that are 
near them or that they want, failing to incorporate the speaker’s perspective. The other response 
pattern is analyzed as salience biased (Tanz, 1980), in which children tend to select the objects 
closer to the speaker. As the child paid attention to the speaker while he was speaking, the object 
in front of the speaker was perceptually salient to the child.  
These findings lead me to hypothesize that those non-adult-like comprehension patterns 
may be associated with the development of cognitive mechanisms, such as Theory of Mind and 
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Executive Function. This dissertation thus examines whether these two types of response 
patterns may be related to children’s still-developing Theory of Mind and Executive Function. In 
the next section, I will first review the studies examining the relationship between language 
development and Theory of Mind as well as Executive Function, followed by a discussion on 
why/how Theory of Mind and Executive Function may be related to demonstrative 
comprehension.    
 
3.2. Language development and cognitive development 
3.2.1. Theory of Mind and language 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand that others may have a different desire, 
emotion, or perspectives (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Theory of Mind is often discussed primarily 
in terms of false belief, that is, the belief that what others hold is false in a given world (See 
reviews in Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). On the other hand, Theory of Mind, by its 
definition, includes not only the understanding of different beliefs but also desires and emotions. 
As Wellman (2010) puts it, Theory of Mind is a “developmental progression”, which suggests 
that children develop their Theory of Mind through several stages, indicating that it is composed 
of several elements. Thus, Wellman and his colleagues proposed that Theory of Mind has five 
subcomponents which are developed in a particular order. The developmental trajectory of 
Theory of Mind is presented in (15).  
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(15) Theory of Mind scales (Wellman, 2010; Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004) 
a. Diverse desires: the ability to understand that people may have different desires 
about the same thing 
b. Diverse beliefs: the ability to understand that people may have different beliefs 
about the same situation 
c. Knowledge access: the ability to understand that others may have different beliefs 
because they perceive the situation differently 
d. False belief: the ability to understand that others may hold a belief that does not 
match with the true situation 
e. Hidden emotion: the ability to understand that others may feel one way but reveal 
their emotion in a different way 
 
Theory of Mind has been widely discussed in relation with children’s language 
development (Astington & Baird, 2005; Astington & Jenkins, 1999; J. G. de Villiers, 2007; 
Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2005; Miller, 2006; Millett, 2010; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007; 
L.-J. Zhang & Wu, 2011). Astington and Jenkins (1999) and others  (e.g., Astington, 2000; 
Astington & Baird, 2005; Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown, & Perkins, 2005; Deák, Ray, & Brenneman, 
2003; Hughes et al., 2005; Rosnay, Pons, Harris, & Morrell, 2004) revealed that children’s 
development of Theory of Mind is related to children’s general verbal development, which is 
measured by language tests such as Test of Early Language Development (e.g., Astington, 2000), 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (e.g., Deák, Ray, & Brenneman, 2003), and Clinical 
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005). Milligan et al. (2007) 
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meta-analyzed these studies, revealing that children’s performances in the Theory of Mind tasks, 
which is the false belief task, is related to children’s general language development, as well as 
children’s development of different language aspects such as vocabulary, syntactic development, 
and comprehension of complement structures.   
Theory of Mind, particularly false belief, has more recently been investigated in light of 
its association with a number of specific aspects of language development. For instance, Theory 
of Mind development has been discussed with children’s acquisition of complement structures, 
such as the comprehension of sentences like “he thinks the candle is an apple.” A sentence with 
complement structure is particularly interesting because the truth of the embedded sentence does 
not interact with the truth of the whole sentence. For example, ‘the candle is an apple’ is not true 
based on the world knowledge, but when this sentence is embedded in another sentence such as 
‘he thinks the candle is an apple’, the truth of the whole sentence is now judged on how the 
person ‘he’ thinks rather than whether his thought is true or false. Studies have revealed 
significant correlation between children’s success/failure of comprehension of the complement 
structures and their false belief understanding (e.g., J. G. de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Low, 2010; 
Rakhlin et al., 2011; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, & Hoffmeister, 2007). However, since the 
complement structures usually contain mental verbs, such as think, believe, and know, others 
have argued children’s mastery of this type of sentence is related to children’s understanding of 
mental verbs rather than the syntactic structure of the sentence. Thus, children’s acquisition of 
mental verbs has also been of particular interest in this field (e.g., Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990; 
Papafragou, Cassidy, & Gleitman, 2007).  
Researchers argue that in order for children to correctly interpret the meaning of mental 
verbs, children need to be able to understand that there are different desires, perspectives, beliefs 
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and emotions out there. Indeed, studies have shown that children’s comprehension of mental 
verbs is related to their Theory of Mind, particularly false belief. Recently, researchers have 
started to investigate children’s development of pragmatics in relation to their development of 
false belief. For example, Zufferey (2010) investigated the relationship between children’s 
acquisition of discourse connectives in French (e.g., puisque ‘since’ and parce que ‘because’) 
and Theory of Mind. The result suggests that children’s development of Theory of Mind may 
play an important role in comprehending sentences that contain discourse connectives when 
discourse connectives are used to connect the premise and conclusion that is based on the 
speaker’s belief
5
. De Cat (2013) and Modyanova and Wexler (2013) examined the relationship 
between children’s acquisition of definite articles in English (e.g., the) and Theory of Mind, 
hypothesizing that to comprehend definite articles, children need to evaluate the interlocutors’ 
knowledge status in order to decide whether the interlocutors have the same knowledge status as 
the children’s in terms of the object mentioned in the speech context. For example, the definite 
article ‘the’ must be used in the situation in which the hearer knows of the referred object and the 
referred object was already mentioned in the prior discourse. Given that children need to 
estimate the interlocutor’s knowledge of the referred object, the development of Theory of Mind 
may thus play a role in the comprehension of definite articles. However, both De Cat (2013) and 
Modyanova and Wexler (2013) fail to provide evidence showing that comprehension of definite 
                                                 
5
 Zufferey (2010) discussed several different uses of discourse connectives. However, she only focused on one 
that is used in epistemic domain. For example, in (1), the conclusion ‘Max is ill’ is based on the premise that ‘he 
didn’t come to work today’. More importantly, the inference from the premise to the conclusion is simply based on 
the belief of the speaker who uttered this sentence. Thus, this sentence can also be rephrased as the speaker believes 
that Max is ill because Max did not come to work today.  
(1) Max is ill, because he didn’t come to work today. (Zufferey, 2010, p.98) 
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articles is related to Theory of Mind development. Note that these studies focused on children’s 
understanding of false beliefs and the comprehension of definite articles. Since false beliefs do 
not cover every subcomponent in Theory of Mind development, the relationship between 
children’s comprehension of definite articles and Theory of Mind may emerge when other 
subcomponents of Theory of Mind are under examination.  
De Mulder (2011) investigated children’s production of referring expressions and Theory 
of Mind development as well as Executive Function. In her study, she asked children to describe 
pictures to another experimenter who was not able to see the pictures; therefore, children needed 
to carefully select expressions to identify the objects involved in the pictures. In this case, 
children need to use the indefinite article ‘a’ and avoid using terms such as the definite article 
‘the’ or pronouns, for instance. The results provide supporting evidence showing that children’s 
production of referring expressions in communication is related to their Theory of Mind 
development, but probably not Executive Function. This indicates that Theory of Mind plays a 
role in children’s ability to evaluate the interlocutors’ perspective in terms of the referred object. 
Resches and Perez Pereira (2007), who used a similar paradigm assessing children’s ability to 
describe a story to a person who has no prior knowledge of it, also reported that children’s 
perspective-taking in communications is related to their Theory of Mind development.   
In sum, studies have suggested a relationship between children’s development of Theory 
of Mind and their acquisition of a variety of specific linguistic expressions, including those that 
require pragmatic computations to correctly convey these expressions such as discourse 
connectives, referring expressions, and possibly definite articles. That is, Theory of Mind may 
play a role in children’s ability to consider the information coming from the discourse context, 
such as the knowledge of the interlocutors’ and the logical connection between sentences. Given 
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that there is evidence of ToM influencing children’s pragmatic development, their demonstrative 
comprehension, which also requires pragmatic computation, is another domain serving as a 
testing ground to examine.  
 
3.2.2. Executive Function and language 
Executive Function (EF) is a set of cognitive functions that allows a person to regulate 
and monitor their own behaviors and thoughts (Aron, 2007; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake 
et al., 2000). Miyake and Friedman (2012) proposed that Executive Function has three 
subcomponents: inhibition, shifting, and updating, which were suggested to be independent 
abilities but interact with each other. Inhibition is the ability to override the prominent or 
dominant response in a given situation; shifting is the cognitive flexibility to shift between tasks 
and mental sets; updating is the ability to monitor and rapidly add or delete information within 
working memory. Among these three components, inhibition and shifting have been widely 
discussed with children’s language development (see Mazuka et al., 2009 for a review). 
Bialystok and her colleagues have conducted a series of studies investigating whether bilingual 
children have any cognitive advantages compared with monolingual children (Bialystok, 1999, 
2010; Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009). Overall findings from their 
studies and others (Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008; Poarch & van Hell, 2012) have suggested that 
bilingual preschoolers outperformed their monolingual peers in the shifting tasks (cf., Paap & 
Greenberg, 2013). This line of research has been expanded to toddlers (Poulin-Dubois, Blaye, 
Coutya, & Bialystok, 2011) and the other EF component, working memory (Morales, Calvo, & 
Bialystok, 2013).  
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In addition to the bilingual experiences, EF development has been argued to relate with 
the development of a number of specific linguistic domains. For example, scholars have 
suggested EF is related to children’s online sentence processing (Choi & Trueswell, 2010; 
Woodard, Pozzan, & Trueswell, 2014). Children are known to show non-adult-like processing 
patterns in comprehending sentences such as ‘put the frog on the napkins in the box.’ This type 
of sentence creates temporal ambiguity in which the propositional phrase ‘on the napkins’ may 
temporarily serve as the goal and later turn out to be a modifying phrase; children thus need to 
revise their initial analysis of ‘on the napkins’, but they often fail to do so. Woodard et al. (2014) 
directly examined children’s comprehension of the kindergarten path sentences and their EF, 
revealing that children who are not able to revise their initial analysis also performed worse in 
the inhibition control tasks. Children’s comprehension of abstract linguistic expressions also has 
been discussed with respect to their EF development. For instance, Beck, Riggs, and Gorniak 
(2009) have reported a correlation between inhibition and children’s comprehension of 
counterfactual expressions. In their study, children were told a story in which Piglet was drawing 
a picture at a table, and the wind blew the picture into a tree. Then, children were asked ”what if 
the wind hadn’t blow, where would the picture  be?”(p.344). To comprehend the counterfactual 
expressions successfully, children needed to inhibit the idea that the premise was in fact true in 
the world and imagine what the alternative would be. Results suggest that children’s inhibition 
ability is related to their ability to reason the counterfactuals. In addition to counterfactual 
comprehension, Minai, Jincho, Yamane, and Mazuka (2012) discussed the role of EF in relation 
with children’s comprehension of sentences containing quantification, such as the universal 
quantifier every. The authors presented the sentences containing every, such as ‘every turtle is 
holding an umbrella’, together with a picture depicting three turtles each holding an umbrella, 
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and an extra umbrella that nobody was holding. This extra umbrella is visually salient but is not 
playing any role in determining the truth of the sentence. From the results, Minai et al. (2012) 
have shown that children’s ability to ignore the salient extra object in order to correctly interpret 
the every-sentence is related to their cognitive flexibility (shifting in Miyake and Friedman’s 
model). 
The studies discussed so far were focused on children’s comprehension of syntactic 
structure and semantic meanings in relation to their EF development. Another line of research 
that is more relevant to the current study investigates children’s pragmatic abilities and their EF 
development. Nilsen and Graham (2009, 2012) argued that children’s communicative 
perspective-taking is related to EF. In Nilsen and Graham (2009), children were asked to 
complete a referential communication task and a series of EF tasks that measured children’s 
inhibition, shifting, and updating. In the referential communication task, children were sitting in 
front of a display case and the experimenter was sitting on the other side of it. In the display case, 
there were two objects with different sizes (e.g., small duck and large duck) and two irrelevant 
objects (e.g., a whale and a bottle) as shown in Figure 6. The four objects were always shown to 
the children (see Figure 7a), but one of the similar objects (e.g., small duck) was blocked to the 
experimenter (see Figure 7b). Then, the experimenter asked the child to ‘pick up the duck’.  
 
   
Figure 7.  Sample picture in referential communication task in Nilsen and Graham (2009).       
7a 7b 
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The results revealed that children’s selection of the alternative object (e.g., the small duck) was 
related to their poor performance in the inhibition tasks. Thus, the authors suggested that 
children’s ability to incorporate the speaker’s perspectives in communications is related to 
children’s development of EF, particularly inhibition. Brown-Schmidt (2009) also argues that 
when communicating to locate a reference in a situation as described above, children may be 
required to suppress their own perspective in order to successfully incorporate the speaker’s 
perspective, and that this ability is deeply related to their EF development. This may also suggest 
that when children comprehend demonstratives requiring them to consider the speaker’s 
perspective, EF may also play a role in the ability for children to successfully comprehend 
demonstratives.   
In sum, the current section discussed that children’s development of language is 
interrelated with their development of ToM and of EF. In particular, both ToM and EF have been 
suggested to play an important role in children’s pragmatic development, such as perspective-
taking communication (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen & Graham, 2009, 2012; Wardlow, 2013). 
This line of findings strengthens the speculation on the relationship between children’s 
demonstrative comprehension and cognitive development. In the next section, a more detailed 
explanation of the hypothesis between the two domains will be presented.  
 
3.3. The relationship between comprehension of demonstratives and cognitive development 
Previous studies suggest that children’s non-adult-like comprehension of demonstratives 
may be related to their still-developing cognitive abilities. In particular, based on children’s non-
adult-like interpretations, such as egocentric biased responses and salience biased responses, 
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their demonstratives may be related to their still-developing Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function. The association between children’s language comprehension and their development of 
Theory of Mind as well as Executive Function has been established for decades. Therefore, 
exploring the role of children’s Theory of Mind and Executive Function in their demonstrative 
comprehension will be one direction to seek for the reason behind children’s non-adult-like 
comprehension of demonstratives. This section will discuss the relationship between 
demonstrative comprehension and cognitive development and provide the foundation of the 
current study.   
 
3.3.1. Demonstrative comprehension and Theory of Mind 
Previous studies revealed that children exhibit egocentric interpretation of demonstratives 
when the demonstratives are uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective. Children’s 
egocentric non-adult-like comprehension of demonstratives is proposed to reflect their non-adult-
like Theory of Mind (de Villiers, 2007; Diessel, 2012). When comprehending demonstratives 
uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective from the children, children need to be able 
to establish the reference point based on the speaker’s perspective rather than their own. In such 
a situation, the speaker’s use of this and that is not the same as the child’s use of these words. 
For example, imagine a situation in which the speaker sat far apart from the child and a cup was 
placed in front of each of them; the speaker uttered ‘this cup’ referring to the cup right in front of 
him/her, but from the child’s perspective the particular cup being mentioned was apart from the 
child and thus that particular cup would be referred as ‘that cup’ instead of ‘this cup’. The child, 
thus, needs to know that the speaker may have a different perspective, and he/she needs to 
incorporate the speaker’s perspective in order to successfully comprehend demonstratives uttered 
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by the speaker. Understanding that others may have a different perspective and taking that 
different perspective requires an adult-like Theory of Mind. Therefore, I hypothesized that 
children’s successful comprehension of demonstratives may be related to their already-developed 
Theory of Mind
6
. I particularly considered Knowledge Access as the subcomponent that may be 
related to children’s demonstrative comprehension. Knowledge Access is one’s ability to 
estimate others’ knowledge status and understand that others may have a different perspective 
from one’s own. I hypothesized that children particularly need this ability to successfully 
establish a reference point based on the speaker rather than themselves when comprehending 
demonstratives. Therefore, I propose that children’s demonstrative comprehension is related to 
their Knowledge Access ability.  
 
3.3.2. Demonstrative comprehension and Executive Function 
Let me now turn to the discussion on the relationship between demonstrative 
comprehension and Executive Function. In the above section, I discussed the potential of Theory 
of Mind to play a role in children’s demonstrative comprehension. However, as argued by 
                                                 
6
 As I discussed in Chapter 1, the production of the Turkish demonstrative şu requires the speaker to 
incorporate the listener’s perspective, while the comprehension of the distance contrast in English and Chinese 
demonstratives requires the listener to incorporate the speaker’s perspective. Thus, incorporation of the 
interlocutor’s perspective is essential to master demonstratives in different languages. Interestingly, Küntay & 
Özyürek (2006) suggested that children’s correct production of şu may be related to their Theory of Mind 
development. The argument in Turkish is in line with the hypothesis in the current study, in that children’s ability to 
incorporate the interlocutor’s perspective may be related to their still-developing cognitive abilities. Thus, the 
hypothesis discussed in the current dissertation could also explain children’s non-adult-like production in Turkish. 
That is to say, children who fail to infer the listener’s perspective observed in Turkish may also be attributed to their 
Theory of Mind development.  
58 
Samson and Apperly (2010), Theory of Mind may not be the sole factor interacting with 
children’s perspective-taking. Children’s egocentrism when it comes to perspective-taking may 
be related to two other things. First, considering a different perspective requires children to 
inhibit their own perspective and switch to that different perspective; however, this process is 
argued to be cognitively demanding. Second, in a real daily communication, children need to 
pick up the correct object that is being mentioned in the discourse while there is tons of 
irrelevant information in the context; thus, once again, children need to inhibit the irrelevant 
information and reengaged in the correct information.  
 Given this, one can see the important role that the Executive Function may play here. Let 
me now discuss why Executive Function may also play a role in children’s demonstrative 
comprehension. I considered mental flexibility (shifting in Miyake and Friedman’s model), which 
is the ability to switch between perspectives, as the crucial component of EF of particular interest. 
Recall that previous studies on children’s demonstrative comprehension reported two types of 
response patterns: egocentric biased and salience biased. Regarding the egocentric biased 
response pattern, I argued that children are egocentric because they tend to fail to understand that 
the speaker of the demonstratives may have a different perspective, and they fail to incorporate 
the speaker’s perspective into the interpretation of the demonstrative words; thus, they interpret 
demonstratives based on their own perspective. According to Samson and Apperly (2010), 
although children may understand that the speaker may have a different perspective, the 
incorporation of such a perspective may be cognitively costly. The cognitive cost may be 
controlled by the switching of the perspectives. Children, being egocentric, establish their own 
perspective from which they interpret the world. However, when they need to interpret the 
demonstrative words uttered by another person with a different perspective, they are required to 
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inhibit and disengage from their own perspective, and then re-engage in a new perspective of the 
speaker. Here, they need to flexibly switch between their own perspective and the new 
perspective. Thus, successful demonstrative comprehension may also recruit cognitive processes 
that are under control of Executive Function, particularly the successful perspective switch, and 
children’s egocentric demonstrative comprehension may also reflect their failure to successfully 
switch to the new perspectives. The mental flexibility in Executive Function, thus, may be 
required for children to successfully switch between their own perspective and the speaker’s 
perspective when comprehending demonstratives.  
With respect to the salience biased response pattern, recall that Tanz (1980) revealed that 
children’s non-adult-like demonstrative comprehension may be influenced by the perceptual 
saliency of the objects; for example, the objects that appear near the speaker may receive more 
attention from the children. If the visually more salient object in the context is not the object the 
speaker intended, children may need to inhibit their attention to the visually salient object and 
shift to the speaker-intended object, in addition to inhibiting their own perspective that leads 
them interpret demonstratives egocentrically. The visual saliency issues may also occur in the 
demonstrative comprehension in daily life communication. In a daily life context, children are 
typically exposed to more than one type of object in a given discourse context. For example, 
when the speaker asks for this cup, there may be bowls, spoons, and plates in the context as well. 
These objects are irrelevant information to interpret the demonstrative phrase ‘this cup’. If any of 
the objects are more attractive to children, they will need to redirect their own attention to the 
relevant information from the irrelevant information in the context. Inhibiting the salient but 
irrelevant information from the context may be related to children’s still-developing Executive 
Function as well, particularly mental flexibility, as suggested by Minai et al. (2012). Minai et al. 
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(2012) investigated children’s interpretation of quantification sentences in relation to mental 
flexibility. The quantification sentences were presented together with a visual context in which 
an irrelevant object were presented, and this irrelevant object caught children’s attention, 
resulting in the non-adult-like interpretation of the quantification sentences. The results point to a 
positive correlation between children’s ability to ignore the irrelevant object and their mental 
flexibility. Given the above discussion, children’s salience biased interpretation of 
demonstratives may reflect children’s Executive Function as well.  
Additionally, and interestingly to the current discussion, the development of the EF and 
ToM is suggested to be interrelated (Devine & Hughes, 2013, 2014; Hughes, 1998; Hughes & 
Ensor, 2007; Müller, Zelazo, & Imrisek, 2005). In a recent meta-analysis, Devine and Hughes 
(2013, 2014) revealed that children’s development of Executive Function and Theory of Mind 
are interrelated, regardless of age and the languages children are acquiring. Children’s 
development of Executive Function and Theory of Mind are also argued to interact with their 
language development (Low, 2010). Therefore, exploring the roles of Theory of Mind together 
with Executive Function in demonstrative comprehension will provide a better understanding of 
how cognitive abilities may be interacting with the acquisition of linguistic expressions. 
Taken together, children’s non-adult-like comprehension of demonstratives might be 
related to their still-developing cognitive abilities, particularly Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function. However, such a speculation has not been directly tested yet; thus, the present study 
aims to investigate the relationship between children’s comprehension of demonstratives, 
specifically in the context that the speaker has a different perspective to the child, and their 
cognitive development, particularly the development of Theory of Mind and Executive Function.  
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3.3.3. A cross-linguistic perspective on Theory of Mind and Executive Function 
Although Theory of Mind and Executive Function are suggested to be interrelated in 
some studies, other studies suggest that children acquiring different languages do not seem to 
follow the same developmental path in terms of Theory of Mind and Executive Function (cf., 
Devine & Hughes, 2013; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006). Interestingly, however, 
research to date has reported mixed results in terms of how children in different language groups 
may differ from each other with respect to their development of Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function. Tsou (2005) investigated Chinese-speaking children’s Theory of Mind development 
and discussed the results with those of studies conducted with English-speaking children. Based 
on the comparison, she proposed that Chinese-speaking children may have performed poorer on 
comprehending demonstratives than their English-speaking peers. D. Liu, Wellman, Tardif, and 
Sabbagh (2008) meta-analyzed Theory of Mind studies conducted with Chinese-speaking 
children and directly compared the data with another set of studies conducted with English-
speaking data. The results revealed that the developmental trajectory of Theory of Mind was the 
same between the two groups of children; however, in terms of the age, Chinese-speaking 
children took longer to develop their Theory of Mind. On the other hand, Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, 
Moses, and Lee (2006) did not report the same results. They measured Chinese-speaking 
children and English-speaking children’s Theory of Mind as well as Executive Function. When 
they compared the data from these two language groups, no significant differences were found 
between Chinese-speaking children and English-speaking children in terms of their Theory of 
Mind; nevertheless, their Executive Function differed. In particular, Chinese-speaking children 
outperformed their English-speaking peers.  
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Thus, there is a complex picture regarding whether different language groups may show 
different developmental pattern in their cognitive abilities. The discrepancies among these 
findings is the motivation to investigate both English-speaking and Chinese-speaking children. 
Regardless of whether children’s cognitive development may differ depending on their language 
background, of current interest is whether I can elicit the same type of relationship between 
demonstrative comprehension and children’s cognitive development from the two groups of 
children.  
Given the discussions above, the current study investigated children’s demonstrative 
comprehension in relation to their cognitive development from a cross-linguistic view. In 
Experiment 1, I studied the relationship between the two domains by focusing on English-
speaking children; in Experiment 2, I focused on Chinese-speaking children as a cross-linguistic 
expansion.  
 
3.4. Experiment 1: Child English 
Experiment 1 explored whether English-speaking children’s demonstrative 
comprehension is related to their still-developing Theory of Mind and Executive Function.  
 
3.4.1. Participants 
Fifty-two English-acquiring children aged 3, 4, 5, and 6 years old participated (3;0-6;2, 
mean = 4;4, with 26 males and 26 females), including 16 three-year-olds (3;0-3;10, mean = 3;5), 
23 four-year-olds (4;0-4;11, mean = 4;5), 10 five-year-olds (5;0-5;7, mean = 5;2), and 3 six-year-
olds (6;1-6;2, mean = 6;1). An additional 9 children were tested but were excluded from the 
analysis for the following reasons: incompletion of all the necessary tasks (6 children); failure to 
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learn the general rule of the Theory of Mind task (1 child); failure to learn the task rule of the 
Executive Function task (1 child); and coding error that occurred during the experimental session 
(1 child). These child participants were recruited at preschools in Lawrence, Kansas. In addition, 
20 adult native speakers of English also participated, who were recruited at the University of 
Kansas (19;3-23;2, mean = 20;3). 
 
3.4.2. Tasks 
In order to examine the relationship between children’s demonstrative acquisition and 
cognitive development, a multi-task design was adopted. Two demonstrative linguistic 
comprehension tasks, an Act-out Task and a Judgment Task, were utilized together with two 
cognitive tasks, the Hiding Game (P. A. de Villiers & Pyers, 2001; Gale et al., 1996; Povinelli & 
DeBlois, 1992; Schick et al., 2007) to measure children’s Theory of Mind, and the Dimension 
Change Card Sort (DCCS, Zelazo, 2006) to measure children’s Executive Function. 
 
3.4.2.1. Act-out Task 
The Act-out Task was used to ensure children’s understanding of the distance contrast 
between this and that based on their own perspectives. This task was widely used in the previous 
studies investigating children’s comprehension of demonstratives. In the task, children were 
asked to perform the action following the instruction that has demonstratives given by the 
experimenter. Children’s act-out outcome reflects how they interpret demonstratives. In terms of 
the experimental workspace, the child sat at a table that had an approximately 55 cm long cloth. 
Two identical boxes and toy figurines of characters were placed on the cloth at the workspace. 
One of the boxes was located right in front of the child and the other one located far from 
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him/her, but still within arm-reach distance to the child. Note that the two boxes were not placed 
in a straight line; instead the farther box was placed on either the right edge of the near box or the 
left edge, so that both boxes were visible to the child. The experimenter, serving as the speaker, 
sat right next to the child and thus the child shared the same perspective with the experimenter. 
The task setting is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8. Experimental setting in Act-out Task (E = experimenter; C = Child).  
 
At the beginning of the task, the experimenter directed the child’s attention to both boxes 
by pointing to the two boxes and saying the following sentences: “Look, we have two boxes and 
animals. In the game, I am going to tell you to put each of the animals (the toy figurines) in one 
of the boxes.” In the task, the child was asked to put toy characters in one of the boxes, either in 
‘this box’, i.e., the box closer to the child, or in ‘that box’, i.e., the box far from the child, by 
receiving the act-out instruction as in (16).  
 
(16) Put X in this/that box.  
 
If the child heard ‘Put Pooh in this box’, for example, he/she was expected to put Pooh in 
the box closer to him/her. If the child heard ‘Put Piglet in that box’, he/she was expected to put 
‘this box’ 
‘that box’ 
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Piglet in the box far from himself/herself. In order to minimize the potential impact from extra-
linguistic cue, when giving the act-out instruction, the experimenter did not provide any extra-
linguistic cue, such as eye-gaze and pointing (Clark & Sengul, 1978; Webb & Abrahamson, 
1976). There were six trials in total, with three trials on this and three trials on that. Whether 
children can correctly put toy figurines in the appropriate box based on the act-out instruction 
was recorded.  
 
3.4.2.2. Judgment Task 
The Judgment Task was used to examine children’s comprehension of demonstratives when 
the speaker has a different perspective from their own. The task was administered as a series of 
picture stories with two characters, a King and a Servant. The story was introduced as a ‘good 
worker test’, in which the King uttered a demand as in (17) to the Servant and the Servant was 
expected to fulfill the demand.  
 
(17) Paint this/that X blue.  
 
In the story setting, two identical objects (e.g., plates) were used with one placed near both the 
King and the Servant and the other one placed far from both of them (see Figure 9a) .  
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Figure 9. Sample pictures in Judgment Task 
 
In each story, the King demanded the Servant to paint a particular object blue by saying 
sentence (17) and the Servant tried to fulfill the demand by painting one of the objects. After the 
Servant finished his painting, he asked the child to judge whether he painted the correct object or 
not. The child then was asked to decide whether the Servant’s painting outcome was correct 
according to the King’s demand. The story plot of one trial is presented in (18).  
 
(18) (Figure 9a) King: Here are two plates. Let me think about which plate I want you to  
paint.  
King: Paint this plate blue.  
(Figure 9b) Servant: Here is what I did. Am I right or wrong? 
 
There were four conditions with two types of demonstratives (this vs. that) and two types 
of Servant’s fulfillments (Match or Mismatch). There were eight trials in total. In the Match 
conditions, the Servant’s painting outcome matched the demand. As presented in Figure 10, in 
some trials, the King demanded the Servant to paint this plate and the Servant painted the plate 
near the King, and thus the painting outcome matched the demand that had this (see Figure 10a). 
In other trials, the King demanded the Servant to paint that plate and the Servant painted the 
9a 9b 
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plate apart from the King, and thus the painting outcome matched the demand that had that (see 
Figure 10b). For items in the Match conditions, the child was expected to accept the painting 
outcome. 
 
  
Figure 10. Match conditions in the Judgment Task 
 
In the Mismatch conditions, the Servant’s painting outcome did not match the demand. 
As presented in Figure 11, in some trials, the King demanded the Servant to paint this plate but 
the Servant painted the plate apart from the King, and thus the painting outcome did not match 
the demand that had this (see Figure 11a). In other trials, the King demanded the Servant to paint 
that plate but the Servant painted the plate near the King, and thus the painting outcome did not 
match the demand that had that (see Figure 11b).  For items in the Mismatch conditions, the 
child was expected to reject the painting outcome.  
 
  
Figure 11. Mismatch conditions in the Judgment Task 
 
10b 
11b 11a 
10a 
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The objects that were used in the task included a plate, a bowl, a pillow, a pot, a cup, a bag, a 
clock, and a box. The trials were presented with a fixed order to each child (see Appendix I). 
Whether children could correctly accept the Match conditions and correctly reject the Mismatch 
conditions was recorded. 
 
3.4.2.3. Theory of Mind task: the Hiding Game 
The Hiding Game (P. A. de Villiers & Pyers, 2001; Gale, de Villiers, de Villiers, & Pyers, 
1996; Schick et al., 2007) was selected to measure children’s development of Theory of Mind, 
particularly the Knowledge Access (Wellman et al., 2011; Wellman & Liu, 2004). In the Hiding 
Game, three characters, the Hider, the Knower, and the Guesser, each played a role in a series of 
hiding events. The Hider first introduced the objects that she was going to hide (e.g., donuts) (see 
Figure 12a) and two helpers, the Knower and the Guesser, helped the child to find the hidden 
objects after each hiding event. In each hiding event, the Knower was asked to observe the 
hiding procedure and knew the hiding outcome while the Guesser was blindfolded and did not 
witness the hiding event; thus, the Guesser did not know where the hidden object was (see Figure 
12b). While the hiding was ongoing, a curtain blocked the scene so the child did not observe the 
hiding event (see Figure 12c). After the hiding was completed, the curtain was removed and the 
Knower and the Guesser each pointed to the box they thought had the hidden object (see Figure 
12d) (The full plot of the hiding game is presented in Appendix II). The child’s task was to find 
the hidden object following the suggestion given by the Knower and the Guesser.  
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Figure 12. Sample pictures in the Hiding Game 
 
Before the hiding game began, the child was given one practice trial in which the Hider 
was the only character who hid the object, and pointed to the correct box at the end of the hiding. 
If the child did not point to the Hider’s box in the practice trial, the experimenter would 
explicitly tell the child that the Hider was there to help, and thus the box the Hider pointed to had 
the hidden object. The practice trial was used to demonstrate that the child needed to listen to 
someone’s advice before finding the hidden object. 
I measured whether the child could correctly point to the Knower’s box in order to find 
the hidden object. There was one practice trial and five main trials. The two bears, brown bear 
and white bear, took turns to be the Knower and the Guesser. Therefore, children could not rely 
on pointing to one of the bears consistently (e.g., point to the brown bear throughout the task) to 
find the hidden object. 
12a 12b 
12c 12d 
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3.4.2.4. Executive Function task: Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) 
The standard version of Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006) was used 
to measure children’s development of EF, particularly shifting, one of the subcomponents of EF. 
Shifting is the ability to flexibly switch between perspectives (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). In the 
task, children were shown cards that could be sorted based on two dimensions, color and shape. 
There were two phases in this task. In the first phase, children were asked to sort cards based on 
one dimension, e.g., color (see Figure 13a and 13b). This is called the Pre-switch Phase. In the 
second phase, children were asked to sort the same set of cards based on the other dimension, 
e.g., shape (see Figure 13c and 13d).This is called Post-switch Phase. Each session had six trials, 
totaling 12 trials in the task. Whether children could correctly sort cards particularly in the Post-
switch Phase was recorded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Sample trails in DCCS (switch from color to shape) 
 
13a 13b 
13c 13d 
Pre-switch Phase 
Post-switch Phase 
71 
In order to counterbalance the presentation order of the sorting dimensions across 
participants, two sets of different materials with different orders of sorting rules were prepared 
and each child only saw one of the two sets of materials. Half of the children were asked to sort 
cards based on color first and then by shape (Figure 13), while the other half of the children were 
asked to sort shape first and then by color (Figure 14).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Sample trials in DCCS (switch from shape to color) 
 
All the materials were electronically generated, and the task was administered using the 
experiment software Paradigm (Perception Research Systems, Inc., Tagliaferri, 2005) with a 
laptop PC. 
 
3.4.3. Procedure 
Child participants were invited individually to a quiet room in their preschools to 
participate in the study. The four tasks were administered in the following order: the Act-out 
Task first, the Judgment Task second, Hiding Game third, and finally the DCCS. Adult controls 
14a 14b 
14c 14d 
Pre-switch Phase 
Post-switch Phase 
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only participated in the Judgment Task; this is because I would like to see if the Judgment Task 
created for the study measures the distance contrast between this and that based on a different 
perspective in the given story context. Regarding the Act-out Task, since previous studies on 
demonstrative comprehension have shown that the performances of the English-speaking adults 
in the Act-out Task was at ceiling (Clark & Sengul, 1978), I assumed that English-speaking 
adults in general would not have problems with the same type of Act-out Task in the current 
study. They were tested collectively in the classroom and were asked to write down their answers 
on the response sheet. 
 
3.4.4. Results and discussions 
In this section, I will first present the results on the Act-out Task, which was used to 
ensure children’s ability to establish the distance contrast between this and that based on their 
own perspective. Only the data from those children who were able to do so will be analyzed in 
the Judgment Task, the Hiding Game and DCCS.  
 
3.4.4.1. Results of the Act-out Task  
In the Act-out Task, children’s selection of the box where they put toy figurines was 
measured. When the child was told to ‘Put X in this box’, if he/she put the toy figurine in ‘this 
box’ which was located in front of him/her, this act-out response was coded as a correct response 
for this. When he/she was told to ‘put X in that box’, if he/she put the toy figurine in ‘that box’ 
which is located apart from him/her, this response was also coded as a correct response for that. 
As shown in Table 5, the mean percentage of the correct responses was 86.67% (SD = 16.36) for 
the act-out instruction with this and 58.98% (SD = 35.92) for the act-out instruction with that.  
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Table 5. The percentages of correct responses on this and that with English-speaking children 
(%(SD)) 
 
Trials with this Trials with that 
Children   86.67 (16.36) 58.98 (35.92) 
 
I further categorized children into two groups, ‘Act-out passers’ and ‘Act-out failers’, 
depending on whether they could return correct responses for two out of three trials with this, 
and two out of three trials with that. Among the 52 children, 15 of them were categorized as 
‘Act-out failers’ (3;4-5;3, M = 4;3) and 37 of them were categorized as ‘Act-out passers’ (3;0-6;2, 
M = 4;5). Those ‘Act-out failers’ fell into two types of error response patterns. One group of 
children were consistently selecting ‘this box’ (N = 11), resulting in the low accuracy in trials 
with that. The other group of Act-out failers were randomly selecting one of the boxes (N = 4) 
regardless of whether the instruction contained this or that. From the two types of response 
patterns, it can be interpreted that the child did not understand the distance contrast between this 
and that based on his/her own perspective.  
On the other hand, for those who were grouped into the ‘passers’ category (N=37, 3;0-6;2, 
M = 4;5), it was interpreted that they were able to comprehend this and that correctly based on 
their own perspective, and thus were able to establish distance contrast between this and that 
based on their own perspectives. Recall that the purpose of the study is to examine children’s 
interpretation of demonstratives based on a different perspective in relation to their ToM and EF. 
The 37 Act-out passers will be the focus for the following analysis, in that I further examined 
whether these children could successfully comprehend demonstratives based on a different 
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perspective and, if so, whether their successful comprehension of demonstratives was related to 
their performances in the ToM task and EF task.  
 
3.4.4.2. Results of the Judgment Task 
The Judgment Task was used to access children’s ability to comprehend demonstratives 
based on a perspective different from the children’s own. In the Judgment Task, participants 
were asked to judge whether the Servant’s painting outcome matched or mismatched the King’s 
demands that had the demonstrative word. In the match condition in which the painting outcome 
correctly matched the demands, children’s acceptance was coded as a correct response. In the 
mismatch condition in which the painting outcome was wrong and mismatched the demands, 
children’s rejection was coded as a correct response. The mean percentages of the correct 
responses in each condition for both children and adults were calculated and summarized in 
Table 6.  
 
Table 6. The percentages of the correct responses in the Judgment Task by English-speaking 
children and adults (% (SD)) 
 Children (N = 37) Adult (N = 20) 
Match on this 93.24 (20.96) 100.00 (0.00) 
Mismatch on this 24.32 (34.60) 97.50 (11.18) 
Match on that 89.19 (26.71) 100.00 (0.00) 
Mismatch on that 28.38 (40.04) 100.00 (0.00) 
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Adults’ comprehension was almost 100% correct throughout the conditions, which 
established the grounds such that adults were able to contrastively comprehend this and that in 
the given story context used in the Judgment Task. That is, this picks out the object near the King 
while that picks out the object apart from the King in the given story context in the task. 
Children, on the other hand, were able to correctly accept items in the Match conditions with 
93.24% for this and 89.19% for that respectively, but their rejections on the Mismatch conditions 
were low. Notice that children’s rejection for this is of particular interests, and the rate was 
24.32%.  
Let me now turn to children’s individual responses. Although children seemed to accept 
all the Match conditions and Mismatch conditions from the average percentage discussed above, 
children’s correct response percentage ranged from 0% to 100%. The variability among 
children’s correct responses motivated a further qualitative analysis on children’s performance. I 
examined children’s responses and identified several types of response patterns. Among the 37 
children, eight children were almost adult-like, correctly accepting the Match items and rejecting 
Mismatch items most of the time. Eighteen children accepted all the items regardless of the 
Match/Mismatch conditions, which indicates that they wrongly accepted the Mismatch 
conditions. Two potential reasons may underlie such a response pattern. One explanation might 
be that children are not able to estimate the speaker’s perspective from the speaker’s orientation. 
Given the visual setting that provided in the task, the two objects in the picture are assumed to 
have been equal-distant to the child. Both objects could be potentially either this or that if the 
child could not determine the distance. The objects were presented on the screen in front of the 
child and they were within arm-reach distance to the child; thus children could easily point to the 
object or “touch” the object on the screen. Therefore, for children, the objects could be indicated 
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by using this because both of them were ‘near’ the child. The interpretation of that, on the other 
hand, is suggested to be vague, that is, that can also be used when the object is near the speaker 
(Levinson, 2004). The interpretation of that will be discussed in more detail in section 3.6.4. The 
other explanation is that children may simply have been reluctant to reject the painting outcome. 
Children in the task were asked to judge whether the Servant was correct or not while 
considering the Servant was taking a test; children may have hesitated to judge the outcome as 
wrong. In fact, among the 18 ‘all-correct’ children, three were able to point to the correct item 
before the painting happened. This suggests that some children could evaluate the King’s 
perspective regarding the distance of the objects; however, when they were asked about the 
painting outcome, they may have been showing sympathy to the Servant and judged the outcome 
as correct. One child consistently selected the object far from the King, ignoring the 
demonstrative words in the demand. The rest of the ten children judged the painting outcomes 
randomly with no observable explicit strategies. The overall error patterns found in the present 
study seem to be consistent with egocentric bias, in that children were not able to establish the 
reference points based on a perspective that was not their own. 
Let me now discuss children’s performance by age group, which is presented in Table 7. 
Overall, the developmental pattern was not so clear for the comprehension of that.  
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Table 7. English-speaking children’s percentages of correct responses in each condition in the 
Judgment Task by age groups (% (SD)) 
  3 yr (N =10) 4 yr (N=16) 5 yr (N=8) 6 yr (N=3) 
Match on this   85.00 (33.75) 93.75 (17.08) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 
Mismatch on this  15.00 (24.15) 12.50 (22.36) 37.50 (44.32) 83.33 (28.87) 
Match on that 100.00 (0.00) 78.13 (36.37) 100.00 (0.00) 83.33 (28.87) 
Mismatch on that 25.00 (35.36) 9.38 (20.16) 43.75 (49.55) 100.00 (0.00) 
 
For items on that in the Match conditions, children’s performance was above chance level, but 
the accuracy rate was not always above 90% from age three to age six. For items on this in the 
Mismatch conditions, a gradual increase in the accuracy can be observed as age increases; 
however, three-year-olds outperformed four-year-olds in this condition. It is also worth noting 
that even 6-year-olds did not show over 90% accuracy on average for items on this in the 
Mismatch conditions. This finding is consistent with Webb and Abrahamson (1976), in which 
they have shown that even some seven-year-olds (with age ranged from 6;6-7;6) did not achieve 
fully adult-like performance when comprehending demonstratives based on a different 
perspective. Regarding the developmental trajectory, one possible explanation for the 
interpretation of that can be attributed Levinson’s analysis. Levinson (2004) suggested that the 
interpretation of that is less straightforward since the exophoric use of that is applied to a wider 
range of contexts. For example, that can also pick out the object near the speaker. Indeed, in the 
pilot study with adults, several participants commented that the Mismatch conditions for the 
items on that could potentially be accepted as correct. Therefore, whether children were 
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responding to the items of that thinking that that could also point to the object close to the 
speaker was not so clear.  
With respect to the interpretation of this, a gradual increase of accuracy as age increased 
was observed for both Match and Mismatch conditions. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies (Clark & Sengul, 1978; Webb & Abrahamson, 1976), which have suggested an age effect 
on children’s demonstrative comprehension. One potential explanation for this age effect may 
come from children’s cognitive development, such as Theory of Mind. As discussed in previous 
section, children develop their language abilities while the development of their cognitive 
abilities is still under way; thus, as children are developing their Theory of Mind gradually, their 
demonstrative comprehension may also develop toward adult-like.  
 
3.4.4.3. Results of the Theory of Mind task: the Hiding Game 
In the Hiding Game, participants were asked to find the hidden donut and crucially, 
participants needed to point to the Knower’s box in order to find the hidden donut. Children’s 
performances were categorized as either ‘passers’ or ‘failers’ following the criteria used in 
Schick et al. (2007). Children were categorized as ‘passers’ if (i) they pointed to the Knower’s 
box in four out of five trials, and (ii) they were able to do so for at least three trials in a row. 
Fifteen out of 37 children were categorized as ‘passers’ in this task. The ratio of the passers and 
failers in the ToM task within each age group is presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8. The ratio of English-speaking passers and failers in Theory of Mind task (numbers of 
children/total number of children) 
  ToM Passers ToM Failers 
3 yr (N =10) 10% (1/10) 90% (9/10) 
4 yr (N=16) 37.5% (6/16) 62.5% (10/16) 
5 yr (N=8) 62.5% (5/8) 37.5% (3/8) 
6 yr (N=3) 100% (3/3) 0% (0/3) 
Total 40.54% (15/37) 59.46% (22/37) 
 
As shown in Table 8, most of the younger children failed in the task while older children were 
able to pass the task, which is consistent with previous findings on the similar task (Gale et al., 
1996; Schick et al., 2007); in particular, about half of 4-year-old children were able to pass the 
task, and most of the 5-year-olds were able to pass the task with the same standard. 
 
3.4.4.4. Results of the Executive Function task: the DCCS 
Two different order lists in DCCS were administered, in order to counterbalance the 
order of the sorting dimensions presented throughout the test. In List 1, children were told to sort 
cards according to the color in the Pre-switch Phase, and according to the shape in the Post-
switch Phase; in List 2, the order of the sorting dimension was presented in the reversed order. 
Half of the children (N=21) were presented the List 1 order, and the other half of the children 
(N=16) were presented the List 2 order. The mean percentages of the correct card sorting 
between the two order lists was compared by conducting a t-test, having ‘list (List 1 vs. List 2)’ 
as a between-subjects factor. The results revealed no significant differences in terms of the 
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correct sorting in the Post-switch Phase between lists (t(35) =-1.159, p = .254), which suggests 
that the order of the sorting dimensions does not affect children’s sorting performance. I thus 
collapsed the List-based grouping of the children and analyzed the data from all the children 
following Zelazo’s (2006) criteria. According to Zelazo, children pass the Pre-switch Phase if 
they can give correct responses in at least five out of six trials, and those who cannot do so will 
be considered as unable to understand the sorting rule. One child aged 3;10 was excluded from 
the following analysis based on this criterion. Children who passed the Pre-switch Phase were 
further categorized into ‘passers’ and the ‘failers’ on the basis of their performance in the Post-
switch Phase; for children who could give correct responses in at least five out of six trials in the 
Post-switch were categorized as ‘passers’.  
 
Table 9. The ratio of English-speaking passers and failers in Executive Function task (numbers 
of children/total number of children) 
  EF Passers EF Failers 
3 yr (N =10) 60% (6/10) 40% (4/10) 
4 yr (N=16) 56.25% (9/16) 43.75% (7/16) 
5 yr (N=8) 87.5% (7/8) 12.5% (1/8) 
6 yr (N=3) 100% (3/3) 0% (0/3) 
Total 67.57% (25/37) 32.43% (12/37) 
 
The results of the categorical analysis were illustrated in Table 9. Among the 37 children, 25 fell 
onto the ‘passers’ category while 12 fell in the ‘failers’ category.  
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3.4.4.5. Across-task correlation between the Judgment Task and cognitive tasks 
The main goal of the current experiment was to explore the relationship between English-
speaking children’s demonstrative comprehension based on a different perspective and their 
development of ToM and EF. In order to directly examine the relationship between children’s 
demonstrative comprehension and their cognitive development, Spearman’s Rho correlation 
coefficients were calculated among the following variables: (i) the mean accuracy of children’s 
demonstrative comprehension measured in the Judgment Task for each condition: mean 
percentage of correct responses (acceptance) on this-Match items; mean percentage of correct 
responses (rejection) on this-Mismatch items; mean percentage of correct responses (acceptance) 
on that-Match items; mean percentage of correct responses (rejection) on that-Mismatch items; 
(ii) pass/fail category in the Hiding Game; (iii) pass/fail category in the DCCS. The results are 
illustrated in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients with English-speaking children (rs (p)) 
 Pass/fail category in ToM task Pass/fail category in EF task 
Match on this   .115(.249) .141(.203) 
Mismatch on this  .288*(.042) .113(.252) 
Match on that .225(.090) .017(.461) 
Mismatch on that .167(.162) .200(.117) 
Note. All significance tests are one-tailed. * indicates p < .05 
 
As presented in Table 10, English-speaking children’s correct rejection on this is significantly 
correlated with their performance in the Hiding Game. No other correlation coefficient is 
significant. These results indicate that English-speaking children’s development of Theory of 
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Mind is related with their comprehension of this whereas their development of Executive 
Function may not be related to their demonstrative comprehension. Discussions on why 
Executive Function did not significantly correlate with demonstrative comprehension and why 
the comprehension of that did not show significant correlation with Theory of Mind will be 
presented in the section 4.6.  
Recall that the analyses conducted above are restricted to children who passed the Act-
out Task. An additional analysis on children who failed the Act-out Task (N = 15) was carried 
out to show that the correlation between Theory of Mind and children’s correct comprehension 
on this may be due to the perspective-taking ability that lies in the demonstratives. The results 
showed that the comprehension of this-Mismatch items by children who failed the Act-out Task 
did not revealed a significant correlation with either Theory of Mind (rs = -.108, p = .351) or 
Executive Function (rs = .224, p = .212).  
 
3.4.5. Summary of Experiment 1 
To summarize, Experiment 1 has shown that although many of the English-speaking 
children have no problem in comprehending demonstratives that are uttered by a speaker who 
shares the same perspective with them in the Act-out Task, they still had difficulties 
comprehending demonstratives when they were required to consider a different perspective in 
the Judgment Task. These children’s performance in the Judgment Task revealed a significant 
correlation to their performance in the Hiding Game, but not DCCS. In particular, children who 
passed Hiding Game returned better comprehension of this uttered by the speaker whose 
perspective was different from their own, whereas children who passed DCCS did not show such 
a tendency. This result suggests that English-speaking children’s demonstrative comprehension, 
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particular comprehension of proximal demonstrative this, may be related to children’s Theory of 
Mind development, but probably not Executive Function. In the next section, Experiment 2 
focusing on Chinese-speaking children’s comprehension of demonstratives and cognitive 
development will be presented.  
 
3.5. Experiment 2: Child Chinese 
Experiment 2 cross-linguistically expanded Experiment 1 by investigating Chinese-
speaking children’s demonstrative comprehension in relation to their cognitive development. 
Recall that previous studies on children’s cognitive development have suggested that children 
who acquire different languages may have different developmental patterns on Theory of Mind 
and Executive Function. In particular, Chinese-speaking children have been found to perform 
differently in those two kinds of cognitive tasks than their English-speaking peers (D. Liu et al., 
2008; Sabbagh et al., 2006; Tsou, 2005; Wellman et al., 2011). This raises a question of whether 
Chinese-speaking children will also show a similar correlation pattern between their 
demonstrative comprehension and cognitive development. Experiment 2 thus investigates 
Chinese-speaking children’s demonstrative comprehension and its relationship with their Theory 
of Mind and Executive Function.   
 
3.5.1. Participants 
Sixty Chinese-speaking 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds (4;4-6;3, mean=5;2) participated in 
Experiment 2, including 25 four-year-olds (4;4-4;11, mean=4;7), 26 five-year-olds (5;0-5;11, 
mean=5;5), and 9 six-year-olds (6;0-6;3, mean=6;1). Two additional children were tested but 
their data were excluded for (1) not completing the task, and (2) did not understanding the rule of 
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the task from the analysis due to not completing all the tasks or failing to learn how to complete 
the tasks. In addition, 16 adult native Chinese speakers also participated (19;9-38;11, 
mean=33;8), serving as the adult control group. The child participants were recruited in two 
preschools in Chiayi, Taiwan. In addition, an adult control group of 16 adult native Chinese 
speakers also participated (19;9-38;11, mean=33;8). The adult participants were recruited in 
Taipei, Taiwan. 
 
3.5.2. Tasks 
The tasks in Experiment 2 were Chinese translated versions of the ones used in 
Experiment 1 with English-speaking children. In Experiment 2, I also administered two 
demonstrative linguistic comprehension tasks, including the Act-out Task and the Judgment Task, 
as well as two cognitive tasks, including the Hiding Game and the DCCS. The only difference 
between the tasks used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is the language that was being used. 
Thus, the linguistic stimuli used in the linguistic comprehension tasks will be introduced in this 
section.  
The first task was the Act-out Task, which was used to assess children’s comprehension 
of demonstratives based on their own perspectives. In the task, children were given act-out 
instructions in Chinese such as in (19).    
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(19) ba7   X  fun  zai  zhe-/na-  ge      hezi  li 
 BA   X  put  in   this/that  CLgeneric  box  inside 
 ‘Put X in this/that box’ 
 
The second task was the Judgment Task, which was used to measure whether children 
can comprehend demonstratives based on a perspective which is different from their own. In the 
task, children listened to the King’s demand as in (20) and judged whether the Servant’s 
fulfillment matched or mismatched the demand. Example (20) is the sample of the demand 
stimuli.  
 
(20) ba    zhe/na   ge     X   tu    cheng lanse 
 BA   this/that CLgeneric X  paint  as    blue 
 ‘Paint this/that X blue’ 
 
3.5.3. Procedure 
Fifty-eight child participants participated in the study in a quiet room in their preschools 
and two other child participants participated in a quiet room in their houses. All children received 
all four tasks in the following order: the Act-out Task, the Judgment Task, the Hiding Game, and 
DCCS. All adult participants participated in a quiet room and were involved in only the linguistic 
comprehension tasks, including the Act-out Task and the Judgment Task. Recall that English-
                                                 
7
 Note that previous studies have already shown that children acquire the BA construction around three and 
four. In terms of production, children as young as age three can produce BA constructions appropriately in various 
types of contexts that required BA construction (Ping Li, 1993); while with respect to comprehension, four-years-old 
exhibit adult-like interpretation of the sentences with BA construction (Cheung, 1992). 
86 
speaking adults only participated in the Act-out Task and not the Judgment Task. All participants 
were invited individually to the study.  
 
3.5.4. Results and discussions 
3.5.4.1. Results of the Act-out Task 
The Act-out Task was used to ensure children’s ability to establish the distance contrast 
between the two demonstrative words based on their own perspective. I examined participants’ 
act-out responses to the instruction that has demonstrative words. The overall results are 
presented in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Percentages of correct responses in Act-out Task by Chinese-speaking children and 
adults (%(SD)) 
 Trials with zhe-ge (‘this’) Trials with na-ge (‘that’) 
Children (N = 60) 88.89 (15.74) 70.00 (32.30) 
Adults (N=16) 95.83 (17.00) 100.00 (0.00) 
 
The adults’ performance was near ceiling, and children overall exhibited above chance correct 
interpretations. Recall that the main goal of the current study was to explore the relationship 
between children’s cognitive development and their comprehension of demonstratives, 
particularly when demonstratives are uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective. The 
Act-out Task is thus used as the baseline, ensuring children’s ability to comprehend zhe-ge 
(‘this’) and na-ge (‘that’) contrastively based on their own perspective. Therefore, based on 
children’s responses, children were categorized into either ‘Act-out passers’ or ‘Act-out failers’. 
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Children who gave adult-like responses in (i) two out of three trials with zhe-ge (‘this’) and  (ii) 
two out of the three trials with na-ge (‘that’) were categorized as ‘Act-out passers’ (N = 47); 
otherwise, they fell into ‘Act-out failers’ category (N = 13).   
Within the group of ‘Act-out failers’, children could be further categorized into two 
groups based on their error response patterns: This-box-only group (N = 7) and Random group 
(N = 6). In This-box-only group, children put all the toy figurines in zhe-ge (‘this’) box, which 
was the box right in front of the child and the experimenter. This response pattern has been 
reported in previous literature (e.g., Tanz, 1980; Webb & Abrahamson, 1978). Children who 
exhibited this type of response pattern were proposed to have no contrast for demonstratives. In 
the Random group, excluding children who simply select the boxes with no specific pattern, 
there were three children who consistently selected zhe-ge (‘this’) box at least three times in a 
row and then switched to na-ge (‘that’) box; particularly, these children explicitly stated that they 
switched to na-ge (‘that’) box simply because the space in zhe-ge (‘this’) box was not enough for 
more toy figurines. To sum up, the ‘Act-out failers’ did not seem to understand that 
demonstrative words are used contrastively based on distance, and the asymmetric accuracy 
between zhe-ge (‘this’) and na-ge (‘that’) does not entail that children understood the meaning of 
zhe-ge (‘this’) but not na-ge (‘that’); in fact, they did not understand the distance contrast 
between the two demonstrative words. Therefore, for the remaining result section, I only 
analyzed data from the ‘Act-out passers’ in the other three tasks to see (1) whether their 
successful interpretation of demonstrative words based on their own perspective can be further 
extended to the cases where they need to incorporate a different perspective; (2) if yes, whether 
their successful demonstrative comprehension is related to their performance in the Theory of 
Mind task and Executive Function task.  
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3.5.4.2. Results of the Judgment Task 
In order to examine whether children who could comprehend demonstratives based on 
their own perspective could also correctly comprehend demonstratives based on others’ 
perspective, I focused on the Act-out ‘pass’ children’s responses in the Judgment Task. I 
calculated the percentage of correct responses in each condition for both children and adult 
controls. As shown in Table 12, adults were at ceiling for each condition, whereas children 
showed different patterns. Overall, children did not have problems accepting the Match 
conditions both with zhe-ge (‘this’) and na-ge (‘that’). However, children performed poorly in 
Mismatch conditions, suggesting that they were not able to reject painting outcomes that did not 
match the demand by the King. This is also the response pattern that was found with English-
speaking children.  
 
Table 12. Percentages of correct responses in Judgment Task by Chinese-speaking children and 
adults (%(SD)) 
  Children(N = 47) Adults (N =16) 
Match with zhe-ge 95.74 (14.10) 100.00 (0.00) 
Mismatch with zhe-ge 38.30 (43.26) 100.00 (0.00) 
Match with na-ge 91.49 (24.05) 100.00 (0.00) 
Mismatch with na-ge 40.43 (47.36) 100.00 (0.00) 
 
Children’s individual responses in the task were further analyzed. Ten out of 47 children 
correctly responded to all the trials, that is, they correctly accepted all the Match trials and 
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rejected all the Mismatch trials. These children’s responses were considered as adult-like. Only 
one child correctly responded to the Match trials and Mismatch trials on zhe-ge (‘this’), and 
failed to judge the trials on na-ge (‘that’), which suggests that this child did not distinguish na-ge 
(‘that’) from zhe-ge (‘this’) based on the King’s perspective. Twenty out of 47 children failed to 
reject Mismatch trials consistently, by accepting all the trials throughout. The reasons for this are 
already discussed in the Experiment 1. The responses from the rest of 16 children did not form a 
consistent response pattern. From the discussion above, error patterns seem to vary across 
children; nonetheless, these children’s data provide evidence showing that children were 
egocentric when comprehending demonstratives in that they were not able to establish the 
distance contrast between zhe-ge (‘this’) and na-ge (‘that’) based on a different perspective.    
Let me now discuss the results based on the age groups. Results in Table 13 shows an age 
effect numerically on the interpretation of demonstratives, particularly in the Mismatch 
conditions.  
 
Table 13. Percentages of correct responses in each condition from Chinese-speaking children 
with different age group (% (SD)) 
  4 yr (N=19) 5 yr (N=20) 6 yr   (N=8) 
Match with zhe-ge 100.00 (0.00) 92.50 (18.32) 93.75 (17.68) 
Mismatch with zhe-ge 26.32 (38.62) 35.00 (40.07) 75.00 (46.29) 
Match with na-ge 97.37 (11.47) 87.50 (27.51) 87.50 (35.36) 
Mismatch with na-ge 31.58 (44.75) 45.00 (48.40) 50.00 (53.45) 
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As shown in Table 13, children’s accuracy on mismatch conditions gradually increased as age 
increased. In particular, in zhe-ge-Mismatch, five-year-olds were still below chance level 
whereas six-year-olds’ average correct responses were as high as 75%.  Interestingly, in na-ge-
Mismatch, six-year-olds’ performances were still at chance level. This result is particularly 
different from what has been found with English-speaking children. Six-year-old English-
speaking children were 100% accurate on that-Mismatch items. One possible explanation for the 
different results between the two groups of language-acquiring children might be attributed to 
the linguistic differences on the distal demonstrative word na-ge (‘that’) or that in English. S. 
Huang (1999) has identified eight discourse-pragmatics functions of the distal demonstrative na-
ge (‘that’) in Mandarin Chinese. Among the eight functions, there are two that did not exist in 
English, which are connective use (i.e., used to loosely connect utterances) and pause-filler 
function (i.e., used during planning or retrieval of information). The analysis shows that Chinese 
distal demonstrative na-ge (‘that’) may have more functions compared to the English distal 
demonstrative that, which may suggest that the Chinese distal demonstrative na-ge (‘that’) may 
be more complicated than English that. The poor performance on na-ge-Mismatch items with the 
six-year-old Chinese-speaking children may reflect what has been suggested in the linguistic 
analysis. Since the distal demonstrative in Chinese has more functions than the English distal 
demonstrative, the Chinese distal demonstrative may be harder to fully master. In general, the 
six-year-old children’s overall performances on the Mismatch conditions were still poorer than 
adults. This finding is consistent with what has been suggested in previous literature. E. V. Clark 
and Amaral (2010) suggested that the full mastery of demonstrative interpretations would be at 
age six or even older. The results suggest that six-year-olds performed much better than four- 
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and five-year-olds; however, they were still not adult-like. Thus, the results also suggest that 
even six-year-olds did not fully master the demonstrative interpretations.  
 
3.5.4.3. Results of the Theory of Mind Task: The Hiding Game 
In the Hiding Game, children’s performances were analyzed based on whether they could 
find out the hidden objects in the Knower’s box. Based on Schick et al. (2007), children were 
categorized into passers if they found the hidden object four out of five times with three times in 
a row. Among the 47 Act-out ‘passers’, 29 children were categorized as ToM passers in the 
Hiding Game. Eighteen children who failed to meet the criteria were categorized as ToM failers. 
Note that five out of 18 failers were categorized as failers because they did not find the hidden 
object three times in a row, but found the hidden object four out of five times. More specifically, 
these children were wrong only in the third trial among the five trials. According to Gale et al. 
(1996) and Schick et al. (2007), this response pattern is interpreted as children simply guessing 
rather than relying on the Theory of Mind reasoning. It is interesting to note that this particular 
response pattern did not appear in Gale et al.’s (1996) study, although they set such a criterion.  
 
Table 14. Percentages of Chinese-speaking passers and failers in Hiding Game (numbers of 
children/total number of children) 
  ToM Passers ToM Failers 
4 yr (N=19) 52.63% (10/19) 47.37% (9/19) 
5 yr (N=20) 65% (13/20) 35% (7/20) 
6 yr (N=8) 75% (6/8) 25% (2/8) 
Total 61.70% (29/47) 38.30% (18/47) 
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With respect to the age group differences, as demonstrated in Table 14, nearly half of the four-
year-olds and the five-year-olds passed the task and only two six-year-olds failed the task. This 
age group difference was predicted based on previous studies (Gale et al., 1996; Schick et al., 
2007), although the number of passers was expected to be more than 50% for the four-year-old 
children. Gale et al. (1996) reported more than 60% of the four-year-olds passed this task.   
Recall that within the English-speaking children in Experiment 1, 37% of the four-year-
olds, 62% of the five-year-olds, and 100% of the six-year-olds were categorized as the EF 
passers. When compared with Chinese-speaking children shown in Table 14, the four-year-old 
Chinese-speaking children seemed to outperform English-speaking peers; however, the 
developmental pattern was the opposite when looking at six-year-olds’ data. This numerical 
comparison is particularly interesting because previous studies have reported either no 
differences between the two language-acquiring groups of children in terms of their ToM 
development (Sabbagh et al., 2006), or English-speaking children exceeding Chinese-speaking 
peers’ ToM performance. The results from both English-speaking children and Chinese-speaking 
children seem to suggest two possible directions, although the number of six-year-olds was low 
for English-speaking children.  
 
3.5.4.4. Results on the Executive Function Task: the DCCS 
Recall that I administered two different order lists in DCCS, in order to counterbalance 
the order of the sorting dimensions presented throughout the test. In List 1, children were told to 
sort cards according to the color in the Pre-switch Phase, and according to the shape in the Post-
switch Phase; in List 2, the order of the sorting dimension was presented in the reversed order. 
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Half of the children (N=22) were tested with the List 1 order, and the other half of the children 
(N=25) were tested with the List 2 order. The mean percentages of the correct card sorting in the 
Post-switch Phase between the two groups of children were compared, conducting an 
independent t-test. The result revealed no significant differences between lists (t(45) = .209, p 
= .836), which suggests that the order of the sorting dimensions does not affect children’s sorting 
performance.  
I thus collapsed children’s data and analyzed the data from all the children following 
Zelazo’s (2006) criteria. Based on Zelazo’s (2006) analysis criteria, I categorized children as EF 
‘passers’, if they first sorted cards correctly for five out of six trials in the Pre-switch Phase, and 
then sorted cards correctly for five out of six trials in the Post-switch Phase; otherwise, I 
categorized them as EF ‘failers’. In the Pre-switch Phase, all 47 children correctly sorted cards 
for six out of six trials, which means that all children were able to follow the sorting rules. In the 
Post-switch Phase, 30 out of 47 children were able to correctly sort cards in five out of six trials; 
these children were categorized as EF passers. The remaining seventeen children who failed to 
match the criteria were thus categorized as EF failers.  
 
Table 15. The percentages of Chinese-speaking passers and failers in DCCS (numbers of 
children/total number of children) 
  EF Passers EF Failers 
4 yr (N=19) 47.37% (9/19) 52.63% (10/19) 
5 yr (N=20) 70% (14/20) 30% (6/20) 
6 yr (N=8) 87.5% (7/8) 12.5% (1/8) 
Total 63.83% (30/47) 36.17% (17/47) 
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Let’s now turn to children’s ‘pass’ and ‘fail’ rate in different age groups. As presented in Table 
15, the number of passers increased while the age increased. However, in the four-year-old group, 
only half of the children passed the task, which was unexpected based on Zelazo, Frye, and 
Rapus’s (1996) findings with English-speaking children. Zelazo et al. (1996) reported that most 
of the three-year-olds had difficulty in switching to new rules in the Post-switch Phase; yet, the 
90% of the four- and five-year-olds should already have been successful at switching to the new 
rule in the Post-switch Phase. Intriguingly, in the current study, Chinese-speaking children seem 
to have more difficulties as compared with English-speaking children reported by Zelazo et al. 
(1996). In particular, the result shows that half of the four-year-olds still struggled to switch to 
the new rule. Additionally, when compared with English-speaking children reported in 
Experiment 1, the same cross-linguistic pattern still emerges. I will briefly discuss the cross-
linguistic pattern here, but a detailed discussion on the direct comparison will be provided in 
section 3.6.1. Recall that regarding English-speaking children’s pass ratio, 56% of four-year-olds, 
88% of five-year-olds, and 100% of six-year-olds passed the task. Compared with the data 
shown in Table 16, English-speaking children seem to perform slightly better than Chinese-
speaking peers when looking at the numerical tendency, although English-speaking children’s 
pass rate is not as high as Zelazo et al. (1996) has reported. This cross-linguistic pattern is not 
predicted from the findings of previous studies. In Sabbagh et al. (2006), when comparing the 
same age group, Chinese-speaking children outperformed their peers of English-speaking 
children in all of the EF tasks, including the task that is compatible with DCCS. This difference 
between English-speaking children and Chinese-speaking children, although not significant, may 
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potentially generate different results on the relationship between EF and demonstrative 
comprehension.   
 
3.5.4.5. Across-task correlation between the Judgment Task and cognitive tasks 
In order to examine the relationship between children’s demonstrative comprehension 
and their cognitive abilities, one-tailed Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients were conducted. 
The variables that were included in the analysis are shown as following: (i) the percentages of 
children’s correct demonstrative comprehension in the Judgment Task, which are the percentages 
of children’s acceptance of zhe-ge-Match items, the percentages of children’s rejection of zhe-
ge-Mismatch items, the percentages of children’s acceptance of na-ge-Match items, as well as 
the percentages of children’s correct rejection of na-ge-Mismatch items, (ii) the pass/fail 
category in the Hiding Game (ToM task), and (iii) the pass/fail category in the DCCS (EF task).  
 
Table 16. Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients with Chinese-speaking children (rs (p)) 
  Pass/fail category in ToM task Pass/fail category in EF task 
Match with zhe-ge .230(.060) -.071(.318) 
Mismatch with zhe-ge .249*(.046) .150(.157) 
Match with na-ge  -.175(.119) -.034(.411) 
Mismatch with na-ge  .208(.080) -.017(.456) 
Note. All significance tests are one-tailed.   * indicates p < .05 
 
The correlation results were exactly the same as the one from in Experiment 1 with 
English-speaking children; as presented in Table 16, only the correct rejection rate in the zhe-ge-
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Mismatch conditions is significantly correlated with children’s performance in the Hiding Game, 
which was also the only significant correlation found for English-speaking children in 
Experiment 1. Children’s correct responses in na-ge (‘that’) conditions did not significantly 
correlate with their performance in the Hiding Game. Additionally, regarding the development of 
Executive Function, there is no significant correlation between the correct responses for each 
condition in the Judgment Task and the performance in DCCS. The results thus suggest that 
children’s comprehension of demonstratives, particularly zhe-ge (‘this’) is related with children’s 
development of Theory of Mind, whereas the development of Executive Function is not related 
to children’s comprehension of demonstratives. The results of the cross-task analysis support the 
prediction of the current study, showing the exact same correlation pattern as in Experiment 1 
with English-speaking children. 
The above analyses focused on children who passed the Act-out Task. I further analyzed 
children who failed the Act-out Task (N = 13) and aimed to examine whether their performances 
in the Judgment Task was related to their cognitive abilities. Results showed that the Act-out 
Failers’ comprehension of zhe-ge did not significantly correlate with their Theory of Mind (rs = -
.141, p = .323) nor Executive Function (rs = .058, p = .426). This result provides a further 
support to the hypothesis that children’s difficulty in comprehending demonstrative based on a 
different perspective is related to their Theory of Mind, suggesting that it would be children’s 
ability to incorporate the speaker’s perspective in demonstrative comprehension that is related to 
the cognitive development, not other component of demonstrative meaning such as distance 
distinction.  
 
97 
3.5.5. Summary of Experiment 2 
In sum, Experiment 2 with Chinese-speaking children has shown the exact same response 
patterns that have been found in Experiment 1 with English-speaking children. Although 
Chinese-speaking children have no problems in comprehending demonstratives based on their 
own perspective in the Act-out Task, many of them still exhibit non-adult-like comprehension 
when the demonstratives are uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective in the 
Judgment Task. Children’s demonstrative comprehension in the Judgment Task, particularly the 
comprehension of the proximal demonstrative zhe-ge (‘this’), correlated with their performances 
in the Hiding Game, but not DCCS.  Results from Chinese-speaking children indicate that 
children’s comprehension of demonstratives may be indeed related to their Theory of Mind. But 
the role that Executive Function may play in children’s demonstrative comprehension remains 
unclear.    
 
3.6. General discussions on demonstrative comprehension and cognitive development 
The current studies aim to examine the relationship between children’s comprehension of 
demonstratives and their cognitive development, particularly, their development of Theory of 
Mind and Executive Function. Results from both Experiment 1 with English-speaking children 
and Experiment 2 with Chinese-speaking children revealed that children’s comprehension of 
demonstratives is related to their development of Theory of Mind, but probably not Executive 
Function. More specifically, the results suggest that Theory of Mind plays an important role in 
children’s comprehension of the proximal demonstrative, this in English and zhe-ge (‘this’) in 
Mandarin Chinese. However, the role of Executive Function in demonstrative comprehension is 
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still unclear. The results support the hypothesis of the current study, showing that demonstrative 
comprehension and Theory of Mind are interrelated.  
In the following sections, an additional cross-linguistic analysis on the interaction 
between language background, Theory of Mind, and Executive Function on children’s 
demonstrative comprehension will be presented, following the discussions of (i) the role of 
language background in the comprehension of demonstratives, (ii) the relationship between 
demonstrative comprehension and Theory of Mind, (iii) the relationship between demonstrative 
comprehension and Executive Function, and (iv) the comprehension of distal demonstrative, that 
in English and na-ge (‘that’) in Mandarin Chinese.  
 
3.6.1. The role of language background in the comprehension of demonstratives: a cross-
linguistic examination  
The cross-task analyses on both English-speaking and Chinese-speaking children have 
revealed that children’s correct rejection on Mismatch items of the proximal demonstrative, such 
as this, correlates with Theory of Mind performances, indicating that Theory of Mind may play a 
role in children’s demonstrative comprehension, particularly on proximal demonstrative. 
However, the results from the cognitive tasks seem to differ between the two groups of children. 
The summary of the results of Hiding Game and DCCS across the two groups of children are 
repeated in Table 17 and Table 18 respectively.  
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Table 17. The ratio of passers and failers in Theory of Mind task (numbers of children/total 
number of children) 
 English-speaking children Chinese-speaking children 
  ToM Passers ToM Failers ToM Passers ToM Failers 
4 yr  37.5% (6/16) 62.5% (10/16) 52.63% (10/19) 47.37% (9/19) 
5 yr  62.5% (5/8) 37.5% (3/8) 65% (13/20) 35% (7/20) 
6 yr  100% (3/3) 0% (0/3) 75% (6/8) 25% (2/8) 
Total 66.67% (15/27) 33.33% (22/27) 61.70% (29/47) 38.30% (18/47) 
 
Table 18. The ratio of passers and failers in Executive Function task (numbers of children/total 
number of children) 
 English-speaking children Chinese-speaking children 
  EF Passers EF Failers EF Passers EF Failers 
4 yr  56.25% (9/16) 43.75% (7/16) 47.37% (9/19) 52.63% (10/19) 
5 yr  87.5% (7/8) 12.5% (1/8) 70% (14/20) 30% (6/20) 
6 yr  100% (3/3) 0% (0/3) 87.5% (7/8) 12.5% (1/8) 
Total 81.25% (25/27) 18.75% (12/27) 63.83% (30/47) 36.17% (17/47) 
 
As demonstrated in Table 17, Chinese-speaking children’s performances in the Hiding 
Game, the Theory of Mind task, seem to be better than those of English-speaking children. In 
particular, considering the pass rate in the four-year-olds, Chinese-speaking children were more 
likely to pass the task than English-speaking peers. Although the six-year-olds showed the 
reverse tendency, the number of English-speaking children was much lower and may not be 
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representative enough for a direct comparison. While Chinese-speaking children seemed to 
exceed their English-speaking peers’ performance in Theory of Mind task, English-speaking 
children seemed to outperform Chinese-speaking children in the DCCS, the Executive Function 
task. As presented in Table 18, the overall pass rate for English-speaking children was 
numerically higher than that of Chinese-speaking children. Given the numerical differences of 
children’s performances across the two groups of children observed in Table 17 and 18, it would 
be worthwhile to conduct a cross-linguistic analysis that takes into consideration children’s 
performances in Theory of Mind task and Executive Function task. Recall that children’s 
interpretation of proximal demonstrative was of particular interest; crucially, in the Judgment 
Task, I was particularly interested in how children respond to the Mismatch items of proximal 
demonstrative. Thus, to examine the role of children’s language background while considering 
the effect from Theory of Mind, and Executive Function on their demonstrative comprehension, 
I conducted a two (Language: English vs. Chinese) by two (the pass/fail category of ToM) by 
two (the pass/fail category of EF) ANOVA, including the mean percentages of children’s 
rejection on Mismatch items of proximal demonstrative as the dependent variable. The summary 
of the ANOVA results is demonstrated in Table 19.  
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Table 19. 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA  
  df F p 
(A) Pass/fail category of ToM  1 3.747 .057 
(B) Pass/fail category of EF  1 1.919 .170 
(C) Language 1 1.260 .265 
A x B (interaction) 1 1.578 .213 
A x C (interaction) 1 .008 .928 
B x C (interaction) 1 .010 .922 
A x B x C (interaction) 1 .001 .976 
 
As shown in Table 19, no significant main effect of language was found in children’s judgment 
in the mismatch trials on proximal demonstrative (F(1, 76) = 1.260, p = .265), suggesting that no 
matter which language children acquire, children of different language-speaking communities 
may not differ from each other. Regarding children’s cognitive abilities, there was a marginal 
main effect of the pass/fail category of ToM on children’s rejection of mismatch trials on 
proximal demonstrative, such as this and zhege (F(1, 76) = 3.747,  p = .057). In particular, ToM 
passers (M = 43.18, SD = 42.58) tend to reject more mismatch trials on proximal demonstratives 
in the Judgment Task than ToM failers (M = 20.00, SD = 33.59). However, there was no 
significant main effect of the pass/fail category of EF (F(1, 76) = 1.191, p = .170). There were 
also no significant interactions among these variables.  
These results indicate that the language children are acquiring may not have played an 
important role in children’s demonstrative comprehension in the current studies. Children’s 
difficulty with demonstrative comprehension may thus be a universal issue since it was found in 
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both English and Chinese, although further cross-linguistic evidence is required. This result is 
also supported by previous studies. Zhao (2007), who investigated Chinese-speaking children’s 
demonstrative comprehension, also reported that children fail to consider the speaker’s 
perspective and thus exhibit egocentric demonstrative comprehension. Zhao’s finding suggests 
that children in general may face difficulty in perspective-taking when comprehending 
demonstratives.  
However, the semantic features of demonstratives vary across languages (Diessel, 1999). 
Languages that employ speaker-object distance scale in demonstratives usually have a two-way 
system as English and Chinese do. The two-way system has a proximal demonstrative that picks 
out an object near the speaker and a distal demonstrative that picks out an object that is some 
distance away from the speaker. Some languages, such as Spanish and Japanese, have a three-
way system. Anderson and Keenan (1985) suggest that the three-way system could be divided 
into “distance-oriented” system and “person-oriented” system (cf. Diessel, 1999, p.39). Taking 
an example from Diessel (1999), Spanish is a distance-oriented system in which este points to a 
proximate object, ese points to an object in the medial, and aquel points to a far object, whereas 
Japanese is a person-oriented system in which kore points to an object near the speaker, sore 
points to an object near the hearer, and are points to an object away from both speaker and 
hearer. Interestingly, the person-oriented system may allow a four-way distinction. For example, 
according to Diessel’s (1999) typological survey, in Quileute, xo′’a points to an object near the 
speaker, so′’o points to an object near the hearer, sa′’a points to an object near both the speaker 
and the hearer, and áːtca’a points to an object away from both the speaker and the hearer. 
Regardless of the two-way or three-way system, the object-speaker distance scale encoded in 
demonstratives appears to be the most frequently used contrast in world languages.      
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In addition to the distance contrast, demonstratives in other languages have different 
deictic distinctions such as visibility of the referent (e.g., Ute), up/down elevation (e.g., Khasi), 
geographical features (e.g., Dyirbal), and the movement of the referent (e.g., Nunggubuyu) (see 
discussions in Diessel, 1999). Since the discussion in this chapter only aims to show the 
linguistic-internal differences across languages, only two most frequent features encoded in 
world languages, invisibility and elevation, will be briefly reviewed. Regarding the invisibility 
feature, typically, there would be a proximal demonstrative, distal demonstrative and a third 
demonstrative that picks out the invisible object. For example, Ute has a proximal demonstrative ′
íca̠, a distal demonstrative máru ̠ , and a demonstrative for invisible object ′úru̠ (Diessel, 1999, 
p.42). With respect to elevation, typically, languages that have elevation features would have a 
demonstrative that picks out an object from a higher position relative to the reference point and a 
demonstrative that picks out an object from a lower position. For example, in Khasi, u-tey 
indicates the object higher than the reference point and u-thie indicates the object lower than the 
reference point. As shown in the above examples, demonstratives have features other than 
distance; however, children’s acquisition of these features is understudied.   
Therefore, to better understand children’s demonstrative comprehension, further cross-
linguistic investigation is called for, particularly taking into account these aforementioned cross-
linguistic variations in demonstrative representations. The study in the following chapter 
attempts to investigate a language-specific characteristic in demonstratives in Chinese, with 
respect to how it may influence children’s demonstrative comprehension. 
 With respect to children’s cognitive development, children’s ToM development may 
have impact on children’s rejection of Mismatch items on proximal demonstrative; however, 
children’s EF development does not seem to play an important role in terms of children’s correct 
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comprehension of proximal demonstrative. Results from the cross-linguistic analysis in the 
current study further strengthen the claim that Theory of Mind is related to children’s 
comprehension of demonstratives.  Furthermore, although numerical differences between the two 
language-acquiring groups of children were observed, the ANOVA result presented above did 
not reveal significant interaction between children’s language background and their Theory of 
Mind development or their Executive Function development. In other words, the tendency of the 
different cognitive developmental pattern observed between the two groups of children does not 
appear to impact children’s demonstrative comprehension. Previous studies have reported 
different developmental patterns on Theory of Mind and Executive Function between English-
speaking and Chinese-speaking children, although it is still under debate whether the differences 
exist. For example, Tsou (2005) and D. Liu et al. (2008) suggested that Chinese-speaking 
children performed poorer than their English-speaking peers on the Theory of Mind tasks; on the 
contrary, Sabbagh et al. (2006) revealed that Chinese-speaking children and English-speaking 
peers did not differ from each other in terms of their performances on the Theory of Mind tasks, 
but Chinese-speaking children performed significantly better on Executive Function tasks than 
their English-speaking peers. Regardless of the disagreement among the findings discussed 
above, Devin and Hugh (2013, 2014) conducted a large-scale meta-analysis across all the studies 
seeking the correlation between Theory of Mind and Executive Function, and suggested that the 
development of Theory of Mind and Executive Function are significantly correlated even if the 
language backgrounds are considered. Thus, the development of Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function are similar across different language-acquiring groups. The results of the current study 
may be more in line with this argument suggesting that the language children are acquiring may 
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not affect children’s development of Theory of Mind and Executive Function under the situation 
where the comprehension of demonstratives is considered.  
 
3.6.2. Comprehension of demonstratives and Theory of Mind 
When comprehending demonstratives, children need to understand that the speaker may 
have a different perspective and incorporate the speaker’s perspective to resolve the reference of 
demonstrative. This ability is considered to be related to children’s Theory of Mind (de Villiers, 
2007; Diessel, 2012). The results from English-speaking children and Chinese-speaking children 
suggested that children’s ability to take the speaker’s perspective into account in identifying the 
referents for demonstratives is related to their development of Theory of Mind. In particular, 
children who are more likely to interpret proximal demonstratives appropriately are also more 
likely to be successful in the Theory of Mind task, which measures children’s Knowledge Access. 
Recall that Knowledge Access is the ability to estimate others’ knowledge status and understand 
that others may have a different perspective. It is thus implied that children who are not able to 
understand that others may have different perspectives from their own would not be able to 
interpret proximal demonstrative in adult-like way. In other words, children’s ability to consider 
the speaker’s perspectives when interpreting proximal demonstrative may indeed be related to 
their development of Theory of Mind.  
Furthermore, additional analyses were conducted on children who did not pass the Act-
out Task and thus were excluded from the results shown above. Results on these Act-out Failers 
in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 did not reveal a significant correlation between their 
performances in the Judgment Task and Theory of Mind Task. This suggests that if children 
could not establish the distance contrast of the demonstratives based on their own perspective, 
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their non-adult-like comprehension of demonstratives based on a different perspective would not 
relate to their development of Theory of Mind. That is to say, children’s Theory of Mind 
development only related to children’s ability in perspective-taking in demonstrative 
comprehension. This result strengthened the claim that children’s ability to incorporate the 
speaker’s perspective is the main component in demonstrative comprehension that relates to 
children’s Theory of Mind.  
The result of the current study is in line with De Mulder’s (2011) and others’ argument 
(e.g., Resches & Perez Pereira, 2007), which states that Theory of Mind plays a role in children’s 
ability to take the interlocutor’s perspectives. This is consistent with the common understanding 
of the nature of Theory of Mind. Theory of Mind is considered to be part of socio-cognitive 
development (Arslan, 2012; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; Wellman, 2010). In other words, it is 
the ability that is needed for an efficient communication and should be deeply related with 
children’s pragmatic development. For instance, Theory of Mind is often discussed with autism. 
Previous research has suggested that the poor communicative skills of autistic children may be 
related to their under-developed Theory of Mind (e.g., J. de Villiers, Stainton, & Szatmari, 2007; 
Happé, 1993). Although the direction in which Theory of Mind and language may interact is still 
under debate, results from the current study and others may suggest that Theory of Mind indeed 
plays a role in children’s ability to consider others’ perspectives.  
 
3.6.3. Comprehension of demonstratives and Executive Function 
The results in the current study show that children’s comprehension of demonstratives 
did not significantly correlate with their Executive Function, suggesting that Executive Function 
may not play a role in children’s demonstrative comprehension. This result is in line with De 
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Mulder’s (2011) findings. Contrary to the findings in previous studies showing that children’s 
perspective-taking communication is related to their EF (e.g., Nilsen & Graham, 2009, 2012), De 
Mulder reported that only Theory of Mind is the good predictor of children’s successful 
perspective-taking in communication. She further suggests that understanding others’ mental 
states is the most crucial cognitive ability for children to correctly use referring expressions in 
communications.   
However, although the results on Executive Function are consistent with De Mulder’s 
findings, the relationship between children’s comprehension of demonstratives and Executive 
Function is still unclear as tested in the current study. Recall that studies have suggested that 
children’s ability to track the interlocutors’ perspectives in conversation is related to their 
Executive Function (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen & Graham, 2009, 2012). In addition to 
perspective taking, the salience biased response pattern revealed by Tanz (1980) was also argued 
to be associated with children’s cognitive flexibility in EF.  Based on these two arguments, I 
hypothesized that in order for children to correctly comprehend demonstratives based on a 
different perspective, they need to disengage from their own perspective and reengage with the 
speaker’s perspective which is different from their own; also, in order for children to inhibit the 
attention to the object that is visually salient but not under discussion and shift their attention to 
the correct object the speaker intended, children may also require better cognitive flexibility. 
These reasons are why cognitive flexibility (shifting) may play a role in children’s demonstrative 
comprehension.   
The current study selected DCCS as the measurement of EF, which was suggested as a 
measure to examine children’s cognitive flexibility in some studies (e.g., Zelazo, 2006) while it 
was also argued to be examining their inhibition control in other studies (Kloo, Perner, Aichhorn, 
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& Schmidhuber, 2010). Kloo et al. (2010) claim that children fail to switch the rule in the Post-
switch Phase because they cannot inhibit the first rule they followed. Nilsen and Graham (2009), 
who studied children’s perspective-taking communication in relation to their EF development, 
have revealed that inhibition control is the most crucial EF component that is associated with 
children’s ability to take a different perspective in communication. Note that Nilsen and Graham 
(2009) did not use DCCS to measure children’s inhibition control rather they used tasks that are 
similar to Stroop task. Given that what DCCS measures is still unclear and children’s 
perspective-taking ability may be related to their inhibition control, it is possible that other tasks 
measuring children’s Executive Function, particularly those that measure inhibition control, may 
associate with their demonstrative comprehension. Thus, one future direction to understand more 
about the role of EF in demonstrative comprehension is to include other types of EF 
measurements, such as Stroop task and Flanker’s task that measures inhibition controls. If 
inhibition control is indeed related with perspective-taking, a correlation between children’s 
demonstrative comprehension and their inhibition control abilities may emerge. 
Let me now discuss the salience biased response pattern proposed by Tanz (1980) in light 
of Executive Function. In Tanz’s experiment, she administered Act-out Task to test children’s 
demonstrative comprehension based on a different perspective. Her results revealed that children 
tended to pick up objects near the puppet speaker because the puppet speaker was moving and 
thus attracted the child’s attention so much that the child could not shift his/her attention to the 
demonstrative word used in the act-out instruction. That is, the perceptual saliency from the 
object may have potentially posed problems for children to correctly comprehend demonstratives. 
Based on Tanz’s argument, I hypothesized that children’s inability to disengage their attention 
from the moving puppet is related to their Executive Function. However, the current study was 
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not designed to directly assess whether the perceptual saliency in demonstrative comprehension 
is related to children’s Executive Function. When examining children’s demonstrative 
comprehension based on a different perspective, I used picture story judgment task instead of an 
act-out task. In addition, in the Judgment Task, I tried to minimize the saliency issue in the 
critical pictures. I made the two objects exactly the same in size and color. The only difference 
about the two objects was the distance to the King, who was the speaker. Most importantly, from 
the child’s orientation point, the two objects were equal-distant to the child. Given these, I may 
not be able to directly assess the claim by Tanz (1980). Therefore, another future direction to 
explore the role of Executive Function in demonstrative comprehension is to use the act-out task 
to test children’s comprehension of demonstratives based on a different perspective.  
 
3.6.4. Comprehension of distal demonstrative  
Let me now discuss why the comprehension of distal demonstratives, such as that in 
English and na-ge (‘that’) in Mandarin Chinese, did not provide results parallel to the proximal 
demonstrative, such as this and zhe-ge (‘this’). As discussed in the previous section, Levinson 
(2004) suggested that the distal demonstrative that can be used in a wider range of contexts than 
proximal demonstrative this; in other words, the uses of this are more restricted. For example, if 
an object is located near the speaker, the speaker could felicitously use either this or that to 
indicate the object, but if the object is located far from the speaker, he/she could only use that to 
refer to the object felicitously. If considering such a claim, it may be predicted that the 
interpretation of that could be more challenging than this for young children. Such a difficulty 
may be supported by the following observation in the pilot study with adult native speakers of 
English. Some adult participants in the pilot study commented that in the Judgment Task, the 
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distal demonstrative that could be appropriately used with the objects that are either near the 
speaker or apart from the speaker. Therefore, the lack of association between children’s 
comprehension of the distal demonstrative, as well as their poorer performance with the distal 
demonstrative than with the proximal demonstrative, may reflect this vagueness about the most 
felicitous circumstances to use that. 
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Chapter 4. EFFECT OF LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC PROPERTY ON DEMONSTRATIVE 
COMPREHENSION: CHILD MANDARIN AS A TESTING CASE 
 
The previous chapter examined a potential role of an extra-linguistic factor (i.e., 
children’s development of cognitive abilities) on their demonstrative comprehension, seeking to 
explore why children exhibit non-adult-like interpretations of demonstratives when the speaker 
has a perspective different from their own. In this chapter, I will present a study to investigate the 
role of language-internal factors, i.e., language-specific morphological characteristics in the 
representation of demonstratives, which may play a role in children’s demonstrative 
comprehension, seeking to understand whether there may be any linguistic-specific properties 
that may help children to avoid comprehension errors.  
The representation of demonstratives varies across languages (Diessel, 1999). 
Demonstratives in some languages, such as English, are monomorphemic, while in other 
languages, such as Mandarin Chinese, demonstratives may contain more than one morpheme. In 
Mandarin Chinese, a demonstrative co-occurs with a classifier, which is a morpheme that 
specifies the semantic category of its associated noun. In this chapter, I will show that Chinese-
speaking children are able to use the semantic information from the classifier to facilitate their 
demonstrative comprehension. In what follows, I will first review the internal structure of 
demonstrative phrases and classifier systems in Mandarin Chinese and discuss relevant 
psycholinguistic studies and acquisition studies. I will then present the study conducted with 
Chinese-speaking children exploring the role of classifiers in their demonstrative comprehension.  
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4.1. Demonstratives in Mandarin Chinese 
A demonstrative phrase in Mandarin Chinese is composed of a demonstrative word and a 
classifier; optionally, numbers will occur between the demonstrative and the classifier and nouns 
may or may not occur in the phrase (C. T. J. Huang et al., 2009). The basic structure of 
demonstrative phrases is demonstrated in (21a) with some examples of the demonstrative phrases 
as shown in (21b), in which the noun is pronounced, and (21c), in which the noun is not overtly 
pronounced. The sequence of demonstrative phrases is suggested to be fixed (Tang, 1990).  
 
(21) a.  Demonstrative + (number) + *(classifier) + noun 
 b.  zhe  (yi)   zhi   mao 
     this (one)  CLanimal cat 
     ‘This cat.’ 
 c.  zhe  (yi)   zhi 
     this (one)  CLanimal 
     ‘This (one).’ 
 
As can be seen in (21a), the occurrence of the classifiers is obligatory in most of the context 
(Tang, 2007), which suggests a close relationship between demonstratives and classifiers from a 
syntactic perspective. In addition, the relationship between classifier and the noun are also 
suggested to be close since the classifiers categorize their associated noun based on the semantic 
categories of the nouns. As the classifiers interact with demonstratives and numbers on the one 
hand and establish the semantic dependency with the noun on the other, the classifier’s syntactic 
position in the tree structure has been debated (Hsieh, 2008c; Tang, 1990, 2007; N. N. Zhang, 
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2011, 2012). In the following sections, the previous analysis of the classifier’s syntactic position 
will first be presented and then a discussion of how the classifiers’ semantic dependency on the 
noun facilitates online sentence processing will be presented.  
 
4.1.1. The role of the classifiers in demonstrative phrase 
Demonstratives or numerals
8
 obligatorily precede classifiers in most contexts; meanwhile 
classifiers establish semantic relationships with their associated nouns. Given that the elements 
preceding and following the classifiers seem to have certain relationships with the classifiers, the 
classifiers’ syntactic role in the demonstrative phrase has been of particular interest to 
researchers. Before discussing the syntactic position of classifiers in the demonstrative phrase, let 
me first examine the context in which the classifiers are obligatory. Tang (2007) suggested that 
the syntactic position of the entire demonstrative phrase in a sentence determined whether the 
classifiers were required. The classifiers are obligatory when the demonstrative phrases are 
located in the object position as in (22) while they are optional when the demonstrative phrases 
are in the subject position as in (23).  
 
(22) wo   xihuan  zhe   *(zhi)    mao 
  I    like    this    CLanimal  cat 
 ‘I like this cat.’ 
 
                                                 
8
 Chinese classifiers are numeral classifiers, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. As they 
are numeral classifiers, these classifiers are argued to have close relationship with the numerals which belong to the 
elements precede the classifier.  
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(23) zhe/na    (zhi)    shi  mao 
 this/that   CLanimal  be  cat 
 ‘This is a cat.’ 
 
Sentence (22) shows that the classifier -zhi is obligatory to co-occur with the noun cat. It should 
be noted that the occurrence of the classifier is still obligatory even when a demonstrative phrase 
is used pronominally in the object position. For example, in (24), the sentence would be 
ungrammatical if the classifier were omitted.  
 
(24) wo   xihuan  zhe   *(zhi)    (mao) 
  I     like    this    CLanimal  (cat) 
 ‘I like this (cat).’ 
 
Although the noun is not overtly pronounced in the pronominal demonstrative phrase such as the 
one in (24), the classifier still implements the semantic dependency with the referent it is 
associated with. Thus, the classifier in the pronominal demonstrative phrase provides the 
semantic information of the referent. For instance, in (24), the classifier –zhi can only categorize 
nouns that denote ‘animals’; thus, the referent of the pronominal demonstrative phrase must be a 
type of animal in order to be semantically compatible with the classifier –zhi.   
The semantic dependency between a classifier and its associated noun is suggested to be 
maintained at a syntactic level. Theorists have proposed different accounts on the position of a 
classifier in the demonstrative phrase in order to explain the classifier’s role within the 
demonstrative phrase. The debate regards whether the classifier is syntactically closer to the 
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noun or closer to the numbers (Hsieh, 2008a; C. T. J. Huang et al., 2009; Y.-h. A. Li, 1998; Tang, 
1990; N. N. Zhang, 2012) and thus proposed right-branch structure and left-branch structure. 
Figure 14 demonstrates the right-branch structure. As shown in Figure 15, the number phrase 
(NumP) contains number (Num) and the classifier phrase (ClP); within the ClP, the classifier 
(CL) is in the specifier position and its sister node is the noun phrase (NP). Since the CL is the 
sister of the NP in the right-branch structure, researchers supporting this analysis suggest that the 
classifiers are syntactically closer to the noun. The main argument in this analysis is based on the 
semantic dependency between the classifier and the noun or the associated object. Zhang (2012) 
suggested that in this type of structure the semantic dependency between the noun and the 
classifiers is maintained through a head-to-head manner under this structure.  
 
  
Figure 15. Right-branch structure (Li, 
1998; Huang, Li, &Li, 2007; N. Zhang, 
2012) 
Figure 16. Left-branch structure 
(Hsieh, 2008c; Tang, 1990) 
 
Figure 16 demonstrates the left-branch structure. As shown in Figure 16, the NumP is in the 
specifier position of the NP and is the sister of the CL node. Researchers supporting this left-
branching structure thus argue that the relationship between number and classifier is syntactically 
closer. This argument is based on the fact that the classifiers in Mandarin Chinese are numeral 
classifiers, suggesting that classifiers should establish a closer syntactic relationship with the 
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numerals. The semantic dependency between the N and the CL can be maintained through other 
mechanisms (See discussion in Hsieh, 2008). 
However, this structural difference does not affect the discussion and conclusion of the 
present project and the present study do not attempt to solve the theoretical debate. The main 
interest in the present study is to see how the classifiers may act as a precursor to the category of 
the following noun. In other words, the present study focuses on how the classifiers establish the 
semantic dependency with the associated noun at the syntactic level. According to Zhang (2011, 
2012), the right-branch structure has the easier mechanism to maintain the semantic relationship 
between the classifier and its associated noun. N. N. Zhang (2011, 2012) suggested that the 
semantic dependency of the classifier can be maintained by the c-command relationship between 
the classifier and its associated noun. Based on Zhang’s statement, the right-branch structure of 
the demonstrative phrase in Chinese was adopted as the theoretical framework of the present 
study. Thus, for a pronominal demonstrative phrase as in (25), the syntactical tree structure is 
presented in Figure 17.  
 
(25) zhe   ge      (ren) 
 this   CLgeneric   (person) 
 ‘This (person).’ 
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Figure 17. Tree structure of pronominal demonstrative phrase in Chinese 
 
In this syntactic analysis, according to Tang (1990), the semantic feature of the classifier and its 
associated noun undergo head-to-head checking procedure, and thus the semantic dependency 
between the classifier and its associated noun is maintained syntactically. Importantly, in this 
phrasal structure, the occurrence of classifiers is required in both prenominal demonstrative 
phrases and pronominal demonstrative phrases while numerals appear optionally.  
This theoretical assumption has been adopted in the acquisition research on child Chinese. 
Previous studies have suggested that children seem to possess the knowledge of the phrasal 
structure within the demonstrative phrase in Chinese (Chang, 2011; Hu, 1993; H. Liu, 2008). In 
particular, children are aware that the classifier is obligatory in the demonstrative phrases and 
they never produce demonstrative phrases without classifiers. This leads me to propose that the 
classifiers may potentially play some role in children’s comprehension of demonstratives.  
 
4.2. Chinese classifiers 
The current section will provide a detailed review of the classifiers in Mandarin Chinese.  
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4.2.1. The classifier system in Mandarin Chinese 
Mandarin Chinese is a language that uses classifiers, and is thus categorized as a 
classifier language (Allan, 1977). The classifier languages can be further distinguished into 
several types, including numeral classifier languages, concordial classifier languages, predicate 
classifier languages, and intra-locative classifier languages (Allan, 1977). Building upon Allan’s 
categorizations, Grinevald (2000) proposed four different categorizations of classifiers from a 
morphosyntactic perspective, in which classifiers can be categorized into numeral classifiers, 
noun classifiers, genitive classifiers, and verbal classifiers. Mandarin Chinese uses numeral 
classifiers
9
.  A numeral classifier is defined as the classifier that occurs in the context of 
quantification and usually appears with numerals. Consider example (26)-(28). The classifiers all 
appear in the counting context.   
 
(26) san  ge      nuhai 
 three CLgeneral  girl 
 ‘Three girls.’ 
  
                                                 
9
 Note that researchers (Gong, 2010; Hu, 1993; Tse, Li, & Leung, 2007) argued that Mandarin 
Chinese also have verbal classifiers. For example, in (1), the classifier quan occurs in the predicate phrase 
and thus the classifier quan can be categorized as verbal classifiers.  
 
(1) da   yi    quan  (Gong, 2010, p.19) 
hit  one  CLfist  
‘hit one time with a fist’ 
 
However, the classifier quan still occurs with numerals and can be used to describe quantity. Thus, 
whether verbal classifiers exist in Mandarin Chinese is still unclear judging from the example provided.  
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(27) zhe  jian    waitao 
 this  CLoutfit  jacket 
 ‘This jacket.’ 
 
(28) zhe  wu  zhi    mao 
 this  five  CLanimal cat 
 ‘These five cats.’ 
 
Classifiers could be further divided into two types, ‘sortal classifiers’ and ‘measure 
classifiers’. Lyons (1977) defined ‘sortal classifiers’ as those that individuate the referents and 
‘measure classifiers’ as those that individuate the quantity rather than the referent of the noun. 
Chinese linguists also followed the same categorization, dividing Chinese classifiers into ‘sortal 
classifiers’ and ‘mensural classifiers’(Cheng & Sybesma, 1998, 1999; Peggy Li, Barner, & 
Huang, 2008; X.-P. Li, 2011; Lyons, 1977; Tai & Wang, 1990; H. Zhang, 2007; N. N. Zhang, 
2012). However, among the Chinese linguists, the definitions of ‘sortal classifier’ and ‘mensural 
classifier’ are not clear in the literature (see Zhang, 2012 for review), and the boundary between 
the two types of classifiers is not consistent across all the studies. Tai and Wang (1990) claim 
that the so-called ‘sortal classifier’ is semantically related to its associated referent while the 
‘measure classifiers’, or ‘measure words’ in their term, do not provide any semantic information 
of the referent. Cheng and Sybesma (1999) distinguishes ‘sortal classifier’ and ‘mensural 
classifiers’ based on mass and count distinction, in which ‘sortal classifiers’ go with mass nouns 
whereas ‘mensural classifiers’ go with count nouns. The current study does not attempt to 
provide any theoretical insight regarding the debate on the definition of the two types of 
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classifiers. Rather, the goal of the current study is to explore the role of classifier in children’s 
demonstrative comprehension, with particular interests within the ‘sortal classifiers’. 
The ‘sortal classifiers’ can be further divided into general classifier and specific 
classifiers. The general classifier –ge is semantically general; it denotes three-dimensional 
objects in general, such as cup, bowl, and person, as shown in (29).  
 
(29) yi    ge      beizi/nuhai/pinggou 
 one   CLgeneric  cup/girl/apple 
 ‘A(n) cup/girl/apple.’ 
 
The general classifier –ge can co-occur with many kinds of objects. Some researchers have even 
suggested that the general classifier is the default classifier (Myers, 2000) and it behaves as a 
placeholder in the syntactic position (N. N. Zhang, 2012). In other words, the general classifier –
ge classifies nouns from a variety of semantic categories, such as person, objects, and concepts. 
Abstract nouns and nouns for new concepts were also suggested to occur with the general 
classifier -ge (Zhang, 2012). In addition, even nouns that already can be classified by specific 
classifiers may occur with the general classifier –ge. For instance, in (30), the bike occurs with 
the classifier –liang which classifies vehicles, but the general classifier can also occur with it.  
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(30) …, qi-zhe    yi   ge      jiaotache,  shi yi   liang   hen  keai  de  xiao 
   ride-PRG  one  CLgeneric   bike      be  one  CLvehicle very cute  DE little  
 
 de    jiaotache (Zhang, 2012, p.35) 
 DE   bike 
 
‘From there comes a child, riding a bike, (it) is a very cute little bike.’ 
   
Specific classifiers, on the other hand, are semantically specific. Each specific classifier 
classifies a generalizable set of objects that share the same feature. The classification is identified 
based on the semantic domains, such as shape, animacy, and function (Hu, 1993; Lee, 1996). For 
example, the classifier –zhi, which is a classifier whose classification is based on animacy, 
classifies noun referents whose denotation is animals as in (31) and the classifier –jian, which is 
the classifier whose classification is based on function, only classifies outfits for upper body as in 
(32).  
  
(31) yi   zhi    xiong/*beizi/*maoyi 
 one  CLanimal bear/*cup/*sweater 
 ‘A bear/*cup/*sweater.’ 
 
(32) yi   jian    maoyi/*beizi/*xiong 
 one  CLoutfit  sweater/*cup/*bear 
 ‘A sweater/*cup/*bear.’ 
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In (31), the classifier –zhi can only occur with nouns that denote animals, such as bears, 
cats, and birds, but becomes semantically anomalous if it co-occurs with other types of noun 
referents. Thus, when the classifier –zhi co-occurs with cup or sweater whose denotation is not 
an animal, the sentence is semantically anomalous. Similarly, in (32), the classifier –jian can 
only occur with nouns whose denotation is an outfit of the upper body, such as a jacket, blouse, 
and sweater. Therefore, when the classifier –jian occurs with nouns such as cup, which is a 
three-dimensional object, and bear, which is an animal, the sentence would be semantically 
anomalous.  
Among a number of ‘sortal classifiers’, the current study selected the general classifier –
ge as in (29) and two specific classifiers –zhi and –jian as in (31) and (32) respectively as the 
testing cases to explore how these classifiers may interact with children’s demonstrative 
comprehension. In the next two sections, I will first present the discussions on how adults use the 
semantics of classifiers in online processing and following that I will discuss children’s 
acquisition of classifiers, particularly on the classifiers selected as the focus of the current study.  
 
4.2.2. Classifiers as a cue in adults sentence processing 
As discussed in the previous section, there is a semantic dependency between a classifier 
and its associated noun. In recent neuro- and psycho-linguistic studies, the classifier-noun match 
is argued to be processed through genuine semantic computation.(e.g., C.-c. Hsu, Tsai, Yang, & 
Chen, 2014; Jiang & Zhou, 2012; Qian & Garnsey, 2014; S.-H. Tsai, 2009). For example, Tsai 
(2008) investigated Chinese-speakers’ lexical processing while recording their brain activity 
measuring the Event-related potential (ERP). In the study, participants were shown different 
word pairs, such as category-noun pair, and classifier-noun pair. In the category-noun pair, she 
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provided items that the target noun matched with the category label (e.g., dictionary-book pair as 
if the dictionary was the target noun, the matched category label was book) and target noun that 
mismatched with the category label (e.g., dictionary-animal pair as if the dictionary was the 
target noun, the mismatched category label was animal). In the classifier-noun pair, she used the 
items that the target noun matched with the classifier (e.g., ben-dictionary pair as the target noun 
is still the dictionary while the matched classifier was –ben) and the target noun mismatched 
with the classifier (e.g., xi-dictionary as if the target noun is dictionary, the mismatched classifier 
was –xi which classifies clothing). The results revealed that when compared with the match 
items, both classifier-noun mismatch and category-noun mismatch elicited N400 (i.e., a 
negativity around 400 millisecond which is argued to indicate the semantic incongruence), 
suggesting that the agreement between the classifier and the noun is semantically constrained. 
Several other studies, such as Jiang and Zhou (2012), Quin and Garsney (2014), and Tsai (2008), 
tested the classifier-noun agreement in sentential contexts using ERP. The results of these studies 
all elicited N400 while processing the mismatch between the classifier and the noun in the 
sentence, confirming that the classifier-noun agreement is semantically-based. Results from these 
studies may also suggest that when processing sentences with classifiers, the listener expects a 
noun to be semantically congruent with the classifier; thus, when they encountered a noun that 
did not match with the classifier, N400 was elicited.  
Given these results suggested in the neurolinguistic studies, it is not surprising to see that 
the semantic dependency created between a classifier and its associated noun serve as a linguistic 
cue allowing one to predict the semantic feature of the following noun in adult psycholinguistic 
studies (e.g., C.-c. N. Hsu, 2006; Wu et al., 2009). Previous studies have revealed that when 
processing sentences containing classifiers, adult native speakers use the semantic information 
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from the classifiers to anticipate the semantic feature of the upcoming nouns (Chinese: C.-c. N. 
Hsu, 2006; Wu et al., 2009; Japanese: Yoshida, 2006). Most of the studies investigated adults’ 
processing of relative clauses, as in (33a).   
 
(33) a. yi     ben     [RC laoshi   tuijian      ti  de   shui] 
    one   CLvolume        teacher  recommend  ti  DE   book 
    ‘A book that is recommended by the teacher.’ 
 
 b. yi   ben     laoshi….. 
    one  CLvolume  teacher…. 
 
The relative clause creates a temporal semantic clash of classifier-noun mismatch (Wu, 
Luo, & Zhou, 2014). For example, in (33), the classifier –ben co-occurs with nouns that 
denote ”volume/book volume”  (Chien et al., 2003, p.93) such as book. Thus, when the 
participant read upon laoshi ‘teacher’ as in (13b), the phrase is semantically incongruent since 
teacher was not the noun whose denotation is volume. However, when the participants continue 
reading the sentence, the entire sentence as in (33a) is revealed to be grammatical and 
semantically congruent as the classifier –ben is associated with the noun shu ‘book’ at the end of 
the phrase rather than the adjacent noun.  
Several studies (C.-c. N. Hsu, 2006; Wu et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2014) tested Chinese 
speakers’ reading of the sentences like (33), and showed a reading time slowdown when the 
classifier did not match with the noun. In particular, it was reported that when participants 
reached the first classifier ben, they anticipated a noun that denotes ‘volume/book volume’ such 
as shu ‘book’ to appear next. Thus, when they saw the following noun laoshi ‘teacher’ which 
does not match with the classifier ben in the sentence, a reading time slowdown was observed, 
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exhibiting a mismatch effect. Results from this line of research suggest that classifiers can be 
considered as a linguistic cue that provides the listener semantic information of the upcoming 
noun and thus allows the listener to anticipate the semantic category of the upcoming noun.  
Other online sentence processing studies have also shown a similar anticipatory effect. 
Some visual-world eye-tracking studies have shown that the semantics of classifiers also led 
listeners to anticipatorily move their eyes onto the object that was the upcoming part of the 
auditory linguistic stimuli (Huettig, Chen, Bowerman, & Majid, 2010; Tsang & Chambers, 2011). 
For instance, in Huettig et al (2010), participants heard the spoken stimuli that contained 
classifiers (e.g.,” Do you know if there is another name for one ba scissors”, in which the 
classifier –ba classifies handheld objects/tools), while they were presented with four pictures, 
including a chair, a nose, a candle, and a framed painting. Critically, among the four pictures, 
only the chair can be associated with the classifier –ba. Huettig et al. have reported that when 
adult native speakers of Chinese heard the classifier which precedes the noun, they quickly 
looked at the picture of the chair that was consistent with the classifier before hearing the noun 
that referred to the visually presented object. The same effect was also found in Tsang and 
Chambers (2011) who tested Cantonese classifiers.  
Taken together, the results from recent neurolinguistic and psycholinguistic studies with 
adult speakers suggest that the classifiers constitute semantic dependency with their associated 
nouns, and their semantics can be used as an anticipatory cue for the upcoming noun and even 
can be used as a cue to pick out the referent that matches with the semantic category the 
classifier. Given that the classifiers seem to be a useful cue in adults’ sentence processing, 
classifiers may also be a useful cue for children when comprehending demonstratives, as the 
classifier is an obligatory component in the demonstrative phrase in Chinese. Thus, the current 
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study aims to explore the role of classifiers in children’s comprehension of Chinese 
demonstratives. In what follows, I will discuss the studies on children’s acquisition of classifiers.  
 
4.2.3. Children’s acquisition of classifiers in Mandarin Chinese 
Children acquire the semantics of some basic classifiers in the early stages of their 
language development, demonstrating that they have the knowledge of the semantic relationship 
between the specific classifiers and the referent of the associated nouns (Chien et al., 2003; 
Erbaugh, 1986; Gong, 2010; Hu, 1993; H. Liu, 2008; I. Y. Tsai, 2008). Erbaugh (1986) 
conducted one of the first studies that examined Chinese-speaking children’s use of classifiers. 
She conducted a longitudinal study recording the spontaneous speech from four two-year-old 
Chinese-speaking children. According to her corpus, children preferred to use the general 
classifier over specific classifiers; in fact, children rarely used specific classifiers before they 
were two and half years old. Yet, children’s use of specific classifiers increased dramatically 
after two and a half years. She reported that children grasped the meaning of shape classifiers 
very early, such as classifier –zhang which classified a two-dimensional flat object such as ‘a 
piece of paper.’ In addition to the shape classifiers, children also produced specific classifiers 
such as –zhi for animals and –jian for outfits before age three. Overall, the results may indicate 
that children understand the semantics of the specific classifiers around age three.  
Studies such as Erbaugh (1986) and Fang (1985) investigating children’s acquisition of 
classifiers only focused on children’s production of classifiers. Hu (1993) conducted one of the 
studies that examined both production and comprehension of specific classifiers by Chinese-
speaking children aged three, four, five, and six using linguistic tasks. In the production task, 
children were asked to perform a counting task; in the task, each time children were asked a 
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question as in (34a), they were presented a picture which featured more than one of the same 
object.  
 
(34) a. tupian  li     you   duoshao  X? 
    picture  inside have many    X 
    ‘how many Xs were there in the picture.’  
  
   b. san    ge     (X) 
     three  CLgeneric (X) 
     ‘Three (X).’ 
 
As can be seen in the example (34), the question in (34a) was formed without a classifier, but a 
classifier is required to answer the question in (34b) because Chinese classifiers are numeral 
classifiers and reporting the number of objects will elicit the use of the classifiers to the object. 
As in (34b), reporting the number of objects with or without the noun requires a classifier to co-
occur with the numerals. In the comprehension task, children were presented five pictures, such 
as pictures of a dryer, a truck, a blouse, a pair of scissors, and a pen as the filler. Then, they were 
given an instruction that only has number and classifier such as ‘one-CLASSIFFIER’ (e.g., yi-
jian in which –jian is the classifier for outfit) without mentioning the noun. Children in the task 
were asked to select the picture that followed the classifier in order to complete the noun phrase 
given by the experimenter. Note that the same set of picture was used repeatedly for four 
classifiers and another set of five pictures was presented and tested with another four classifiers. 
The results from the production task revealed that the general classifier was the most productive 
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classifier as compared with other specific classifiers. This also indicates that children tend to 
overgeneralize the use of the general classifier, regardless of whether they are three or six years 
old. Note that in Hu’s observation, although children did not always use the most appropriate 
specific classifiers and instead used general classifier to fill the position, they never produced a 
general classifier in an incorrect syntactic position, showing that they knew the syntactic 
structure of the nominal phrases. Based on this observation, Hu argued that children acquired the 
general classifier early because they learned from the syntactic distribution of general classifier 
and children’s use of general classifier in the context where specific classifiers are required is 
simply fulfilling the syntactic structure; thus, the general classifier is a place-holder in that 
syntactic position to children. Among the production of specific classifiers, the classifier –zhi for 
animals was the most productive one across all the age groups. Other specific classifiers such as 
–shuang for paired objects (e.g., shoes), –zhang for two-dimensional flat objects (e.g., paper), –
jian for outfits (e.g., blouse), and –ba for handheld tools (e.g., scissors) were also productively 
used by a great number of children. Regarding children’s comprehension of the specific 
classifiers, children associated the classifier –jian with outfit most accurately following –shuang 
for paired objects, -ba for tools with handheld, and –zhi for animals. From the findings of the two 
tasks, Hu concluded that there is a gap between the comprehension and production in that while 
–zhi for animal was the most productive specific classifier, children’s comprehension on -jian 
was much better than –zhi. However, the comprehension task used in Hu’s study may cause 
problems for children. In her task, particularly in the set of pictures testing classifier –zhi, she 
included a picture of a cow, of an eagle, and of a horse. The intended correct answer was the 
picture of eagle; yet, both cow and horse could also be classified by –zhi. This may have resulted 
in a lower accuracy in the comprehension of –zhi.   
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Hu’s finding is further supported by Chien, Lust and Chiang (2003) using a modified 
comprehension task. Hu’s comprehension task has two potential confounding factors that may 
interact with children’s performances. First, Hu used the same set of pictures to test children’s 
knowledge of different classifiers. More specifically, within the same set of pictures, one picture 
was the target of one particular trial, but would be a filler in the other trial. Thus, in Chien et al. 
(2003), instead of providing the same set of pictures to test different classifiers, the researchers 
provided three different pictures each time, in which one of the pictures matched with the 
instruction while the other two were fillers. Second, Hu’s instruction to elicit children’s response 
was ungrammatical without context support. In Hu’s instruction, the noun following the 
classifier was omitted for children to ‘fill in the blank’ by selecting one of the picture. Chien et al. 
(2003) modified the task by using stories in which the main character, Mickey Mouse, was 
described as a learner of Chinese. In this way, Mickey as a learner may say ungrammatical 
sentences or code-switch between English and Chinese. In Chien et al. (2003), Mickey used 
‘something’ in English to replace the noun after the classifier such as (35a). Then, after 
describing what Mickey wanted, the experimenter provided the instruction such as (35b) to the 
child asking the child to pick out what Mickey wanted.  
 
(35) a. Milaoshu      shou ta  yao   yi-tiao  something   (Chien et al., 2003, p.102) 
    Mickey Mouse  say  he  want  one-CL something 
    ‘Mickey Mouse says he wants something.’ 
 
 b. gaosu laoshi  Milaoshu      yao   yi-tiao  shemo 
    tell   teacher  Mickey Mouse want  one-CL what 
    ‘Tell teacher what Mickey Mouse wants.’ 
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If children know the meaning of the classifier –tiao which semantically requires a long and 
flexible object, such as rope, as the denotation of its associated noun, they would be able to pick 
out the correct items. Chien et al. (2003) found that children at age three were about 50% 
accurate on average in selecting a correct object that semantically matched the tested specific 
classifiers, while four-year-olds’ accuracy increased to about 70% on average and six-year-olds 
were almost adult-like. Particularly, accuracies on the items testing –jian for outfits and –zhi for 
animals for the four-year-olds were 81% and 70% respectively, which slightly minimized the 
differences presented in Hu which reported –jian at 83% accuracy and –zhi at 67% accuracy.  
Regardless of the discrepancies between production and comprehension of each specific 
classifier, the findings of previous studies suggest that children have knowledge of the semantic 
relationship between the classifier and the denotation of the noun. Particularly, children seem to 
acquire the two selected classifiers early on, that is they understand that –jian classifies outfits, 
thus they performed well in comprehension tasks, and understand that –zhi classifies animals, 
thus were able to use it most accurately. Assuming that children have the knowledge of the 
specific classifiers, especially the two selected classifiers for the current study, the question is 
raised if children are able to use the semantics of the classifiers as a semantic cue to help them 
resolve the referent of the demonstrative phrase in Chinese. The next section reviews children’s 
use of semantic cues in language comprehension.  
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4.3. Children’s use of semantic cues in language comprehension: can they utilize the 
semantics of the classifier in Chinese demonstrative to improve their comprehension? 
Language comprehension is an incremental process. When comprehending sentences, 
listeners integrate information as the sentences unfold rather than waiting until the end of the 
sentence to interpret the sentence as a whole. Therefore, listeners use every single linguistic 
element in the sentence to help them successfully comprehend the sentence. Developmental 
psycholinguists have been interested in how children use linguistic elements, or linguistic cues, 
during sentence processing, such as phonological cues (e.g, Zhou, Su, Crain, Gao, & Zhan, 2012) 
(e.g., the use of intonation in Mandarin Chinese to resolve syntactic ambiguity), prosodic cues 
(e.g., Choi & Mazuka, 2003) (e.g., the use of prosodic cues such as tonal patterns in Korean, 
pauses, and VOT to resolve word-segmentation ambiguity and syntactic ambiguity), and 
semantic cues (e.g., Arnold et al., 2007) (e.g., the use of gender specification in English 
pronouns to resolve the referent for pronouns). The current chapter focuses on semantic cues of 
Chinese classifiers in language comprehension, and thus discusses studies investigating 
children’s use of semantic cues when comprehending linguistic expressions in which children 
often have non-adult-like interpretation.  
Many studies reported that children are able to use semantic cues to comprehend 
linguistic expressions. A number of studies have discussed whether children could use various 
semantic cues in resolving referents for pronouns, which are suggested to be ambiguous. For 
example, one study conducted by Pyykkönen, Matthews, and Järvikivi (2010) showed that 
children were able to use verb semantics, such as the verb transitivity, when identifying the 
antecedent of pronouns. In the study, children were presented with different levels of verb 
transitivity, which is defined as the likelihood of the agent- and patient-likeness, and exhibited 
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different behavior for verbs of higher and lower transitivity respectively. For example, the verb 
‘hit’ has a higher transitivity level because in terms of thematic roles the subject of the verb is 
prototypically an agent and the object of the verb is prototypically a patient. In contrast, the verb 
‘see’ has lower transitivity level because the subject is less likely to be an agent and the object is 
less likely to be a patient; in fact, for most of the lower transitivity verbs, the object tends not to 
be a patient. Pyykkönen et al. (2010) showed that children are sensitive to the level of verb 
transitivity to identify the antecedent of the ambiguous pronoun. In particular, for verbs with 
higher transitivity, children showed stronger preference toward the subject, that is, they looked at 
the subject more often in the visual stimuli. Pyykkönen et al. (2010) thus argues that children are 
able to pick up the verb semantics as a cue in pronoun resolution.  
In addition to verb semantics, other studies examined whether children were able to use 
semantic-morphological cues to resolve the ambiguous pronouns. For instance, a series of studies 
by Arnold and her colleagues (Arnold et al., 2002; 2007) revealed that English-speaking children 
can use the gender specification in English such as he and she as a cue to resolve referents for 
pronouns. They presented pictures with two characters that had different genders. The results 
show that children were able to rapidly match the gender of the pronoun with the character right 
after they heard the pronoun rather than waiting until the end of the sentence. Dispaldro, 
Ruggiero, and Scali (2014) further extended this line of research examining children's use of 
grammatical gender and number information as a cue in resolving Italian pronouns. They have 
shown that Italian-speaking children were more successful at using number information in 
identifying the correct referent of pronouns when compared with the grammatical gender. Their 
claim is that the association between grammatical gender and referent is arbitrary in that it is 
independent of the biological gender, whereas the number information corresponds to the 
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conceptual level of quantity which is might be easier. Therefore, Italian-speaking children in 
their study did not use the gender information as successfully and as early as in Arnold et al. 
(2007), which focused on English gender specification in pronouns that describes the inherent 
property of the referent.   
Studies discussed above suggest that children are able to use various semantic cues to 
identify the referent of referring expressions. In line with their argument, I hypothesize that the 
classifiers, in which their association with the referent was established based on conceptual 
categories such as animals and outfit, may also be a useful cue when children are comprehending 
demonstratives in Chinese. In section 4.2.2., I have already established that the classifier 
semantic is argued to be used in adults’ processing (Hsu, 2006; Wu et al., 2009; Huettig, et al., 
2010; Tsang & Chambers, 2011; Wu, Luo, & Zhou, 2014); this raises a question regarding 
whether children can also utilize the semantics of classifiers, particularly for demonstrative 
comprehension, the exact focus of the current dissertation. Moreover, as is discussed above, the 
semantic information of classifiers is similar to the gender specification in English and number 
marking in Italian. Each classifier was associated with a particular semantic category which was 
formed based on the shape, animacy, or function of a set of noun referents. Therefore, once 
children established the semantic dependency between the classifier and the noun referents, they 
should be able to use it as a semantic cue to identify the correct referent for pronominal 
demonstratives in Chinese.  
 
4.4. The present study 
Unlike English demonstratives that are monomorphemic, Chinese demonstratives co-
occur with classifiers that may provide extra semantic information regarding the referents. The 
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semantic information provided by the classifiers is particularly informative when it comes to a 
pronominal demonstrative phrase, in which the noun is not pronounced. Take (36) for example.  
 
(36) wo  xiangyao zhe  zhi     (mao) 
  I   want    this  CLanimal  (cat) 
   ‘I want this (cat).’ 
 
The demonstrative zhe picks out an object closer to the speaker and the classifier zhi picks out a 
kind of animal. Taking the two pieces of information together, one can infer that the pronominal 
demonstrative phrase zhe-zhi points to an animal (e.g., a cat) close to the speaker, even though a 
noun is not pronounced. When this sentence is uttered in the context where a pair of a coat and a 
cat are placed both near and apart from the speaker, the listener uses meaning of the 
demonstrative to limit the intended object to a coat and a cat near the speaker, and crucially s/he 
could use the classifier to further narrow down the referent to the cat near the speaker. This is a 
strategy that the listener can follow in Chinese, as given above, but not in English, in which 
demonstratives do not contain classifiers; an English pronominal demonstrative similar to (36) 
above (e.g., ‘I want this.’) could only express the speaker’s intended position, and it does not 
clearly express whether the coat or the cat in that position could be the speaker’s intended 
referent. Therefore, the semantics of the classifiers may potentially play a role in children’s 
demonstrative comprehension, particularly in the pronominal demonstratives phrase where the 
noun is not overtly pronounced. To this end, the current study focused on the pronominal 
demonstratives phrase in Chinese in order to examine whether and to what extent the classifier 
semantics could help children’s demonstrative comprehension.  
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Recall that children have difficulty comprehending demonstratives when the speaker has 
a different perspective and tend to exhibit egocentric demonstrative comprehension. Most of the 
previous studies focused on children’s comprehension of prenominal demonstrative phrases, in 
which the noun was presented in the demonstrative phrase, such as ‘I want this cat.’ Children’s 
comprehension of pronominal demonstrative phrases as in (36) above has been far less studied; 
to date, Zhao (2007) was the first study that investigated Chinese-speaking children’s 
comprehension of pronominal demonstrative phrases. Zhao conducted a comprehension task, 
revealing that children exhibit the egocentric comprehension of pronominal demonstrative 
phrases when the speaker has a perspective different from children’s own. However, Zhao did 
not control the context in the comprehension task to manipulate classifier semantics. In her study, 
only the general classifier -ge was used as the linguistic stimuli. Unlike specific classifiers that 
provide specific semantic categories of the upcoming noun, the general classifier –ge tested in 
Zhao’s study does not necessarily provide useful semantic information as it broadly classifies 
general objects. Thus, the possible role of the semantics of classifiers in children’s demonstrative 
comprehension was out of the scope in Zhao’s study, and the question remains if the classifier 
semantics may interact with Chinese children’s demonstrative comprehension. Since specific 
classifiers are suggested to anticipate the category of the following noun, the classifiers in 
Chinese demonstratives phrases may provide semantic information about the referent the 
demonstrative is depicting. As discussed in 4.2.3 and 4.3, children may be equipped with the 
semantic knowledge of some of the classifiers and their potential ability to grasp the semantic 
cues to resolve referent. Given the discussions in previous sections, the classifier semantics may 
be helpful to children when comprehending demonstrative phrases, particularly pronominal 
demonstrative phrases. Therefore, the first goal of the current study is to explore whether the 
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classifiers can function as a useful semantic cue that children can take advantage of when 
comprehending demonstrative phrases.  
If children were able to use the semantics of the classifier when comprehending 
demonstrative phrases, another intriguing question is how effective the classifier semantics may 
be in children’s demonstrative comprehension. A recent study suggested that children were able 
to take advantage of semantics cues in certain domains, and that the benefit children gained from 
the semantic cues may be robust enough to be generalized. For example, Jincho et al. (2008) 
have shown that children were able to use a cue to facilitate their comprehension of certain 
linguistic expressions. They tested children’s comprehension of ambiguous sentences in 
Japanese. For instance, the sentence ‘sanbanme-no inu-wa dore?’ (‘Which is the third dog?’) has 
two interpretations: (i) subset interpretation (e.g., among a set of cats and dogs, it is the third one 
among the dogs); (ii) local interpretation (e.g., a set of cats and dogs, it is the third one among all 
the animals that happens to be the dog). Children tend to exhibit the local interpretation; thus, the 
authors provided children a visual context that bias them toward the subset interpretation and 
examined whether children could shift from the local interpretation to the subset interpretation. 
Results show that many children were able to switch their interpretation from local to subset 
within the context when the contextual cue was available, and even when the contextual cue was 
no longer available, children were able to interpret the ambiguous sentence in an ambiguous 
context with subset interpretation. Interestingly, the authors reported that the extent to which 
each child may benefit from the carried-forward effect of the facilitative cues may be related to 
their development of EF, particularly mental flexibility. Thus, the present study also aimed to 
investigate the strength of the classifier cue and whether children’s ability to carry over the effect 
of the cue to other contexts is related to their development of EF, particularly mental flexibility.  
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Taken together, the current study aims to explore how the semantics of classifiers impact 
Chinese-speaking children’s comprehension of demonstratives. In particular, the current study 
has two goals: (i) to discover whether the semantics of the classifiers in a demonstrative phrase 
serve as a cue to help children comprehend demonstratives uttered by a speaker whose 
perspective is different from their own, and if the cue is helpful, (ii) to explore to what extent is 
the classifier semantics able to rescue children’s adult like demonstrative comprehension.  
To these ends, I created two types of experimental contexts in which pronominal 
demonstrative phrases are uttered while the classifier plays different roles in specifying the 
speaker’s intended referent. In one context, the classifier semantics clearly suggests which of the 
specific entities the speaker intends to refer to, even without uttering a noun; this type of context 
is called Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context. In another context, the classifier semantics does not 
allow the listener to identify a specific entity as what is being mentioned by the speaker; this type 
of context is called the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context. Figures 18 and 19 below are 
examples for these contexts, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 18. Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context. There is a t-shirt (outfit) and a bear 
(animal) in this context. The t-shirt is specified by the classifier –jian while the bear is specified 
by the classifier –zhi; thus, when speaker A said ‘wo xiangyao zhe-zhi’ (‘I want this-CLanimal’), 
A B 
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owing to the semantics of the classifier –zhi which specify the referent is a kind of animal, the 
listener could infer that the speaker referred to the bear, rather than the t-shirt, which is classified 
by another classifier –jian, solely based on the classifier semantics. As the semantics of classifier 
is robust in this way, children are expected to correctly pick out the referent, which is the bear 
that is located near the speaker, even if they failed to incorporate the speaker’s perspective 
successfully and thus may have failed to correctly comprehend the demonstrative zhe. In this 
way, the classifier semantics may have helped children to pick out the correct referent and thus 
overcome their difficulty to incorporate the speaker’s perspective that may lead them to pick out 
the wrong referent.  
 
 
Figure 19.  Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context 
 
Figure 19 is an example of the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context. Unlike Figure 18, Figure 19 
has two objects, namely an animal (classified by –zhi) and an outfit (classified by –jian), in each 
of the distance domains from the speaker’s position; that is, an animal-clothe pair is located at 
both near the speaker and apart from the speaker. Therefore, in a context such as Figure 19, if the 
speaker said ‘wo xiangyao zhe-zhi’ (‘I want this-CLanimal’), the semantics of classifier which 
specifies the category of the intended object would no longer be as informative as in the context 
shown in Figure 18. Notice that there are two animals in the discourse domain, one near the 
speaker and the other apart from the speaker. Thus, even though the listener could infer that the 
B 
A 
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speaker referred to an animal, by means of the classifier semantics, he/she still needed to 
correctly incorporate the speaker-object distance information expressed by the demonstrative in 
order to correctly identify which animal was being mentioned. In brief, in order for the listener to 
correctly interpret the demonstratives uttered by the speaker, he/she was required to incorporate 
not only the semantics of the classifier, but also the distance contrast of the demonstrative, which 
has been suggested to be challenging for children.  
In the current study, I adopt the two contexts discussed above in the experiment and 
examine children’s comprehension of demonstrative phrases uttered in those contexts. First, 
adopting the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context, the current study examines whether children are 
able to utilize the classifier semantics to infer the object being mentioned by the demonstratives 
uttered by the speaker with a perspective different from their own. In addition, by sequentially 
showing the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context (Figure 18) and then showing the Classifier-Cue-
Insufficient Context (Figure 19), the presentation sequence allows me to examine whether 
children can benefit from the preceding exposure to the semantics of classifiers as in the 
Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context (Figure 18). In this context children can take advantage of the 
classifier semantics to guide them correctly to comprehend demonstratives and may be carried 
forward to the subsequent context, (Figure 19), in which children are required to incorporate 
classifier semantics and demonstrative specification. In this way, the exposure to the Classifier-
Cue-Sufficient Context as in Figure 18 will serve as ‘training’ for children.   
The hypothesized mechanism of the training, which I call the Implicit Training, is 
described as follows. As the semantics of some classifiers such as the two of particular focus are 
suggested to be acquired early, children may be able to successfully identify the correct referent 
using classifiers when they are informative enough to associate the demonstrative 
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(accompanying the classifier) and the intended object, as in Figure 18. If children are able to 
successfully identify the correct referent based on the semantics of the classifier in the 
demonstrative phrase while hearing the demonstrative (zhe- or -na) uttered simultaneously by the 
speaker several times children may be able to implicitly learn the association between the 
demonstrative and the referent’s location relative to the speaker. That is, zhe is associated with 
the object closer to the speaker while na is associated with the object apart from the speaker. The 
current study, examines children’s comprehension of pronominal demonstratives uttered 
particularly in the aforementioned two contexts, the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient context and the 
Classifier-Cue-Insufficient context. The goal of the study is to understand whether, and to what 
extent, children’s comprehension of pronominal demonstratives may benefit from the presence 
of a classifier, whose semantics could be informative enough to associate the demonstrative and 
the intended noun. 
 
4.5. The experiment 
In order to test children’s use of the classifier cues in demonstrative comprehension, I 
administered the Act-out Task and the Judgment Training Task. Following Jincho et al. (2008), I 
also executed the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) (Zelazo, 2006) measuring children’s 
development of Executive Function, which was exactly the same one used in the studies in 
Chapter 3. Additionally, a Classifier Comprehension task was conducted as a baseline task to 
ensure children’s knowledge of selected classifiers; I also conducted a Classifier Production task, 
which was used as a picture norming task with adults and also was use to confirm adults’ use of 
classifiers with those items in the pictures.  
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4.5.1. Participants 
Fifty-four Chinese-speaking children aged 4-, 5-, and 6-years-old participated in the 
study (mean age = 5;4, age range = 4;1 - 6;3). A group of 25 native Chinese-speaking adults also 
took part in the study (mean age = 28;0, age range = 20;2-40;2). Child participants were 
recruited in Taipei and Chiayi, Taiwan. Adult participants were recruited in Taipei, Taiwan, 
except one adult participant was recruited in Chiayi, Taiwan. 
   
4.5.2. Tasks 
4.5.2.1. Classifier Tasks: baseline tasks for classifier knowledge  
Two Classifier Tasks, including a Classifier Comprehension Task and a Classifier 
Production Task, were used as the baseline task to ensure children’s knowledge of classifiers as 
well as adults’ uses of classifiers. The Classifier Comprehension task was used to confirm that 
children know the meaning and its semantic dependency of the classifiers used in the current 
study. The Classifier Production Task was used to examine whether adult’s use of classifiers for 
the objects used in the current study matched with the classifiers selected in the task.  
The Classifier Comprehension Task (Chien et al., 2003; Hu, 1993; I. Y. Tsai, 2008) 
examined children’s comprehension of the two classifiers, -jian and -zhi, that appeared in the 
demonstrative stimuli used in the main demonstrative comprehension tasks in the current study. 
The classifier -jian classifies outfits for the upper part of the body; for example, a t-shirt goes 
with the classifier -jian. The classifier -zhi classifies animals; for example, a cat goes with the 
classifier -zhi. Both -jian and -zhi belong to the specific classifier category and they are known to 
be acquired around age 4 (Chien et al., 2003; Hu, 1993). In the Classifier Comprehension Task, 
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children were given three different pictures, one target picture and two distractor pictures, in 
each trial and were asked to pick out the picture that completes the instruction such as (37).  
 
(37) wo  xiangyao   yi    jian   /zhi _____ 
 I     want     one   CLoutfit/CLanimal _____ 
 ‘I want one _____’ .  
 
Note that the instruction as in (37) is not a complete sentence and thus ungrammatical in the 
given context. Children were asked to select an object which semantically matched the classifier 
and pick a picture that depicted that object to grammatically complete the sentence. In order for 
children to pick out the picture that makes the sentence grammatical as well as semantically 
congruent, they need to know the semantic categories the classifiers are associated with. As the 
instruction was not a complete sentence, the task was administered as a story in order to make 
the instruction felicitous in the task. In the story, the main character was a boy named Pipi, who 
was still learning Mandarin Chinese and therefore might produce sentences that were incomplete. 
In each trial, the boy put up three different pictures on a blackboard and asked the child to help 
him pick up the object he wanted. He was described as an absent-minded person who often 
forgot the name of the objects, and thus, omitted the noun in the sentence. Therefore, the child 
was asked to do his/her best to guess what the character wanted by listening to sentences such as 
(37), in which the noun was not produced.  In order to correctly pick out the object the character 
wanted, children needed to have knowledge of the classifier semantics. In one trial, in which the 
target was the animal, the child was shown three pictures including a picture of a tree, a picture 
of a rabbit, and a picture of a cake, and listened to (38).  
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(38) wo  xiangyao  yi   zhi      ________ 
 I    want     one  CLanimal   ________ 
 ‘I want one______.’ 
 
Then, the child had to pick up the picture of the object whose semantic category matched 
the classifier’s semantic property. In this case the classifier -zhi denotes animals. Among the 
three pictures, only the rabbit is a kind of animal. Thus, the child was expected to select the 
picture of a rabbit as correct response; if the child selected other pictures, his/her response was 
coded as wrong. In each trial, the set of three pictures contained a correct object that match with 
the given classifier and two incorrect objects that did not match with the given classifier. There 
were six trials including three that tested-zhi and three that tested -jian. The objects that were 
used are listed in Table 20. The full list of the objects in each trial is presented in Appendix III. 
 
Table 20. Target objects that go with the selected specific classifiers 
Objects go with classifier -zhi Objects go with classifier -jian 
cat sweater 
monkey jacket 
bear coat 
rabbit t-shirt 
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The Classifier Production Task (Hu, 1993; Kuo, 2003) was used to examine adults’ use of 
classifiers regarding the objects selected for the current study. Chinese classifiers co-occur with 
numerals as well as demonstratives, as shown in (39a) and (39b). 
 
(39) a. san   zhi    mao 
    three  CLanimal cat 
    ‘Three cats.’ 
 b. zhe  zhi    mao 
    this  CLanimal cat 
    ‘This cat.’ 
 
Thus, in order to elicit adults’ use of numeral classifiers, a counting task was used as the 
Classifier Production Task. In the task, participants were shown pictures of same objects with 
multiple numbers in a row and they were asked to write down the number of the objects in 
Chinese, which would require the use of classifier. For instance, in one trial, participants were 
shown pictures of three cats and read a question such as in (40a), and the participants’ task was 
to write down the number of objects such as in (40b).  
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(40) a. Question:  you   duoshao   mao 
             have  many    cat 
           ‘How many cats are there?’ 
  
 b. Expected Answer:  san    zhi 
                 three   CLanimal 
                 ‘Three (cats)’ 
 
Since counting in Chinese also requires classifiers, their answer was expected to provide their 
selection of the classifier they naturally use to count the object in the pictures. All eight objects 
used in the current study were tested and an additional eight objects that go with different 
specific classifiers were included as filler items; there were 16 trials in total (See Appendix IV 
for the full task).  
 
4.5.2.2. The Act-out Task  
The Act-out Task was used as the basis to see whether children had already established 
the distance contrast of pronominal demonstratives based on their own perspective. Since this 
task was used to test whether children knew the meaning of demonstrative words based on their 
own perspective, the general classifier –ge,  was used in the linguistic stimuli in order to create 
the context in which the semantics of the classifier does not play any role in the listeners’ 
comprehension of demonstratives. The basic experimental setting is illustrated in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20. The experimental workspace for the Act-out Task 
 
The basic set-up of the task was the same as the Act-out Task discussed in Chapter 3, except for 
the following two modifications made in the current version in order to accommodate the use of 
general classifier in the act-out instruction. First, instead of using two boxes, the current Act-out 
Task has two Lego blocks placed in the workspace for each trial. Second, the speaker of the act-
out instruction was a puppet manipulated by the experimenter. The puppet, in the task, was 
building a house using the building blocks and he asked the child to help him pick up one Lego 
block each time. The act-out instruction uttered by the puppet is shown in (41).  
 
(41) keyi  qing     ni    ba   zhe-/na-    ge      na  gei wo ma 
 Can  please   you  BA   this/that    CLgeneric   take for me Q 
 ‘Can you pick this/that up for me?’ 
 
In the task, when children were asked to pick up zhe-ge (‘this (one)’), if they selected the 
block near themselves and the speaker, their response was coded as correct; but if they selected 
the block apart from themselves and the speaker, their response was coded as wrong. When 
children were asked to pick up na-ge (‘that (one)’), if they selected the block apart from 
themselves and the speaker, their response was coded as correct whereas if  they selected the 
zhe-ge (‘this’) 
na-ge (‘that’) 
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block near themselves and the speaker, their response was coded as wrong. There were 6 trials in 
total, with three trials testing zhe-ge (‘this (one)’) and three testing na-ge (‘that (one)’). The 
items were presented in a fixed order.  
 
4.5.2.3. Judgment Training Task  
The Judgment Training Task was used to examine whether, and to what extent, the 
semantics of classifiers could facilitate children’s comprehension of pronominal demonstrative 
phrases based on a different perspective. In particular, the primary focus in this task is to 
investigate whether children are able to incorporate the semantic dependency of the classifier in 
the pronominal demonstrative phrase in Chinese, in order to utilize it as a semantic cue to 
correctly associate the object being pointed to by the speaker, whose perspective is different 
from children’s own.   
 
4.5.2.3.1. The Contexts used in the Judgment Training Task 
Like the Judgment Task used in the study in Chapter 3, the Judgment Training Task was 
also presented as a series of picture stories with the demand-paint fulfillment story plot. A Great 
Wizard and a Student Wizard were the main characters. In the stories, the Great Wizard uttered 
demands with a demonstrative such as (42) and the Student Wizard tried to fulfill the demand. 
The Student Wizard sometimes successfully fulfilled the demand (Match items) while other 
times unsatisfactorily (Mismatch items). The child’s task was to judge whether the Student 
Wizard’s painting fulfilment matched the Great Wizard’s demand. Since the Great Wizard in the 
story had a different perspective from the children, children’s judgment of the painting 
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fulfillment reflected how children comprehended pronominal demonstratives based on a different 
perspective. 
 
(42) a.  ba   zhe/na   ge      tu     cheng  lanse 
     BA   this/that  CLgeneric   paint   as     blue 
 
  b. ba   zhe/na   zhi   /jian     tu     cheng  lanse 
     BA   this/that  CLanimal/CLoutfit   paint   as     blue 
     ‘Paint this/that blue’  
 
Note that in (42a) and (42b), the selection of the classifiers depends on the semantic category of 
the referent (which cannot be translated into English, as can be seen). Whereas the general 
classifier –ge as in (42a) does not specify the detailed category of the associated object, the 
classifiers appearing in (42b), -zhi and -jian each classify a specific semantic category of the 
noun referents. –Zhi requires an animal in the noun denotation, and –jian requires an outfit of the 
upper body in the noun denotation as in (42b). Given the characteristics of the classifiers, these 
specific classifiers in the demonstrative phrase may serve as a cue for listeners to infer what 
category of object the entire demonstrative phrase is pointing to.  
Two contexts, the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context (e.g., Figure 18 in previous section) 
and the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context (e.g., Figure 19 in previous section), were adopted in 
the story discourse. Recall the design in Figure 18 presented previously, in the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context, both the semantics of the specific classifier as well as the demonstrative 
words can solely serve as a cue to specify what object is being referred to; this design is adopted 
in Figure 21a, which was presented in a demand-fulfilling story.  
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 Figure 21. The visual stimuli in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context  
 
In this type of context, the classifiers itself may be sufficient enough to identify the referred 
object. Consider the context in Figure 21a and imagine that the Great Wizard (the old wizard) 
uttered the demand as in (43). 
 
(43) ba  zhe   zhi    tu   cheng lanse 
 BA  this  CLanimal paint  as    blue 
 ‘Paint this blue.’  
 
Even though the noun is not overtly present, one can infer that the Great Wizard was 
pointing to the bear, based on the two pieces of information: (i) the demonstrative word zhe 
(‘this’), which picks out the object near the speaker; (ii) the classifier –zhi which classifies an 
animal, not an outfit. Importantly, even if children were egocentric when comprehending 
demonstratives, failing to correctly interpret zhe (‘this’) uttered by the Great Wizard (whose 
perspective was different from their own), the semantics of the classifiers may have helped them 
to make the correct inferences on the object the Great Wizard pointed to.  
 21a  21b  21c 
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In this context, I manipulate the success/failure of the painting event by the Student 
Wizard in response to the Great Wizard’s demand; this was set out as ‘Match’ and ‘Mismatch. 
For Match items, acceptances of the fulfillment of painting were expected as an adult-like 
response (e.g., Figure 21b with the demand in (43)). For Mismatch items, rejections of the 
fulfillment were expected (e.g., Figure 21c with the demand in (43)). Note that in terms of the 
position of the type of objects, half of the visual stimuli had an animal placed near the Great 
Wizard and an outfit placed apart from the Great Wizard while the other half of the visual stimuli 
placed the animal and the outfit in the reverse way.     
Regarding the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context, which was presented in Figure 19 
previously, the semantics of the specific classifiers is not informative enough to resolve the 
referent, as illustrated the Figure 22 here.  
 
  
   
 Figure 22. The visual stimuli of the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context  
 
 22a  22b 
 22c  22d 
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To identify the object being referred to, information from both the specific classifier and the 
demonstrative word were equally important. In such type of context, children thus need to 
consider both the classifier semantics and demonstrative meaning, in which they are required to 
incorporate the speaker’s perspective. Consider the context in Figure 22a and imagine that the 
Great Wizard uttered the demand as in (43), which is repeated in (44). 
 
(44) ba  zhe  zhi    tu    cheng lanse 
 BA  this  CLanimal paint  as    blue 
 ‘Paint this blue.’  
 
As presented in Figure 22a, there are two objects (i.e., the two bears) that semantically 
matched the classifier –zhi, and crucially, one is located near the Great Wizard and the other one 
is apart from the Great Wizard. Thus, in such a situation, children cannot solely rely on the 
semantics of the classifier to resolve the referent, because there are two objects in the whole 
context that match the classifier semantics; they need to compute which of the position the 
demonstrative word uttered by the speaker was designating. Therefore, in this case, children 
were expected to integrate both information from the demonstrative zhe (‘this’) which picks out 
the object near the speaker and the classifier –zhi, which classified animals to identify that the 
bear near the Great Wizard was the correct referent.  
In this context, Match (see Figure 22b) and Mismatch items were manipulated in the 
following way. Regarding the Mismatch items, since both demonstrative meanings and classifier 
semantics are required to pick out the correct referent for demonstratives, I manipulated the 
Mismatch items in two ways. One type of Mismatch items was created based on the 
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incongruence of the demonstrative and its designated distance domain (see Figure 22c); thus, this 
type of item is called a Demonstrative Mismatch item. The other type of Mismatch items was the 
semantic mismatch between classifier and the category of the entity (see Figure 22d); thus, this 
type of items is called a Classifier Mismatch item. For example, in the Demonstrative Mismatch 
item such as Figure 22c, if the Student Wizard painted the bear apart from the Great Wizard, 
children were expected to reject the outcome since the position of the bear did not match with the 
demonstrative word in the demand, although the classifier –zhi classified animals. In the 
Classifier Mismatch item such as Figure 22d, if the Student Wizard painted the sweater near the 
Great Wizard, children were also expected to reject the outcome since the sweater was an outfit, 
which does not match with the classifier –zhi in the demand, although the demonstrative picked 
out the object near the speaker.  
 
4.5.2.3.2. The Block Design adopted in the Task 
These two contexts, the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context and the Classifier-Cue-
Insufficient Context, were presented in a sequential order in order to examine children’s use of 
the classifier semantics during demonstrative comprehension and whether the classifier 
semantics cue could be expanded to other contexts. I adopted the block design from Snedeker 
and Yuan (2008) and Jincho et al. (2008), setting up the following three blocks: Block 1, the Pre-
training Block, where the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context (Figure 22) was presented; Block 2, 
the Training Block, where the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context (Figure21) was presented;  
Block 3, the Post-training Block, where the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context was again 
presented.  
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To examine the first research question, whether children could use classifier cues to 
improve their demonstrative comprehension, I further adopted a between-subject design which 
includes an Experiment Group and Control Group. The difference between the two groups is in 
the context provided in the Block 2: Training Block. The Experiment Group was presented with 
the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context in the Training Block, as was described above. Regarding 
the context for the Control Group, I created a Control Context as shown in Figure 23.  
 
   
Figure 23. The visual stimuli of the Control Context  
 
The Control Context was presented together with the sentence such as (42a), which is repeated in 
(45).  
 
(45) ba   zhe    ge      tu     cheng  lanse 
   BA   this  CLgeneric   paint   as     blue 
 ‘Paint this blue.’ 
 
Note that sentence (45) contains the general classifier –ge which is suggested not to provide any 
specific semantic information of the associated noun. Additionally, both objects used in the 
Control Context are always classified by the general classifier –ge. Thus, children cannot use the 
23a  23b  23c 
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classifier as a semantic cue to infer the referent of the demonstrative phrase; instead they need to 
use the information from demonstratives, incorporating the speaker’s perspectives. In this 
context, I also created Match items (e.g., Figure 23b) in which the fulfillment matched the 
demonstratives in the demand and Mismatch items (e.g., Figure 23c) in which the fulfillment did 
not match the demonstratives in the demand. Children were expected to accept Match items as an 
adult-like response while they were expected to reject Mismatch items. Let me now turn back to 
the between-subject design between the Experiment Group and Control Group.  
As discussed earlier, the Experiment Group was presented with the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context, in which children may be able to use the classifier semantics as a cue to 
identify the correct referent, whereas the Control Group was presented with the Control Context, 
in which children need to rely on their knowledge of demonstratives and incorporate the 
speaker’s perspective in order to correctly pick out the referent. In brief, the crucial difference 
between the Experimental Group and the Control Group is in the Training Block, in which the 
classifier semantics as a sufficient cue is presented in Experimental Group, but not in the Control 
Group. Given this difference between the two groups, comparing children’s performances 
between these two Groups in the Training Block allowed me to see whether children who were 
given the classifier cue could have a better performance than children who did not have the cue.   
If children were able to use the classifier cues when comprehending demonstratives as 
shown in the Training Block, the second research question investigates to what extent the 
classifier cues may have an effect on children’s demonstratives. In particular, I would like to 
know whether children could carry over the classifier effect from one context to another. Thus, 
the focus is on whether the exposure to the classifier cue in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context 
could help children to perform better in the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context. As discussed 
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above, the Training Block provided the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context in the Experiment 
Group. Within that type of context, children may have been using classifier cues to identify the 
referent. While they were using the classifier cues to pick out the referent, they heard the 
different demonstrative words throughout the block and may have ‘implicitly’ learned that the 
correct referent picked out by the classifier does not always appear on the same location. Then, 
children may have learned the association between demonstrative words and the location of the 
referent relative to the speaker. Therefore, the exposure to the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context 
in the Experiment Group serves as the Implicit Training. In contrast to the Experiment Group, 
children in the Control Group were shown the Control Context where the classifier cues were not 
available. Therefore, they received no classifier cue training. In order to examine whether the 
effect of the cue is carried forward to a different context, I compared children’s performances 
before and after the exposure to the cue to determine whether there was any improvement after 
the exposure. Recall that Pre-training Block and Post-training Block both provided the 
Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context, in which children need to identify the correct referent for 
demonstratives by incorporating both (i) the speaker’s perspective, and (ii) the classifier 
semantics. If children in the Experiment Group showed improvement from Pre-training Block to 
the Post-training Block, it may be a piece of evidence that children learned the association 
between the position of the object and demonstratives via the Training Block (the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context); in other words, they may have been able to associate this-phrase with the 
object whose position is near the speaker and associate that-phrase with the object whose 
position is distant from the speaker. However, if children showed any improvement from the Pre-
training Block to Post-training Block in the Control Group, children’s improvement in either 
Experimental Group or the Control Group may have been related to the practicing effect. Given 
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that the Control Context did not provide any classifier cues, children who were exposed to this 
type of context in the Training Block would not be trained to associate the location of the object 
with the demonstrative phrase. Thus, improvements shown in the Control Group would be due to 
the practice effect. 
 
4.5.2.3.3. The Design: Summary  
The following two figures present a summary of what context each condition used in 
each block. Figure 24 demonstrates the contexts used in each block in the Experimental 
Condition and Figure 25 shows the contexts in the Control Condition.  
 
   
Figure 24. The design of the Experimental Group in the Judgment Training Task 
   
     
Figure 25. The design of the Control Group in the Judgment Training Task 
   
Block1: Pre-Training Block 2: Training Block 3: Post-Training 
Block 1: Pre-Training Block 2: Training Block 3: Post-Training 
Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context 
Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context Control Context 
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Each Block had eight items, totaling 24 items presented per participant. In the Pre-training 
and Post-training Blocks, in which the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context was presented, the 
two specific classifiers each appear four times in each block. Each block has four Match items 
and four Mismatch items, which include two ‘Classifier Mismatch items’ and two 
‘Demonstrative Mismatch items.’ The positions of the objects were counterbalanced throughout 
the items; that is, in one trial, the animal object near the speaker was on the top shelf while the 
animal object was on the bottom shelf apart from the speaker; in another trial, the animal object 
near the speaker was in the bottom shelf while is the animal object was on the top shelf apart 
from the speaker. In the Training Block of the Experiment Group, in which the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context was presented, each specific classifier also appeared four times. In this block, 
there were four Match items and four Mismatch items. The positions of the objects were also 
counterbalanced through the items as discussed previously. In the Training Block of the Control 
Group, in which the Control Context was presented, only the general classifier –ge was used. 
Four Match items and four Mismatch items were created. Note that for all Match and Mismatch 
items, if children rejected the outcome, the experimenter asked a subsequent question to the child 
to elicit the reasons as to why they made such a judgment.  
Two order lists were created to counterbalance the presentation order of the two specific 
classifiers in the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context which was presented in the Pre-training and 
Post-training Blocks. Block A starts with the classifier –zhi while Block B starts with the 
classifier –jian (See full items in Appendix V). As I manipulated the presentation order in the 
Pre-training and Post-training Blocks to control the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context, creating 
Block A and Block B, two order lists, namely List 1 and List 2, were created within each Group. 
In List 1, Pre-training Block started with Block A while Post-training Block had Block B. In List 
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2, Pre-training Block started with Block B while Post-training Block had Block A. Thus, in total, 
there were four lists, including Experimental List 1, Experimental List 2, Control List 1, and 
Control List 2.   
In addition to the 24 testing items, two additional practice items were also included in order 
to elicit ‘correct’ and ‘wrong’ responses in the task. One practice item was designed to elicit 
children’s ‘correct’ responses. In the item, the demand matched with the fulfilment (e.g., if the 
demand was ‘paint a triangle blue’, the Student Wizard painted a triangle blue). The other 
practice item was designed to elicit children’s ‘wrong’ response. In the item, the demand 
mismatched the fulfilment (e.g., if the demand was ‘paint a triangle blue’, the Student Wizard 
painted a circle blue). Note that the demands in the practice items did not contain both 
demonstratives and classifiers. Additionally, children were given feedback for the practice items, 
but no feedback on the testing items. 
   
4.5.2.4. DCCS 
All the children participated in the DCCS. The DCCS was administered in exactly the 
same way as the studies discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
4.5.3. Procedure 
Children participated in the tasks with the following order: they took the Act-out Task 
first, the Judgment Training Task second, following the Classifier Comprehension task and the 
DCCS. Adult control groups took parts in the Act-out Task, and the Judgment Training Task and 
following the Classifier Production task and the Classifier Comprehension task. In the Judgment 
Training Task, both children and adults were pre-assigned to either the Control Condition (List 1: 
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N = 11, mean age = 5;6, age range = 4;7-6;3; List 2: N = 10, mean age = 5;4, age range = 4;2-6;2) 
or Experimental Condition (List 1: N = 10, mean age = 5;6, age range = 4;7-6;1; List 2: N = 11, 
mean age = 5;4, age range =  4;1-6;1). Child participants were invited individually to a quiet 
classroom in their preschools, with the exception of one child who participated in a room at his 
home. All adult participants were invited to a conference room individually.   
 
4.5.4. Results 
4.5.4.1. Results of the classifier tasks 
Recall that there were two classifier tasks administered to examine children’s knowledge 
of the selected classifiers and adults’ uses of the selected classifiers. In this section, the results on 
the Classifier Comprehension Task will be reported first following the results on the Classifier 
Production Task which was only used with adult participants.  
The Classifier Comprehension Task was used to ensure children have the knowledge of 
the classifiers used in the Judgment Training Task. Table 21 shows the mean percentages of the 
correct comprehension of classifiers, as measured by the correct selection of the picture that 
matched with the classifier in the instruction.  
 
Table 21. The mean percentages of correct responses in Classifier Comprehension Task (% (SD)) 
 Items of -zhi Items of -jian 
Children  
(N = 54) 
99.07 (4.77) 98.61 (7.55) 
Adults 
(N = 25) 
100.00 (0.00) 99.00 (5.00) 
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As shown in the table, adults’ performance is almost at ceiling, indicating that the pictures 
selected matched with the uses for both classifiers -jian and -zhi. Regarding children’s 
performances, their performances were near ceiling. Children’s almost-adult-like responses were 
expected. Both Hu (1993) and Chien et al. (2003) reported that children grasp the meaning of 
classifier -zhi and -jian before age four. The goal of this task is to use as a baseline ensuring 
children’s knowledge of classifiers; thus, I categorized children into ‘Classifier passers’ who 
showed the understanding of the semantics of the selected classifiers and ‘Classifier failers’ who 
seemed not to understand the semantics of the selected classifiers. Children were categorized as 
‘Classifier passers’ if they returned correct responses on three out of four items for -zhi as well as 
for -jian; otherwise, they were categorized as ‘Classifier failers.’ Among the 54 children, only 
one child was categorized as ‘Classifier failers’ because the child returned three correct 
responses on items of -zhi, but only returned two correct responses on items of -jian. Note that 
all other ‘Classifier passers’ were 100% accurate on both -zhi and -jian, except two children who 
wrongly selected the object in one item. From the categorical analysis, one child was excluded 
from the following analysis; thus, only the 53 ‘Classifier passers’ who demonstrated adult-like 
knowledge of the classifiers will be reported in the remaining results section.  
Let me now turn to the results of the Classifier Production Task. The Classifier 
Production task was used to examine whether adults’ uses of classifiers to describe the selected 
objects matched with the selected classifiers. Overall, the mean correct percentage for items of -
zhi is 97% while the mean correct percentage for items of -jian is 100%. It is worth to note that 
only three adults put the general classifier –ge in the very first item testing on –zhi and thus were 
coded as incorrect, but from the second item on –zhi they correctly put –zhi as the classifier. 
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Regarding the filler items, the mean correct percentage is 92%. It is not surprising to see the 
mean accuracy on the filler items was not 100%. Some adults used the general classifier for too 
many objects. For example, ‘table’ is suggested to be categorized by the classifier –zhang, but 
some adult used the general classifier to classify it. Some other cases may be related to the 
influence of Taiwanese. For example, ‘ship’ is suggested to be categorized by the classifier –sou, 
but some adult used –tiao to describe it. In Taiwanese, ‘ship’ is classified by -tiau which is 
translated as –tiao in Mandarin Chinese. Thus, for some speakers, they may use the classifiers 
interchangeably between the two languages. Regardless of the some overgeneralization of the 
use of general classifier and the influence of Taiwanese on the filler items, adults’ uses of the 
classifiers on the target pictures were consistent with the selected classifiers.  
 
4.5.4.2. Results of the Act-out Task 
The Act-out Task was used to examine whether children understand the distance contrast 
between the two pronominal demonstrative phrases, zhe-ge (this-CLgen ‘this’) and na-ge (that-
CLgen ‘that’), based on their own perspective. In the task, if the act-out instruction was ‘pick up 
zhe-ge (this-CLgen ‘this’)’ and the child selected the block near himself/herself and the speaker, 
the response was coded as correct; if the act-out instruction was ‘pick up na-ge (that-CLgen ‘that’)’ 
and the child selected the block apart from himself/herself and the speaker, the response was 
coded as wrong. The mean percentages of participants’ correct responses were first calculated. 
The results are summarized in Table 22.  
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Table 22. The mean percentages of correct responses in the Act-out Task (% (SD)) 
 Items of zhe-ge (this-CLgen ‘this’) Items of na-ge (that-CLgen ‘that’) 
Children (N = 53) 93.87 (17.15) 77.16 (37.66) 
Adults    (N = 25) 100.00 (0.00) 97.33 (9.23) 
 
Overall, adults’ performance was near ceiling. Adults’ results established the ground that 
adults are able to contrastively comprehend zhe-ge and na-ge in the context of the Act-out Task. 
That is, zhe-ge refers to the block near the child and the speaker while na-ge refers to the block 
apart from them. Children’s overall performance replicates the finding in previous literature 
(Clark & Sengul, 1978; Tanz, 1980; Webb & Abrahamson, 1976; Zhao, 2007), showing an 
asymmetrical performance between zhe-ge and na-ge. Table 22 illustrates that children have 
more difficulty in the interpretation of na-ge while they achieved almost-adult-like performance 
for the interpretation for zhe-ge. 
As the purpose of the Act-out Task was to ensure children’s knowledge of distance 
contrast between the two demonstratives based on their own perspective so I could further 
analyze their performances in the Judgment Training Task, a categorical analysis was conducted. 
I categorized children as ‘Act-out passers’ and ‘Act-out failers’ based on their performances. 
Children who returned correct responses on two out of three items on zhe-ge and two out of three 
items on na-ge were categorized as ‘Act-out passers’; otherwise, they were categorized as ‘Act-
out failers.’ Based on the criteria, 42 children were categorized as ‘Act-out passers’ and 11 
children were categorized as ‘Act-out failers’. Among the 11 ‘Act-out failers’, 9 children 
consistently selected the block near themselves throughout the task. One child exhibited random 
choice and another child selected the block apart from him/her consistently throughout the task. 
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The successful performances of the ‘Act-out passers’ indicates that these children understand the 
distance contrast between zhe-ge and na-ge based on their own perspectives.  
In the following analysis, only data from 42 children who were categorized as ‘Classifier 
passers’ as well as ‘Act-out passers’ are reported. These 42 children were considered as having 
the knowledge of semantics of the selected classifiers and were also considered as understanding 
the distance contrast between the two demonstratives based on their own perspective. 
 
4.5.4.3. Results of the Judgment Training Task  
The Judgment Training Task was used to examine whether children can use the 
semantics of the classifiers as a cue to facilitate their comprehension of pronominal 
demonstrative phrases. The data from adults were examined first. The mean percentages of 
adults’ correct responses in each block within each Group were calculated and presented in Table 
23.   
 
Table 23. Descriptive results in the Judgment Training Task by adult controls 
    N M SD 
Pre-training Block Experimental Group 11 93.94 13.48 
 Control Group 12 100.00 0.00 
Training Block Experimental Group 11 97.73 7.54 
  Control Group 12 100.00 0.00 
Post-training Block Experimental Group 11 90.15 14.35 
  Control Group 12 100.00 0.00 
Note. Control Group (N = 12); Experimental Group (N = 11). 
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As shown in the table, adults’ performances were at ceiling, suggesting that the context used in 
the task was indeed testing the distance contrast between zhe-ge (‘this’) and na-ge (‘that’) based 
on a perspective different from one’s own.  
 
Table 24. Descriptive results in the Judgment Training Task by children 
 
M SD 
Pre-training Block Control Group 80.95 16.90 
 Experimental Group 75.00 18.45 
Training Block Control Group 77.38 21.87 
 Experimental Group 98.24 5.93 
Post-training Block Control Group 78.17 18.54 
  Experimental Group 81.75 17.60 
Note. Control Group (N = 21); Experimental Group (N = 21).  
 
The mean percentages of the correct responses from the two groups of children in three 
blocks are presented in Table 24
10
. As can be seen, children in the Experimental Condition seem 
to have performed differently across the three blocks. Particularly, there is a huge improvement 
from the Pre-training Block to the Training Block followed by a performance drop from the 
Training Block to the Post-training Block; however, their performance in the Post-training Block 
did not drop below that of the Pre-training Block. On the contrary, children’s performances in 
                                                 
10
 Children in the two counterbalanced lists did not performed significantly differ (Control Group: Pre-training 
Block (t(19) = 1.597, p > .05), Training Block (t(19) = .716,  p > .05), and Post-training Block (t(19) = .542,  p 
> .05); Experimental Group: Training Block (t(19) = 1.390,  p > .05), Post-training Block (t(19) = .800,  p > .05)), 
except in the Pre-training Block in the Experimental Group (t(19) = 3.426, p < .05). Although children in List 1 were 
slightly older than those in List 2, the differences were not significant in both Control Condition (t(19) = .581,  p 
> .05) and Experimental Condition (t(19) = .621,  p > .05). 
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the Control Condition did not change over the blocks; they remained at around 80% in terms of 
the mean accuracy. In order to examine whether children’s performance was related to the 
condition they received, a 2 (Condition: Experimental vs. Control) X 3 (Blocks: Pre-training 
Block, Training Block, Post-training Block) mixed ANOVA was conducted, using the mean of 
percentages of the correct responses as the dependent variable. The summary of the 2 x 3 
ANOVA is shown in Table 25.  
 
Table 25. Results on the 2 by 3 Mixed ANOVA 
  df F p 
Blocks 2 7.556 .001 
Blocks * Conditions 2 12.904 .000 
Error(Blocks) 80   
 
As shown in Table 25, a main effect on the Blocks was observed (F(2, 80) = 7.556, p < .01). 
Crucially, there is significant interaction between Blocks and Conditions (F(2, 80) = 12.904, p 
< .01), suggesting that the pattern shown in the Experimental Condition differs from the Control 
Condition across the three blocks. In particular, children in the Experimental Condition 
outperformed children in the Control Condition in the Training Block (t(40) = 4.217, p < .05), 
indicating that  children in the Experimental Condition benefitted from the classifier cue 
provided in the Training Block. Recall that the critical difference between the Experimental 
Condition and Control Condition in the Training Block is that in the Experimental Condition the 
classifier cue was provided as the classifiers were sufficient enough to resolve the referent 
whereas in the Control Condition the general classifier was used in the linguistic stimuli and thus 
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children could only rely on the meaning of the demonstratives to identify the referent. Recall that 
the first goal of the current study is to examine whether children can take advantage of the 
classifier semantics to improve their comprehension of demonstratives when the classifier cue is 
available in the context. The significant differences between the two groups of children in the 
Training Block shown in the results suggest that children are able to incorporate the classifier 
cues when comprehending demonstratives and the semantics of the classifiers indeed facilitate 
children’s demonstrative comprehension when the cue is present.   
The second goal of the current study is whether the effect of classifier semantics in the 
Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context could be carried forward to a different context, the Classifier-
Cue-Insufficient Context, in which the classifier semantics and demonstratives are both required 
to pick out the correct referent. In order to explore the second goal,I examined whether children 
in the Experimental Condition improved after the exposure to the Training Block by conducting 
two paired t-tests, comparing the mean percentages of correct responses in the Pre-training Block 
and Post-training Block within the Experimental Condition and Control Condition respectively. 
The results of the paired t-tests reveal that the mean percentages of the correct responses in the 
Pre-training Block marginally differ from those in the Post-training Block for children in the 
Experiment Condition (t(40) = -1.718, p = .051) whereas the performances in the two blocks did 
not show significant differences for children in the Control Condition  (t(40) = .725, p > .05). 
The results indicate that children who received the training with classifier cues showed a 
tendency of improvement from Pre-training Block to Post-training Block while children who 
were not exposed to the classifier cues did not improve. These findings suggest that the second 
goal of the current study is marginally supported with the results as there is a tendency showing 
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that children may benefit from the effect of classifier semantics in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient 
Context and carry over the effect to a different context, the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context.   
 
4.5.4.4. Results of the Executive Function Task: the DCCS 
Children’s performances
11
 in DCCS were analyzed based on Zelazo’s (2006) criteria. 
Children’s correct card sorting in the Pre-switch Phase was first examined. Children who 
returned five of six correct card sorting responses in the Pre-switch Phase were considered as 
having passed the Pre-switch Phase; all children in the present study correctly sorted the cards 6 
of 6 times. Children who passed the Pre-switch Phase were further categorized as ‘EF passers’ 
and ‘EF failers’ on the basis of their performances in the Post-switch Phase. Children were 
categorized as ‘EF passers’ if they returned correct card sorting 5 of 6 times in the Post-switch 
Phase; otherwise, they were categorized as ‘EF failers’. Thirty-seven children were categorized 
as ‘EF passers’ and five children were categorized as ‘EF failers.’ The results by age group are 
summarized in Table 26.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 Recall that two sets of materials were used to control the sorting rules. In one set of the material (List 1), the 
Pre-switch Phase started with the color-sorting rule and switch to the shape-sorting rule in the Post-switch Phase; in 
the other set of material (List 2), the sorting rules were in the reverse order in that Pre-switch Phase started with the 
shape-sorting rule while Post-switch Phase had the color-sorting rule. Children were pre-assigned to each list (List 1: 
24 children; List 2: 18 children). Result of an independent t-test revealed that children’s performances between the 
two lists did not significantly differ from each other in terms of the correct sorting in the Post-switch Phase (t = .610, 
p > .05), suggesting that the order of the sorting dimensions does not affect children’s sorting performance.  
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Table 26. The ratio of passers and failers in Executive Function task (numbers of children/total 
number of children) 
 
EF Passers EF Failers 
4yr 81.82% (9/11) 18.19% (2/11) 
5yr 94.44% (17/18) 5.56% (1/18) 
6yr 84.62% (11/13) 15.38% (2/13) 
 
The age group results are consistent with Zelazo et al. (1996)in which nearly 90% of the 
four-year-old children passed the task. Interestingly, the pass/fail pattern in DCCS observed in 
the current study, which is consistent with Zelazo et al.’s findings, was not consistent with the 
results from another group of Chinese-speaking children who participated in the study discussed 
in Chapter 3 of the current dissertation. One possible explanation may be the geographic 
differences because about half of the children in the current experiment were recruited in another 
preschool and they were from Taipei instead of Chiayi, in the southern part of Taiwan. The 
geographic differences may affect their better performances, as the languages spoken in these 
two areas differ slightly and the socioeconomics also differ slightly. However, it is still not clear 
why there is such a difference between the two groups of Chinese-speaking children. The 
unknown factor of high passing rate in DCCS thus may not allow me to do further analysis 
regarding whether children’s better performance in the Judgment Training Task is related to their 
performances in the DCCS
12
. Recall that the DCCS used in the current experiment was the 
                                                 
12
 Despite the high passing rate in DCCS, it is still interesting to take a look at the cross-task analysis. I first 
categorized children into two groups based on whether they showed improvement from Pre-training Block to Post-
training Block. I subtracted children’s mean percentage of accuracy in the Post-training Block with their mean 
169 
standard version, which is suggested to be easier. Future study may extend to the advanced 
version of DCCS in order to seek a potential reason for which some children benefitted from the 
Training Block while others did not.  
 
4.5.5. Summary of the results 
The overarching goal of the current study is to explore the role of classifier cue in 
children’s demonstrative comprehension. I examined whether and to what extent children’s 
demonstrative comprehension could be facilitated by the semantics of the classifiers. Overall, 
results of the current study have shown that children can use their knowledge of classifiers-
referent dependency as a cue to facilitate their demonstrative comprehension when the 
demonstratives are uttered by a speaker who has a different perspective. As shown in the results 
of the Judgment Training Task, children in the Experiment Group outperformed those in the 
Control Group in the Training Block, suggesting that the classifier cue presented to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
percentage of accuracy in the Pre-training Block. Children were categorized as ‘improved’ if the subtraction is 
above zero. Children were categorized as ‘no improvement’ if the subtraction equals zero or minus zero. Then, I 
further divided children into EF passers and EF failers within the ‘improved’ group of children as well as ‘no 
improvement’ group of children. The summary of the results were shown in the following Table.  
 
Table 1. The number of EF passers and EF failers showing improvement or not in the Judgment Training Task 
 
EF Passers EF Failers 
Improved 9 3 
No improvement 28 2 
 
As can be seen from the Table, the number of the EF failers was low; thus, no explicit pattern can be drawn from the 
results.  
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Experiment Group helped children to pick out the correct referent of demonstratives. Moreover, 
within the Experiment Group, there was a tendency for children’s performances to improve from 
the Pre-training Block to the Post-training Block; this result indicates that the exposure to the 
classifier cue in the Training Block may further help children’s demonstrative comprehension. 
That is to say, the semantic effect of the classifiers in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context may 
be carried over to a different context, the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context, where children 
need to incorporate the semantics of classifiers and demonstrative meanings together in order to 
correctly pick out the referent. However, it was also not clear whether children’s ability to carry 
over the effect of the classifier cue was related to their Executive Function, since I was unable to 
perform further analysis on the interaction between DCCS and the Judgment Training Task.   
 
4.6. General discussions 
In this section, I will discuss (i) the nature of the training effect, (ii) the role of classifiers 
in demonstrative comprehension, (iii) understanding children’s processing of semantics and 
pragmatics, and (iv) the role that Executive Function may play in Chinese demonstrative phrases.     
 
4.6.1. The nature of training effect 
The Judgment Training Task explored whether children could benefit from the classifier 
semantics that can help them gain their knowledge of demonstratives. I particularly assessed the 
type of the training which I call Implicit Learning. Children were expected to use the semantics 
of classifiers to successfully identify the correct referent of the demonstrative phrase in the 
Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context; during the presentation of this particular context, children 
may implicitly learn the association of each demonstrative with the position of the object relative 
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to the speaker. According to the results in the Judgment Training Task, children seem to benefit 
from the training, in that the classifier semantics helped them to have a slightly better 
demonstrative comprehension in the context, where the classifier cue was no longer sufficient to 
pick out the correct referent, immediately following their exposure to the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context. Children in the Experiment Group, presented with the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context during the Training Block, showed a tendency to improve from Pre-training 
Block to Post-training Block, in which they saw the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context in both 
blocks. On the other hand, children in the Control Group, who were exposed to the Control 
Context, in which the classifier semantics plays no role, did not show such improvement over 
those two Blocks. It is worthwhile to note that children who were in the Experiment Group 
exhibited almost-adult-like performance during the Training Block, suggesting that the classifier 
semantics facilitate children’s comprehension and thus the improvement shown in the Post-
training Block is likely to be a carry-over effect of the classifier cue. In fact, all children in the 
Experimental Condition were 100% accurate in the Training Block, except two children with 
88% and 75% accuracy. This indicates that all children in the Experiment Group were able to use 
the classifier semantics to pick out the correct referent in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context 
within the Training Block.   
The results discussed above show that children may be able to take advantage of the 
Implicit Training on the classifier semantics. An additional qualitative analysis on children’s 
individual responses within the Experiment Group was conducted in order to further examine 
how the Implicit Training of the classifier semantics may have worked. I categorized children 
into groups based on the training effect, measured by the subtraction of the mean percentages of 
correct responses in the Post-training Block from those in the Pre-training Block for each child. 
172 
Four subgroups were identified for children within the Experiment Group, which is summarized 
in Table 27.  
 
Table 27. Children’s individual response patterns in Judgment Training Task  
Pattern Group 
Pre-training Block < Post-training Block ‘Classifier-cue-advantage’ (N = 7) 
Pre-training Block = Post-training Block ‘Classifier-cue advantage-local’ (N = 6) 
Pre-training Block > Post-training Block ‘Classifier-cue-disadvantage’ (N = 3)  
Pre-training Block = Post-training Block = 100% ‘Adult-like’ (N = 5) 
 
The first was children whose mean percentage of correct responses in Post-training Block was 
higher than that in Pre-training Block (N = 7), indicating that those children improved from Pre-
training Block to Post-training Block. The second group had children whose mean percentage of 
correct responses in Pre-training Block and Post-training Block did not show any differences (N 
= 6); the difference between the two blocks was zero. This group shows a subset of children who 
did not carry over the classifier cue to the Post-training Block. The third was children whose 
performance in the Pre-training Block was higher than that in the Post-training Block (N = 3), 
indicating that the training did not work as facilitation, rather it affected children’s performance 
in the opposite direction. The last was children who were 100% accurate for both blocks as well 
as the Training Block (N = 5), showing that their performances were already adult-like. In what 
follows, I will discuss the results based on the above categorization.  
Seven of 21 children in the Experiment Group were categorized into the first group; these 
children’s performances in the Post-training Block were better than that in the Pre-training Block, 
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in which the differences ranged from 16% to 67%. I label this group as ‘Classifier-cue-advantage’ 
group, in which the exposure to the available semantic cue further facilitated their demonstrative 
comprehension in a different context where the cue is no longer sufficient. Recall that the 
experimenter asked the children for justifications of their judgment in the task. Examining 
children’s individual reasoning on their judgment may provide a hint for an explanation of why 
children show such improvement. Children’s individual reasoning could be categorized into 
three types: (i) children who seem to implicitly learn the association between the location of the 
referent and the demonstratives (N = 2); (ii) children who showed improvement due to the 
Classifier Mismatch items (N = 1); (iii) children whose improvement was unclear to explain (N = 
4). I will discuss each reasoning pattern in more detail below. 
Two children in the ‘Classifier-cue-advantage’ group fall into the first category that 
seems to show the Implicit Learning. Let’s take a look at one child’s reasoning pattern, which 
changed from Pre-training to Training Block. In the Pre-training Block, when asked to identify 
the correct referent if he judged that the Student Wizard painted wrong, the child always pointed 
to a closer object regardless of the classifier or the demonstrative. For instance, in one Match 
item, when the demand was ‘paint this-zhi (CLanimal)’ and the fulfillment was painting the animal 
that was close to the speaker, s/he judged the fulfillment as wrong and pointed to the outfit closer 
to the speaker; the choice s/he made, however, did not match with the classifier –zhi but matched 
with the demonstrative. In one Classifier Mismatch item, when the demand was ‘paint that-zhi 
(CLanimal)’ and the fulfillment was painting the outfit apart from the speaker, s/he judged the 
fulfillment as ‘wrong’ which was accurate; however, s/he pointed to the animal near the speaker, 
and the choice matched with the classifier whereas it did not match with the demonstrative. 
Interestingly, when the child proceeded to the Training Block, s/he started using the 
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demonstratives to correct the fulfillment; for instance, by saying ‘he should paint THIS one’ 
instead of saying ‘he should paint the cat, not the outfit’
13
. This particular type of response using 
demonstratives may be an index of the association between the location of the object and the 
demonstrative word. Once this child built up the association, s/he was able to exhibit adult-like 
performance in the Post-training Block and indeed was 100% accurate in the Post-training Block. 
Another child who falls in this group also gave a similar response in the Training Block. When 
the child was asked to explain why s/he thought the fulfillment was wrong, s/he explicitly said 
‘because he was asked to paint THIS-zhi (CLanimal), but he painted THAT-jian (CLoutfit)’, 
indicating that the child may associate the position of the object with the demonstratives in the 
Training Block.  
For the second category in the ‘Classifier-cue-Advantage’ group, one child’s reasoning 
pattern falls into the category of improvement due to the use of classifier cues. This particular 
child showed improvement at the first glance; however, this child only improved in the Classifier 
Mismatch items in the Post-training but did not improve in Demonstrative Mismatch items. It is 
clear that the Training Block was drawing children’s attention to the classifier cues; thus, it is not 
surprising to see children showed improvement on the Classifier Mismatch items.  
Oher children in this ‘Classifier-Cue-Advantage’ group fall into the third category. It was 
not clear why they showed such improvement; their responses were less clear in how and why 
they took advantage of the Training. For example, two children only incorrectly accepted one 
Demonstrative Mismatch item in the Pre-training Block, which was also the first mismatch item 
they encountered; in all other items, they exhibited adult-like performance and correctly accepted 
                                                 
13
 In fact, many children said ‘he should paint the cat, not the outfit’ as the response and it seems that they tend 
to focus on the ‘kind’ category of the object. This type of responses will be discussed latter. 
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Match items and rejected Mismatch items. One possible explanation for this pattern might be 
because they were not familiar with the Mismatch items and thus accidentally accepted it. In 
another example, one child pointed to the correct referent on every occasion before the painting 
happened; however, his/her judgment did not match with his/her selection of the referent. As s/he 
was exposed to more items, the accuracy increased. To summarize children’s reasoning pattern 
in the ‘Classifier-Cue-Advantage’ group, although there are some cases children seemed to 
follow the Implicit Learning as expected, future studies are still needed to explore a more 
efficient way to train children’s association between the location of the object and the 
demonstratives.  
Let me now return to the discussion on the second subgroup categorized within the 
Experiment Group. Six of 21 children were categorized in the second pattern, in which there was 
no difference between their performances in the Pre-training Block and Post-training Block. This 
indicates that even though the classifier cue worked within the Training Block, there was no 
carry-over effect after the Training Block. I call this group ‘Classifier-cue-advantage-local’ 
group, in which the semantic cue works only when the cue is available, and can work as the sole 
cue for referent resolution. Two response patterns were observed to show that children might use 
the classifier cue solely to interpret the demonstrative phrase. The first pattern is as follows; 
when children were asked why they thought that the fulfilment was wrong in the Training Block, 
they responded to the question using the semantic category of the classifier and ignored the 
demonstrative word. For instance, when the demand was ‘paint this-jian’ and the fulfilment was 
to paint the cat apart from the speaker, the child rejected the fulfillment by saying ‘because it is a 
cat, not an outfit.’ In another pattern, children demonstrated that they were able to use the 
classifier cue since they were able to reject the fulfilment in the Classifier Mismatch items in the 
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Pre-training Block and Post-training Block; however, when they were asked to point to the 
correct referent, they tended to point to the wrong referent that matched with the classifier but 
not the demonstrative. For instance, when the demand was ‘paint this-zhi’ and the fulfillment 
was painting the outfit closer to the speaker, children pointed to the animal apart from the 
speaker as the response to why they thought it was wrong. This type of pattern shows that 
children have the knowledge of classifier-referent dependency, but they were not able to use it 
together with the demonstrative.  
Three of 21 children were grouped into the third category, in which these children’s 
performances in the Post-training Block were 8% to 16% worse when compared with their 
performances in the Pre-training Block. Children’s worse performance after the Training Block 
indicates that the classifier cue in the Training Block may have worked in the opposite direction 
than I expected. These three children were labelled ‘Classifier-cue-disadvantage’ group, in which 
the semantic cue in the classifier did not improve their demonstrative comprehension. However, 
it was not clear why the classifier cue influenced children’s interpretation of demonstrative 
phrase in a different direction.  
Last, five of 21 children were identified as belonging to the fourth category. These 
children were adult-like throughout the task; particularly, they were 100% accurate for all three 
blocks. As children who exhibited adult-like performance, this group of children was labelled 
‘Adult-like’ group.  
As discussed above, the qualitative results thus suggest that some children in the 
Experimental Group, but not many, indeed showed improvement after the Training Block in the 
Judgment Training Task. Recall that the statistical analysis revealed that children in the 
Experiment Group performed marginally better in the Post-training Block when compared with 
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their performance in the Pre-training Block (t(40) = -1.718, p = .051) whereas children in the 
Control Group did not show any differences (t(40) = .725, p > .05). The qualitative results, 
particularly children identified as belonging to the ‘Classifier-Cue-Advantage Group’, would 
serve as support to the quantitative results. From children’s individual reasoning across the 
blocks, the Implicit Training may have worked as expected. As discussed previously, during the 
Training Block, some children were able to switch their reasoning from the kind category of the 
referent to the speaker-object distance. Then, their reasoning in the Training Block was further 
carried over to the next block and helped them successfully avoid the comprehension errors.  
This shows that children who used classifier semantics to successfully identify the correct object 
may have been able to implicitly learn the association between demonstratives and the location 
of the object.  
Although the Implicit Training seems to work to some extent, many children still failed 
to learn the association between demonstratives and the position of the referent. Therefore, 
further studies are needed to explore whether other types of training could better facilitate 
children’s demonstrative comprehension. One potential direction could be to manipulate the 
visual material to attract children’s attention to the location of the speaker and guide them to 
associate each demonstrative with the position of the speaker relative to the object. The design of 
the task could be as follows. In the Training Block, I will adopt the same visual setting in which 
there is only a cloth-animal pair, one of which is located near the speaker and the other apart 
from the speaker. Crucially, I will manipulate the location of the speaker across items; in some 
trials the speaker will appear on the right side of the visual scene, whereas in others, he will 
appear on the left side. By placing the speaker in different positions in the visual scene, children 
may need to pay attention to the position of the object relative to the speaker and may further be 
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able to figure that the position of the speaker is one of the key components to consider in 
comprehending demonstrative phrases. Additionally, in each item, before the speaker utters the 
demand, the experimenter will ask the child where the speaker is in order to force the child to 
pay attention to the speaker’s location. If children notice that the location of the speaker is going 
to be relevant information to incorporate when comprehending demonstrative phrases, they may 
possibly establish the reference point onto the speaker and further improve their egocentric 
demonstrative comprehension.   
 
4.6.2. The role of classifiers in demonstrative comprehension 
The classifier cue seems to be a useful cue to help children identify the correct referent of 
demonstratives. The results revealed that children in the Experiment Group who were exposed to 
the classifier cues in the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context in the Training Block outperformed 
children in the Control Group who received the Control Context, in which the classifier 
semantics was virtually absent. This piece of evidence indicates that the classifier cue in the 
demonstrative phrase facilitates children’s demonstrative comprehension. This robust effect 
observed in the Training Block in the Experiment Group also appears in other blocks. Recall that 
in the Pre-training and Post-training Blocks, the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context was 
provided for both Experiment Group and Control Group. In this context, two types of items that 
elicited rejection as the correct judgment were created. One was the Demonstrative Mismatch 
and the other one was the Classifier Mismatch. For the Demonstrative Mismatch items, the 
object being selected did not match with the demonstrative word in the demand, but matched 
with the classifier (e.g, the demand was zhe-zhi (this-CLanimal) but the fulfillment was a bear apart 
from the speaker). Thus, in order for children to make the judgment, they needed to consider the 
179 
meaning of the demonstratives. If children still had difficulty in using demonstrative meaning to 
make the judgment and thus relied on classifier semantics, they would incorrectly judge the 
outcome as match. On the other hand, in the Classifier Mismatch items, the object being selected 
matched the demonstrative in the demand, but did not match the classifier (e.g., the demand is 
zhe-zhi (this-CLanimal) but the fulfillment is a coat near the speaker). Thus, if children use the 
classifier semantics in judging the outcome, their performances would be adult-like. Keeping this 
in mind, let me now examine children’s performances in the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context, 
particularly focused on the Demonstrative Mismatch items and Classifier Mismatch items 
 
Table 28. The mean percentage of correct responses of Mismatch items in Pre- and Post-training 
Blocks 
      M SD 
Pre-training Block 
Classifier Mismatch 
Control Group 95.24 21.82 
Experimental Group 88.10 31.24 
Demonstrative 
Mismatch 
Control Group 68.25 30.69 
Experimental Group 56.35 30.95 
Post-training Block 
Classifier Mismatch 
Control Group 90.48 25.59 
Experimental Group 97.62 10.91 
Demonstrative 
Mismatch 
 
Control Group 54.76 49.76 
Experimental Group 50.00 50.00 
 
As shown in Table 28, overall, children’s performances on the Demonstrative Mismatch items 
were around chance level, whereas their performances on the Classifier Mismatch items were 
much more successful compared with the Demonstrative Mismatch items across the two blocks. 
As discussed earlier, if children consistently rely on the classifier cues across the items, their 
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judgment on the Demonstrative Mismatch items and Classifier Mismatch items would show 
different results. This finding, revealing different response patterns between these two types of 
Mismatch items, thus suggests that while children are able to use the classifier as a cue to 
identify the correct referent, they still have difficulty in using the demonstrative meaning to 
identify the referent. 
Furthermore, note that in the Demonstrative Mismatch items, the fulfillment matched 
with the classifier in the demand but not with the demonstrative. If children used the classifier as 
a cue, but not demonstrative, they may incorrectly accepted the fulfillment in the Demonstrative 
Mismatch items. Children’s poor performances in the Demonstrative Mismatch items may thus 
suggest that children may have difficulty incorporating the classifier meaning together with 
demonstrative meaning when comprehending demonstratives, which would further suggest that 
the classifier cue may be easier to access than demonstrative meaning.   
When comparing the availability between the semantics of classifiers and demonstrative 
meaning, classifiers seem to be a more readily available cue. That is, children are able to more 
easily take advantage of the classifier semantics when identifying the referent. As noted 
previously, children were more likely to judge Classifier Mismatch items correctly than 
Demonstrative Mismatch items, which suggest that they tended to use classifier cue to make the 
judgment and may imply that the classifier cues may be a more reliable cue to identify the 
correct referents.  
The idea that classifier cues may be more easily accessible is consistent with the data 
from adults. One adult in the present study made his/her judgment based on the classifiers 
throughout the task, that is, even for the Demonstrative Mismatch items, he/she incorrectly 
accepted the fulfillment. This may indicate that the classifier cue is more readily available or 
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easier to access when comprehending demonstrative phrases. When examining the nature of 
classifier cues and demonstrative meaning, we can find that classifier cues are processed simply 
on semantics while demonstratives requires listeners to examine the context and calculate the 
distance between the speaker and the objects when resolving demonstrative phrases. Using the 
demonstrative meaning to identify the correct referent may require extra effort to consider the 
contextual information, whereas using classifiers cue is simply assessing the semantics category 
of the classifier categorized without extra steps. Since the classifier cue seems to a cue that is 
easier to access when identifying the correct referent, as a consequence, children may rely on 
classifier cues much more than demonstrative meanings when resolving referents for 
demonstrative phrase. It is not surprising that children tend to rely on the classifier cues, as 
Huang and Snedeker (2009) have suggested that children tend to use the semantic information 
instead of pragmatic information.  
Given that the classifier cue is semantics-based while demonstrative interpretation 
requires incorporation of the speaker’s perspective and thus is pragmatics-based, the findings are 
consistent with the imbalanced ease of availability of the cues that are available to children 
discussed in a number of studies. An existing line of research has showed that children tend to 
rely on semantics information more robustly than pragmatic information when identifying 
referents being mentioned. For instance, Arnold et al. (2007) have shown that children are able to 
use gender specification as the semantic cues to identify referents for English pronouns, while 
they were not able to use the order-of-mention, which was considered as the discourse contextual 
cue, to identify the referent in the linguistic stimuli. In addition to referent resolution, another 
line of research that investigates children’s sematic and pragmatic processing focuses on 
children’s comprehension of scalar implicatures (Guasti et al., 2005; Y. T. Huang & Snedeker, 
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2009; Noveck, 2000; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). The interpretation of the scalar terms is 
ambiguous at the semantic-pragmatic interface, in that one interpretation is semantically based 
while the other is pragmatically based. Several studies have shown that children tend to interpret 
the scalar terms with their semantic meaning rather than the pragmatic implicature (Guasti et al., 
2005; Y. T. Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Noveck, 2000; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). The 
results suggest that the semantic information and pragmatic information may have different 
statuses in processing. The semantic information may be more robust information children rely 
on as compared with pragmatic information.  
In short, the semantics of classifiers per se seem to play an important role in 
demonstrative comprehension for children. However, it seems to be challenging for children to 
incorporate classifier semantics together with demonstrative meaning when comprehending 
demonstratives. One potential reason for the difficulty might be the imbalanced ease of 
availability between semantic information and pragmatic information. Previous studies 
investigating children’s processing semantic and pragmatic information have suggested that 
semantic information is more accessible compared with pragmatic information. However, there 
is still room for further examination regarding the extent to which the classifier cue may be more 
readily available, compared to demonstrative meaning, which was not clear in the current study, 
as the current discussion is mainly based on the behavioral responses in the Judgment Training 
Task.   
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4.6.3. Understanding children’s processing of semantics and pragmatics: hints from a 
follow-up study with adult speakers of Chinese 
The discussion in the previous section on children’s imbalanced use of semantic 
information and pragmatic information further raises a question regarding how the classifier 
semantics and the pragmatic computation involved in the demonstrative-referent association may 
indeed be used in children’s online processing of the demonstrative comprehension. In this 
section I will report a follow-up study regarding how adult speakers of Chinese may utilize these 
two sources of information during the online computation of demonstrative comprehension (Chu 
& Minai, 2014). Although this study only involved adult speakers as participants, the findings of 
this study will be taken to provide a ground on the basis of which subsequent studies with 
children will be generated, seeking better understanding of their online processing of 
demonstratives. I will discuss those hints in what follows.  
I tested 36 adult native speakers of Mandarin Chinese (mean age: 22; age range: 18-30). 
They were asked to perform a story-based judgment task. The stories were exactly the same as 
those used in the Judgment Training Task discussed above in the current chapter. There were two 
main characters in the story, the Great Wizard and the Student Wizard. In each story, the Great 
Wizard uttered demand such as (46) to the Student Wizard.  
 
(46) ba   zhe/na   zhi    /jian     tu     cheng  lanse 
 BA  this/that  CLanimal/CLoutfit   paint   as     blue 
 ‘Paint this/that blue’  
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The Student Wizard sometimes successfully fulfilled the demand (Match items), and other times 
was unsuccessful (Mismatch items). The study was a within-subject design with three conditions, 
namely, the Experimental Condition, the Demonstrative Only Condition, and the Classifier Only 
Condition.  
The Experimental Condition presented the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context that was used 
in the Judgment Training Task, in which the referent identification requires the two sources of 
information: (i) the pragmatic information in the demonstratives (i.e., near/far contrast relative to 
the speaker position) and (ii) the semantic information as in the classifier semantics. Based on 
each of these information sources, two Mismatch items were created, Classifier Mismatch items 
and Demonstrative Mismatch items, as well as Match items. In the Classifier Mismatch items, 
the object the Student Wizard painted matched the demonstrative meaning in the demand, but 
mismatched the classifier semantics (e.g., The Great Wizard uttered zhe-zhi (this-CLanimal), and 
the Student Wizard painted the outfit closer to the Great Wizard; see Figure 26). 
 
 
Figure 26. Sample visual contexts for Classifier Mismatch item in Experiment Condition 
 
In the Demonstrative Mismatch items, the object the Student Wizard painted matched the 
classifier semantics in the demand, but mismatched the demonstrative meaning (e.g., The Great 
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Wizard uttered zhe-zhi (this-CLanimal), and the Student Wizard painted the animal apart from the 
Great Wizard; see Figure 27).  
 
 
Figure 27. Sample visual context for Demonstrative Mismatch item in Experiment Condition 
 
With respect to the Demonstrative Only Condition, the study presented the Control Context 
used in the Judgment Training Task, in which the demand such as (47) contained the general 
classifier –ge, which is claimed to not have any specific semantic information and thus the 
demonstrative information was the only source for referent identification.  
 
(47) ba   zhe/na    ge      tu     cheng  lanse 
 BA  this/that  CLgeneric   paint   as     blue 
 ‘Paint this/that blue’  
 
The Match items and the Mismatch items were also created for this Condition. The Match 
items were created by the satisfactory painting in response to the demand (e.g., The Great 
Wizard uttered zhe-ge (this-CLgeneric) followed by –ge, and the Student Wizard painted the 
correct object; see Figure 28a). The Mismatch items showed unsatisfactory painting in response 
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to the demand (e.g., The Great Wizard uttered zhe-ge (this-CLgeneric), the Student Wizard 
wrongly painted the object apart from the Great Wizard; see Figure 28b). 
 
   
Figure 28. Sample visual contexts for (a) Match and (b) Mismatch items in Demonstrative Only 
Condition 
 
The Classifier Only Condition presented the visual material as in the Classifier-Cue-
Insufficient Context, but with a different demand such as (48), which did not have the 
demonstrative but the numeral yi (‘one’) co-occurring with the classifier.  
 
(48) ba   yi    zhi    /jian     tu     cheng  lanse 
 BA  one  CLanimal/CLoutfit   paint   as     blue 
 ‘Paint one (animal/outfit) blue’  
 
The Match items and the Mismatch items were also created for this Condition. The Match items 
showed a correct painting in response to the demand; crucially, Student Wizard painted an object 
whose semantic category matched the classifier semantics (e.g., The Great Wizard uttered yi-zhi 
(one-CLanimal), and the Student Wizard painted an animal; see Figure 29a). The Mismatch items 
showed a painting of the wrong object whose category did not match the classifier semantics 
28a 28b 
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(e.g., The Great Wizard uttered yi-zhi (one-CLanimal), the classifier associated with an animal, and 
the Student Wizard painted an outfit; see Figure 29b). 
 
  
Figure 29. Sample visual contexts for (a) Match and (b) Mismatch items in Classifier Only 
Condition 
Thus, in this condition, classifier semantics was the only source of information for referent 
identification. In the task, participants were asked to judge the fulfillment by pressing a mouse 
button as quickly and accurately as possible. Their reaction time (RT) to the judgment was 
measured. Note that the last two conditions were Control Conditions designed to obtain the 
baseline duration for each of the information sources (semantics/pragmatics). In each condition, 
one of the information sources would be the sole cue to make the judgment (i.e., Demonstrative 
Only Condition is the condition when demonstrative/pragmatics is the only source for the 
acceptance/rejection, and Classifier Only Condition is the condition when classifier is the only 
informative cue to accept/reject the outcome. 
The variables of crucial interest here were the RTs for the Mismatch items across three 
conditions. I directly compared the RTs of the judgment to Classifier Mismatch items and 
Demonstrative Mismatch items in the Experimental Condition. Since the Experimental 
Condition provided the context in which both semantics and pragmatics were information 
sources to identify the correct referent, the RTs to the Mismatch items would reflect how quickly 
29a 29b 
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one could incorporate each of the information sources for referent identification. Additionally, 
RTs in the other two Control Conditions were also compared, particularly focused on the 
Mismatch items, namely the Classifier Only Mismatch items and the Demonstrative Only 
Mismatch items, to see determine whether, by nature, the use of classifier information differs 
from the use of demonstrative information. The results revealed that the mean RT for the 
Demonstrative Mismatch Condition (778.03ms) was longer than that for the Classifier Mismatch 
Condition (716.77ms; t(36) = -1.801, p= .04, one-tail) in the Experimental Condition. As the RT 
reflects how easily adults could use the information to falsify the wrongly picked referents of 
demonstrative phrases, the shorter RT would suggest a faster use of the information. The results 
revealed a longer RT on the Demonstrative Mismatch Condition, indicating that using the 
classifier information to identify the correct referent of demonstrative phrase is easier when 
compared with using the demonstrative information.  
However, the comparison between the other two conditions may complicate the 
interpretation. There were no significant differences between the mean RT of the Demonstrative-
Only Mismatch (702.74ms) and that of the Classifier-Only Mismatch (707.98ms; t(35) = .137, p 
= .45) in the other two conditions. This seems to suggest that when classifier semantics and 
demonstratives are the sole information to identify the correct referent, the access to each type of 
the information seems to be equal.  Currently, there is no clear explanation as to why this was the 
case in the current data, and would like to address it as a further issue for a future study. To sum 
up, the findings suggest that the semantic information from the classifier semantics may be more 
readily available than the pragmatic information from the demonstratives when resolving the 
referent for demonstrative phrases in Chinese.  
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Following this study, future studies with online processing measures, such as eye-
tracking using visual world paradigm, would be required to investigate how adults as well as 
children use the semantics information from classifiers and pragmatic information from 
demonstratives to process demonstrative phrases in Chinese. Such an online measurement would 
provide a better understanding of both adults’ and children’s use of the two sources of 
information online and further understand the mechanism of demonstrative computation that 
children may need.  
 
4.6.4. The role of Executive Function in the Implicit Training  
Finally, I will discuss the findings from children’s data with respect to their Executive 
Function. The current findings suggest that some children seemed to benefit from the training 
and improved their demonstrative comprehension in the Post-training Block. Recall that children 
in the Experiment Group showed marginal improvement in demonstrative comprehension from 
Pre-training Block to Post-training Block, whereas children in the Control Group did not perform 
differently for those two blocks. Interestingly, children’s performances on the EF task were 
overall successful; therefore, having the ceiling effects in the task, I was not able to further 
explore any relationship between children’s performance in DCCS and their ability to show the 
improvement in the Post-training Block in the Judgment Training Task. Given these findings, 
future studies are needed to further explore the role of Executive Function in demonstrative 
comprehension and the Implicit Training.  
The hypothesis of the current study regarding the role of Executive Function, particularly 
shifting, was formed based on Jincho, Yamane, Minai, and Mazuka (2008) study, which showed 
a correlation between children’s adult-like processing in ambiguity resolution driven by a 
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training and their performance in Executive Function task. Given this, I hypothesized that 
children’s Implicit Learning from the Training Block may be predicted by a better developed 
mental flexibility. More specifically, if children were able to improve their demonstrative 
comprehension procedures within the Training Block and further use the improved way to 
compute the meaning of demonstratives in the subsequent, Post-training Block, they may show 
better performance in the Executive Function task.  
Recall that in the Judgment Training Task, I used the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context 
in both Pre-training Block and Post-training Block (the context in which both demonstrative and 
classifier needed to be considered to identify the referent), while I used the Classifier-Cue-
Sufficient Context in the Training Block (the context in which the classifier was informative 
enough to find the correct referent). In such a case, since the classifier semantics is a robust and 
informative cue in identifying the referent, children’s meaning computation procedure may be 
very likely to rely on classifier semantics in the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context in the Pre-
training Block, while the demonstrative may be ignored, and thus children tend to exhibit 
comprehension errors. Recall that in this context, classifier semantics cannot be the sole cue to 
identify the referent; both classifier semantics and demonstrative meanings are required to 
interpret the demonstrative phrase appropriately. Thus, if children’s meaning computation 
procedure largely relied on the classifier semantics, their interpretation of the whole 
demonstrative phrase would be incorrect; in particular, children would still exhibit egocentric 
comprehension for the Demonstrative Mismatch items. Then, in the next Block, the Classifier-
Cue-Sufficient Context provided the classifier cue in which classifier semantics was the sole cue 
to identify the referent. In this Training Block, children may potentially be able to learn the 
association between the location of the object and the demonstrative via the Implicit Training. If 
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children learned the association between the objects’ locations and demonstratives, they would 
revise their meaning computation procedure for the Chinese demonstratives, in which they 
would consider both classifier semantics and demonstrative meaning. Once children revise their 
meaning computation procedure in the Training Block, they should be able to further apply the 
revised computation procedure in the Post-training Block, in which the context was once again 
the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context. The whole training process may have required children’s 
shifting ability, in that children’s initial meaning computation procedure driven from the 
Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context in the Pre-training Block may have been revised in the 
Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context in the Training Block and further applied to the revised 
meaning computation procedure in the Post-training Block. As suggested by the findings from 
Jincho et al. (2008), shifting was related to children’s ability to revise their initial analysis of an 
ambiguous linguistic stimulus over the blocks. Thus, children who showed improvement from 
the Pre-training Block to the Post-training Block may have a better developed shifting ability in 
Executive Function. Meanwhile, children who had difficulty revising their initial meaning 
computation procedure in the Pre-training Block and showed no improvement in the Post-
training Block may still have been developing the shifting ability in Executive Function.   
Based on the discussion above, the current findings could not speak to the relationship 
between shifting and the revision of meaning computation procedure in the Implicit Training, 
and the question of whether these two domains are related may still be open for debate. In order 
to understand the role of Executive Function in the Implicit Training, it may be helpful for future 
studies to use another Executive Function task, such as a more advanced Executive Function task 
measuring shifting or a task that measures inhibition/updating. Inhibition/updating is suggested 
to be related to children’s ability to revise their initial analysis (Choi & Trueswell, 2010).  
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Woodard et al. (2014) showed that children’s ability to revise their initial analysis of the 
kindergarten path sentences was related to their inhibition/updating ability. Thus, in addition to a 
more advanced shifting task, another possible task to explore the Implicit Learning effect in the 
Judgment Training Task would be to examine whether inhibition/updating ability may be related 
to children’s ability to revise their attention, from only classifier cues to dual cues, and thus 
improved their comprehension of demonstrative phrase in Chinese.  
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Chapter 5. GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Two central issues of the current dissertation are to understand (i) why children exhibit 
non-adult-like comprehension in demonstrative comprehension, with a goal of seeking a 
language-external factor such as children’s cognitive development, and (ii) what can help 
children to avoid the comprehension errors, with a goal of exploring the potential effect from the 
language-internal factor. Chapters 3 and 4 presented experiments to explore these two issues. In 
the current chapter, I will first summarize the findings of the experiments I reported in Chapter 3, 
and will develop a general discussion regarding the cognitive factor in children’s language 
comprehension on the basis of my own findings regarding children’s demonstrative 
comprehension. I will then summarize the findings of the study I reported in Chapter 4, and 
elaborate on those findings to further discuss language-internal factors that may interact with 
children’s language comprehension. Last, I will present some remaining issues which provide 
insights for further research.  
 
5.1. Demonstrative and cognitive development: Why do children exhibit egocentric interpretation 
of demonstratives? 
5.1.1. Summary of the findings 
The two experiments in Chapter 3 examined children’s demonstrative comprehension in 
relation to their cognitive abilities, such as Theory of Mind and Executive Function. In the 
experiments, the Act-out Task was used to examine children’s demonstrative comprehension 
based on their own perspectives, ensuring their knowledge of distance contrast between the two 
demonstratives. Only children who demonstrated understanding of the distance contrast between 
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the two demonstratives based on their own perspective were studied in the further analysis. 
These children were tested with their demonstrative comprehension based on the speaker’s 
perspective, which is different from children’s own (the Judgment task), together with the 
Theory of Mind task and Executive Function task, and the correlations among the three tasks 
were conducted. Results from English-speaking children revealed a significant correlation 
between children’s demonstrative comprehension and their Theory of Mind task performance. 
However, no significant correlation was found between children’s demonstrative comprehension 
and their Executive Function, which calls for further exploration. In particular, children who 
passed the Theory of Mind task returned better comprehension of this, whereas children who 
passed DCCS did not show such a tendency. The experiment was cross-linguistically expanded 
to Chinese-speaking children. Results from the Chinese-speaking children replicate the exact 
pattern shown in English-speaking children’s data. Chinese-speaking children’s comprehension 
of demonstratives, particularly the proximal demonstrative zhe-ge (this-CLgeneric ‘this’), 
significantly correlated with their performance in the Theory of Mind task, but not the Executive 
Function task. These results suggest that children’s demonstrative comprehension may indeed be 
related to their cognitive ability, particularly Theory of Mind, although the role of Executive 
Function in demonstrative comprehension remains unclear. From the results of the two 
experiments, I am in the position to discuss the relationship between language and cognition.  
 
5.1.2. Discussion  
The results of the experiments in the current dissertation suggest that children’s language 
comprehension may be related to their cognitive abilities. In particular, I assumed that children’s 
difficulty exhibiting adult-like comprehension was not due to a lack of intact linguistic 
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knowledge but rather was related to their still-developing cognitive abilities. I would argue that 
children have knowledge of the meaning representation of demonstratives; however, they may 
not have a mature cognitive ability to utilize their knowledge. Recall that Lyons (1975) 
represented the meanings of the two demonstratives as in (7) in Chapter 2, repeated here as in 
(49).  
 
(49) this [+D, +entity, −person, +proximate] 
that [+D, +entity, −person, −proximate, +distal]  
 
The results of the Act-out Task in the experiments have shown that children have the 
distance contrast distinction between the two demonstratives, in that they were able to correctly 
associate proximal demonstrative this, or zhe-ge, with the object near themselves and associate 
distal demonstrative that, or na-ge, with the object apart from themselves. This indicates that 
children represented the meaning of demonstratives correctly. However, the results may not 
directly speak to whether children set the correct value for [+D] or whether they represented the 
feature [+D] appropriately. The feature [+D] represents the deictic properties in that it points to 
an entity in the context and also takes control of the determination of the deictic center that is the 
speaker’s orientation. Recall that the Act-out Task is designed so that the speaker and the child 
shared the same perspective. Children’s successful comprehension of demonstratives in this 
situation thus may be interpreted in at least the following two ways. First, children have the 
correct value setting for [+D] in which they know that the speaker determines the speaker-object 
distance for the demonstratives. Second, children do not have the correct value setting for [+D] 
in that they failed to set [+D] feature as anchoring on the appropriate speaker’s perspective and 
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instead they set themselves as the anchoring point due to the egocentrism. However, since in the 
situation in the Act-out Task the speaker’s perspective happened to be children’s own, they 
would be able to correctly interpret demonstratives because of their egocentric bias toward the 
interpretation of demonstratives. In sum, the first two possibilities suggest that children have [+D] 
feature represented in the meaning of demonstratives. In the first possibility, the children 
represent all the semantic features correctly, including a correct feature value setting for the [+D] 
feature, while in the second one, children have the [+D] feature in their semantic knowledge, but 
the value setting for the feature is not specified, or the children set the value anchoring on 
themselves as the deictic center. 
Now consider the results of the Judgment Task. Many children still exhibit non-adult-like 
comprehension of demonstratives in the Judgment Task. The results show that while children are 
able to correctly comprehend demonstratives based on their own perspective in the Act-out Task, 
they still have difficulty comprehending demonstratives based on a different perspective in the 
Judgment Task. The results are consistent with the second possibility discussed above. That is, 
children were being egocentric and anchored the deictic center on their own orientation rather 
than the speaker’s. The results from the Judgment Task rule out the first possibility. This is 
because children were not able to appropriately interpret demonstratives based on a different 
perspective, which suggests that they do not have correct value setting for [+D].  
Now, let me assume that children have [+D] feature in the meaning representation of 
demonstratives. This raises the question of why children could not implement the knowledge in 
the actual computation of demonstratives, or why children could not set the value in an adult-like 
way. One potential answer is children may not possess the relevant ability to compute the 
meaning. That is, children may not be able to take the speaker’s perspective because (i) they do 
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not understand that others may have a different perspective from their own, and/or (ii) they are 
not able to switch from their own perspective to a different perspective. Note that each of the 
abilities is related to Theory of Mind and Executive Function respectively, which may suggest 
that children’s non-adult-like demonstratives are related to their still-developing Theory of Mind 
and Executive Function. Results of the experiments partially support this argument in that 
children’s demonstrative comprehension correlated with their Theory of Mind performances, but 
not their Executive Function. More specifically, children who passed the Theory of Mind task 
were more likely to exhibit an adult-like demonstrative comprehension. The results may suggest 
that children’s non-adult-like comprehension of demonstratives may very likely be due to their 
value setting on [+D]. Crucially, children’s ability to correctly implement the feature [+D] is 
closely related to their Theory of Mind. This indicates that this aspect of children’s language 
performances may be related to their cognitive development. The data in the current dissertation 
could only speak to a relationship between the two domains. Further studies are needed to 
examine whether the development of Theory of Mind is the source of children’s non-adult-like 
comprehension of demonstratives.  
The findings of this dissertation are in line with other studies exploring the interaction 
between children’s language processing and cognitive abilities (J. G. de Villiers, 2007; J. G. de 
Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Mazuka et al., 2009; Minai et al., 2012; Moore et al., 1990; Papafragou et 
al., 2007; Woodard et al., 2014). In particular, the two cognitive domains of the particular 
interest, Theory of Mind and Executive Function, are suggested to be related to comprehension 
of other linguistic expressions. For instance, Theory of Mind is argued to be related to the 
linguistic expressions that require the listener to understand the speaker’s mental representation, 
such as the comprehension of mental verbs or epistemic state verbs (Moore et al., 1990; 
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Papafragou et al., 2007), and comprehension of complement structures (J. G. de Villiers & Pyers, 
2002; Rakhlin et al., 2011; Schick et al., 2007). The results of this dissertation add new evidence 
to this line of research. Additionally, although findings of the current dissertation did not show a 
relationship between demonstrative comprehension and Executive Function, Executive Function 
is also suggested to be related to a variety of comprehension of linguistic expressions, 
particularly those require revisions of the listeners’ initial analysis of the linguistic stimuli, such 
as children’s comprehension of kindergarten path sentences (Choi & Trueswell, 2010; Woodard 
et al., 2014), universal quantifiers (Minai et al., 2012), and potentially scalar implicature (Y. T. 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009).  Future studies exploring the role of Executive Function in 
demonstrative comprehension may shed some lights in this line of research.  
Now, let me turn to the discussion on the framework of the interaction between language 
and cognition proposed by Slobin, which has been discussed in Chapter 1. In Slobin’s framework, 
particular cognitive abilities may be prerequisite for comprehension of some linguistic 
expressions. The assumption is that children have the intact linguistic knowledge, but children 
need to have the appropriate cognitive abilities to correctly utilize their linguistic knowledge. 
Mazuka et al. (2009) and Huang and Snedeker (2009) further elaborated Slobin’s proposal in 
more detail, arguing that the children’s non-adult-like language processing may be related to 
their processing ability such as children’s still-developing Executive Function.   
This dissertation examines both Slobin’s (1973) and Mazuka et al.’s (2009) proposals, 
looking at children’s demonstrative comprehension in relation to their Theory of Mind and 
Executive Function, in which Theory of Mind is the ability that would allow children to know 
that the speaker may have a different perspective before utilizing their linguistic knowledge on 
demonstratives, whereas Executive Function is the processing ability that would allow children 
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to switch to the speaker’s perspective when comprehending demonstratives. The results of the 
studies support Slobin’s proposal because the results revealed a correlation between Theory of 
Mind and the comprehension of demonstratives. This may indicate that children need to know 
that the speakers may have a different perspective before they can successfully implement the 
[+D] feature in Lyons’ analysis of demonstrative meaning representation.  
On the basis of the discussions above, I hypothesize that successfully comprehending 
demonstratives may require at least two steps. First, children need to be able to evaluate the 
physical distance between a speaker and an object and associate the distance distinction with 
each demonstrative. Children are equipped with the perceptual ability to evaluate the physical 
distance (H. Clark, 1973); however, children need to “discover the linguistic input” (Slobin, 
1973, p.208); that is, children need to map what they perceived onto the semantic features of 
demonstrative. Therefore, children would first set the [±proximate] value for each demonstrative. 
Second, children need to be able to anchor to the speaker’s orientation point to calculate the 
distance; that is, setting the correct value for [+D]. For children to appropriately anchor to the 
speaker’s orientation in demonstrative comprehension, they need to know that the determination 
of distance contrast is not absolutely fixated, but is established based on speaker’s orientation 
point which varies across contexts. In order for them to successfully do so, children need to 
know that the speaker may have a perspective the same or different from their own. Once they 
know the speaker’s perspective, they will be able to establish the distance contrast based on that 
perspective. Note that when speakers have the same perspective, children’s value setting may 
seem to be correct as they anchored the deictic center on themselves; however, children have 
difficulty in anchoring a perspective different from their own. Therefore, during the development 
of setting correct value for [+D], Theory of Mind is required, as it is the ability that allows 
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children to understand that others’ perspectives may differ from their own. Based on the steps 
children need to take to appropriately comprehend demonstrative, it is possible that children’s 
demonstrative comprehension may require Theory of Mind as a prerequisite cognitive ability to 
correctly establish the speaker’s perspective.  
This dissertation particularly focused on languages in which demonstratives implement 
the two-way distance distinction. As discussed in previous chapters, other languages may have 
three-way or even four-way distinction, and the semantic features are not always distance 
contrast. However, demonstratives in those languages still has the [+D] feature (Diessel, 2014); 
thus, children acquiring demonstratives in those languages may still have difficulty to correctly 
set the value for [+D]. In addition to the value setting for [+D], demonstratives in those 
languages may encode more than distance contrast and thus may be more challenging to children, 
since children are required to implement two or three different semantic features into their 
demonstrative system. For instance, Turkish has three-way system in which the third 
demonstrative is neutral to distance but encodes whether the listener’s visual attention is on the 
referent. This language-specific feature indeed is shown to be very challenging for Turkish-
speaking children. Küntay & Özyürek (2002, 2006) has revealed that even six-year-old Turkish-
speaking children have not achieved adult-like use of the demonstrative şu in Turkish, which is 
distance neutral but used when the listener’s attention is not allocated to the referent that the 
speaker intends to pick out. In brief, children acquiring demonstratives in languages that has 
more than a two-way distinction still need to set the correct value for [+D], in which Theory of 
Mind might still be prerequisite for them to master it; additionally, demonstratives in those 
languages encode more than distance contrast or more fine-grained distance distinction may be 
more challenging for children.  
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5.2. Demonstrative and language-internal factor: What can help children overcome the egocentric 
interpretation of demonstratives?  
5.2.1. Summary of the findings 
In Chapter 4, I reported the experiment that examined whether and to what extent 
Chinese-speaking children’s comprehension of demonstratives can be facilitated by the 
semantics of classifiers. Two screening tasks, an Act-out Task and a Classifier Comprehension 
Task, were used to ensure children’s knowledge of distance contrast between two demonstratives 
and their knowledge of the semantics of the selected classifiers, –zhi for animal and –jian for 
outfit. A Judgment Training Task was used to test the research questions in Chapter 4. Data of 
the Judgment Training Task from children who passed the two screening tasks were analyzed. 
The results of the Judgment Training Task show that Chinese-speaking children can use their 
knowledge of semantic dependency between the classifier and its associated noun, which helps 
them perform better on comprehending demonstrative phrases that are uttered by a speaker who 
has a different perspective.  
In the Judgment Training Task, children exhibited almost adult-like performance when 
they were provided the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context in which the classifier cue could be the 
sole cue to identify the referent. The effect of the cue is significant in that when compared with 
children who were provided with no classifier cues (Control Context), children who received the 
context with classifier cue performed much better in comprehending demonstratives. Moreover, 
children also show the tendency to carry over the classifier cue effect to the subsequent context, 
the Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context, where the classifier cue is no longer the sole cue to 
identify the referent. Recall that children were asked to perform a training task, which included 
202 
three blocks: a Pre-training Block (Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context), a Training Block 
(Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context), and a Post-training Block (Classifier-Cue-Insufficient 
Context). Children’s performance on demonstrative comprehension improved from Pre-training 
Block to Post-training Block after the exposure to the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context in the 
Training Block.  
Additionally, although children’s Executive Function was also tested to explore whether 
children’s Implicit Learning is related to their development of Executive Function, their 
performance was at ceiling. Thus, further analysis was not conducted to explore a potential 
reason for children’s improvement after the exposure to the classifier cue.  
 
5.2.2. Discussion 
The study in Chapter 4 is the first attempt to consider the role of classifiers in Chinese 
demonstrative comprehension. The results of the experiment reveal that the classifiers serve as a 
cue to facilitate children’s demonstrative comprehension, providing a piece of evidence showing 
that language-specific properties interact with children’s language comprehension. This indicates 
that children are able to use a linguistic device that they have already acquired to improve their 
performances on linguistic expressions that are still challenging for them. Results of this study 
provide converging evidence to support the argument that the language-specific characteristics 
may impact on children’s language comprehension in a positive way, such as the effect shown in 
Zhou et al. (2012) who found that children took advantage of Chinese-specific property to 
improve their comprehension. Zhou et al. (2012) examined the use of intonation in Mandarin 
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Chinese to resolve syntactic ambiguity
14
. They showed that Chinese-speaking children were able 
to use the intonation contour in Chinese to disambiguate the speech act as either a question or a 
statement. Zhou et al.’s study, as an example, revealed that the language-specific linguistic 
properties may interact with children’s language comprehension. This current dissertation 
together with Zhou et al.’s (2012) findings may suggest that once children have the knowledge of 
a particular language-specific characteristics, children are very likely to take advantage of them 
to help their comprehension on other linguistic expressions that contain them, rather than those 
language-specific characteristics hindering their correct comprehension of those linguistic 
expressions that contain them.   
Results of the current study are also in line with studies that have shown that children are 
able to use semantic information in sentences to help them interpret the meanings of the 
sentences more successfully (Arnold, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2007; Dispaldro et al., 2014; 
Pyykkönen et al., 2010). Recall that in the line of research Arnold et al. (2007) conducted, 
children were able to use the gender specification in personal pronouns as semantic information 
to resolve the pronouns in sentences; however, pragmatic information manipulated in the context 
did not seem to be available to children. Importantly, the authors have shown that children used 
the semantic information rapidly in online processing of pronouns. This suggests that children 
can incorporate linguistic information, such as semantic information, in linguistic expressions as 
cues as they unfold the expressions. The current study also revealed that children could use the 
semantics of classifiers embedded in the demonstrative phrases to facilitate their demonstrative 
                                                 
14
 Zhou et al. (2012) focused on the interpretation of wh-words, sheme (‘what’). When she in sheme received a 
rising tone, the wh-word forms a question. In contrast, when she in sheme received a different tone, the level tone, 
the wh-word has a statement reading.   
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comprehension, which further suggests that children could use the linguistic properties which 
they have already acquired to further help their comprehension of other linguistic expressions.  
While the results shed some lights on children’s comprehension of Chinese demonstratives, 
future studies should further explore how rapidly classifier semantics could be used in 
demonstrative comprehension for both children and adults using online measurements, such as 
eye-tracking technique. The current study reported that the effect of classifier semantics is 
suggestive in children’s demonstrative comprehension. Future studies should examine how 
rapidly children as well as adults could use classifier semantics in resolving demonstrative 
phrases in Chinese.  
In addition, the training task in this study was presented in the format of what I called 
Implicit Learning to children to explore to what extent children could benefit from using 
classifier semantics. Results of the experiment in Chapter 4 reveal that Chinese-speaking 
children can take advantage of the semantic dependency between the classifier and its associated 
referent to help them successfully identify referent for the demonstrative phrase containing the 
classifier. Furthermore, the effect of the Implicit Learning seems to be observed in the 
experiment, suggesting that the classifier semantic effect may be carried forward across contexts. 
This further suggests that children at this stage may already show the Implicit Learning effect on 
their demonstrative comprehension. Supposing that Chinese-speaking children are able to use 
classifier semantics, which is a linguistic device that is not available in English, to improve their 
demonstrative comprehension, Chinese-speaking children would be expected to have a better 
demonstrative comprehension than their English-speaking peers. Chinese-speaking children have 
classifiers to help them point to the correct referent for demonstrative phrases while English-
speaking children would not have the same input as the classifier does not exist in their language. 
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This assumes the effect of Implicit Learning serves as the mechanism for Chinese-speaking 
children to completely overcome their difficulty of demonstrative comprehension.  
However, this does not seem to be the case in the cross-linguistic experiments in Chapter 
3. Children who participated in the experiments in Chapter 3 were within the same age range as 
those in Chapter 4, which would suggest that children in Chapter 3’s experiments should have 
been able to make use of the Implicit Learning and show the effect of classifier semantics. 
Nonetheless, Chinese-speaking children still show the same difficulty as their English-speaking 
peers in incorporating the speaker’s perspective when comprehending demonstratives. This 
raises questions regarding the nature of implicit learning and the effect shown in Chapter 4. The 
effect observed suggests that children may possibly establish the association between 
demonstrative phrase and its referent, but the association may only apply to the context in the 
task rather than improving children’s association at the conceptual level. Hence, children’s 
success in the experiment does not imply that they may also overcome the difficulty in 
comprehending demonstratives based on a different perspective.  
The current study serves as the first to explore Implicit Learning for demonstratives. 
Future research should investigate the nature of Implicit Learning and explore whether there is 
an alternative way to train children to expand their uses of classifier semantics in all contexts to 
improve their demonstrative comprehension. One possible expansion is to provide the Implicit 
Learning over a period of time, such as three times per week for two weeks. In the training 
sessions, the Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context would be provided repetitively. Additionally, 
another possible expansion is to develop Implicit Learning in an alternative context that might 
more efficiently train children’s association between demonstratives and the location of the 
referent relative to the speaker. Additionally, if the alternative context successfully improved 
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children’s demonstrative comprehension, it would also be important to understand whether the 
successful training effect in using linguistic devices is related to an adult-like cognitive ability, or 
whether it is more related to children’s language abilities in general. Future studies thus may 
need to develop a different kind of training for children to see how it would work; furthermore, 
cognitive tasks as well as general language assessments should be administered together with the 
training task to explore the potential reasons behind a successful training.  
 
5.3. Concluding remarks and remaining issues 
This dissertation examined two factors in children’s language comprehension, 
particularly focusing on children’s demonstrative comprehension. First, two studies reported in 
Chapter 3 investigated the role of cognitive abilities in demonstrative comprehension by English-
speaking children and Chinese-speaking children. Results of the experiments revealed that 
children’s demonstrative comprehension is related to their Theory of Mind. Given that children’s 
success/failure in comprehending demonstratives from a perspective different than their own and 
their success/failure in the task measuring their Theory of Mind were reported to be correlated, 
the findings indicate that Theory of Mind may be a prerequisite cognitive ability for children to 
correctly comprehend demonstratives, particularly those uttered by a speaker who has a different 
perspective from the children’s own. Current findings can only speak to a correlation between 
Theory of Mind and demonstrative comprehension; future research is needed to explore whether 
Theory of Mind is indeed a perquisite for demonstrative comprehension. Second, Chapter 4 
presented an experiment that examined the role of language-specific property, the obligatory 
presence of classifiers in demonstrative phrases in Chinese, in Chinese-speaking children’s 
demonstrative comprehension. Results suggest that Chinese-speaking children can take 
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advantage of classifier semantics when comprehending demonstrative phrases. Children were 
able to use the classifier cues to correctly pick out the referent for demonstrative phrases when 
classifiers could be the sole information to resolve the demonstrative phrase. Furthermore, there 
was a tendency that the effect of classifier semantics was carried forward to the subsequent 
context where the classifier semantics was not the sole information children needed to consider. 
Overall, the classifier in Chinese demonstrative phrase facilitates children’s demonstrative 
comprehension, rather than hinders their comprehension.  
While the findings reported in this dissertation reveal important roles that the cognitive 
factor (development of Theory of Mind) and the language-specific factor (the presence of 
classifier in demonstrative phrases in Chinese) may play, they also serve as a fertile ground for 
further research to seek the more precise picture of demonstratives in young children.  
First, the current study confirmed the previous findings on children’s asymmetric 
comprehension of the proximal demonstrative (e.g., this) and the distal demonstrative (e.g., that), 
adding another piece of evidence showing children comprehend the former better than the latter 
even based on their own perspective. This is particularly due to the vagueness of the distal 
demonstrative. Future research should deal with the vagueness of the distal demonstrative and 
shed some light on children’s comprehension of the distal demonstrative. The experiments in 
Chapter 3 did not provide much insight into children’s comprehension of the distal 
demonstrative due to the vagueness; it is suggested that the distal demonstrative could be used to 
depict entities apart from the speaker and also any entities in the physical context, as a neutral 
demonstrative. Webb and Abrahamson (1976) proposed that the vagueness of the distal 
demonstrative that may diminish if that and this are both used in a contrastive context. For 
instance, in a sentence such as ‘I want that bear, not this bear’, the ‘that’ would not be a neutral 
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demonstrative, but a distal demonstrative that point to the bear apart from the speaker. Future 
experiments may adopt similar contrastive context to examine children’s demonstrative 
comprehension to see if the manipulation should result in any differences in children’s 
performances.  
Second, the current study primarily focused on children’s comprehension of 
demonstratives, and their production of demonstratives was out of the research scope. Indeed, 
research to date has suggested that children do produce demonstratives quite frequently from 
early on in their development. Diessel (2006), for example, reported that demonstratives in 
English are among the first 15 words produced by one to two year olds. E. V. Clark (1978, 2003) 
also suggested that demonstratives are one kind of function words that are productive among 
very young children. Whereas researchers have pointed out frequent utterance of demonstratives 
by young children, it remains unclear whether demonstratives uttered by children would be fully 
deictic on par with adults’ use; for instance, whether children’s early productions of 
demonstratives are indeed exophoric demonstratives, or whether they are able to use 
demonstratives as non-deictic expressions. To date, only Chen (2009) has analyzed Chinese-
speaking children’s use of the distal demonstrative na-ge (‘that’) and found that among all kinds 
of uses, exophoric use is one of the most frequent. Unfortunately, Chen (2009) only examined 
one of the demonstratives and focused on Chinese demonstratives. More studies are needed to 
explore children’s use of demonstratives and see if exophoric demonstratives are indeed acquired 
earliest as claimed by Diessel (1999).  
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APPENDIX I: TRIAL TABLE FOR THE JUDGMENT TASK 
 
# King’s demand Servant's choice Condition 
1 Paint this plate blue. this plate Match 
2 Paint this bowl blue. that bowl Mismatch 
3 Paint that pillow blue. that pillow Match 
4 Paint this pot blue. this pot Match 
5 Paint that cup blue. this cup Mismatch 
6 Paint that bag blue. that bag Match 
7 Paint this clock blue. that clock Mismatch 
8 Paint that box blue.  this box Mismatch 
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APPENDIX II: FULL SCRIPT OF THE HIDING GAME 
      
     
The full script of the story, which is the Hider’s speech, is described in the following:  
Figure a:  Now, I have another donut, and I am going to hide it in one of these boxes. Before 
I hide it, let’s do something funny. Brown Bear, I will blindfold you so that you 
won’t see anything for a while.  
Figure b:  OK, the Brown Bear is blindfolded, and he won’t see anything. White Bear, stay 
with me and watch me hide the donut.  
Figure c:  Now, I am going to hide the donut. And you can’t peek now!  
Figure d:  I’m done! See, the donut is hidden in one of these boxes. Let’s take the blindfold 
off of the Brown Bear so that he will be able to see again too.  
Figure e:  Now, before you start finding the donut, let’s ask the Brown Bear and the White 
Bear to help you. Brown Bear and White Bear, which box has the donut? Can you 
go there?  
Figure f:  OK. Now, can you find the donut? Which box has the donut?   
a b c 
d e f 
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APPENDIX III: TRAIL TABLE FOR THE CLASSIFIER COMPREHENSION TASK 
 
# CL Objects for selections Correct answer 
1 jian sweater orange boat sweater 
2 zhi tree rabbit cake rabbit 
3 jian coat bus chair coat 
4 jian ball boy t-shirt t-shirt 
5 zhi desk bike bear bear 
6 jian girl blouse airplane blouse 
7 zhi cat book flower cat 
8 zhi apple car monkey monkey 
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APPENDIX IV: THE CLASSIFIER PRODUCTION TASK 
範例(example)：   
有    多少    盤子？ 
      have  many   plate 
‘How many plates are there?’ 
  兩    個      (盤子) 
 two   CL(ge)  (plate) 
‘Two (plates).’ 
問題 (Question)  答案 (Expected Answer) 
1. 有     多少     球？ 
have  many   ball 
‘How many balls are there?’ 
 
 三   顆/粒   (球) 
 three  CL(ke/li)  (ball) 
 ‘Three (balls).’ 
2. 有     多少     熊？ 
have  many   bear 
‘How many bears are there?’ 
 
 四  隻    (熊) 
 four CL(zhi)  (bear) 
 ‘Four (bears).’ 
3. 有      多少    背心？ 
have  many   blouse 
        ‘How many blouses are there?’ 
 
 兩  件    (背心) 
 two CL(jian)  (blouse) 
 ‘Two (blouses).’  
4. 有      多少    船？ 
have  many   ship 
        ‘How many ships are there?’ 
 
 三  艘    (船) 
 three CL(sao)  (ship) 
 ‘Three (ships).’ 
5. 有     多少     猴子？ 
have  many   monkey 
‘How many monkeys are there?’ 
 
 五  隻   (猴子) 
 five CL(zhi) (monkey) 
 ‘Five (monkeys).’ 
6. 有     多少     花？ 
have  many   flower 
‘How many flowers are there?’ 
 
 三   朵    (花) 
 three  CL(duo) (flower) 
 ‘Three (flowers).’  
7. 有     多少     大衣？ 
have  many   coat 
‘How many coats are there?’ 
 
 兩  件    (大衣) 
 two CL(jian)  (coat) 
 ‘Two (coats).’ 
8. 有     多少     橘子？ 
have  many   tangerine 
‘How many tangerines are there?’ 
 
 五  顆/粒  (橘子) 
 five CL(ke/li) (tangerine) 
 ‘Five (tangerines)’ 
9. 有      多少     貓？ 
have  many   cat 
‘How many cats are there?’ 
 
 三   隻    (貓) 
 three  CL(zhi)  (cat) 
 ‘Three (cats).’ 
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10. 有      多少     T 恤？ 
have  many   t-shirt 
‘How many t-shirts are there?’ 
 
 三   件     (T 恤) 
 three  CL(jian)  (t-shirt) 
 ‘Three (t-shirts).’ 
11. 有     多少      車？ 
have  many   car 
‘How many cars are there?’ 
 
 一  輛/台    (車) 
 one CL(liang/tai)  (car) 
 ‘One (car).’ 
12. 有      多少    兔子？ 
have  many   rabbit 
‘How many rabbits are there?’ 
 
 三   隻    (兔子) 
 three  CL(zhi) (rabbit) 
 ‘Three (rabbits).’ 
13. 有      多少    書？ 
have  many   book 
‘How many books are there?’ 
 
 五  本    (書) 
 five CL(ben)  (book) 
 ‘Five (books).’ 
14. 有      多少    書桌？ 
have  many   desk 
‘How many desks are there?’  
 兩  張     (書桌) 
 two CL(zhang)  (desk) 
 ‘Two (desks).’ 
15. 有      多少    毛衣？ 
have  many   sweater 
‘How many sweaters are there?’ 
 
 三  件    (毛衣) 
 three  CL(jian) (sweater) 
 ‘Three (sweaters).’ 
16. 有      多少    腳踏車？ 
have  many   bike 
‘How many bikes are there?’ 
 
 兩  輛/台    (腳踏車) 
 two CL(liang/tai)  (bike) 
 ‘Two (bikes).’ 
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APPENDIX V: TRIAL TABLES FOR THE JUDGMENT TASK 
 
Pre-/Post-Training Blocks: Classifier-Cue-Insufficient Context that has an animal-cloth pair in 
both proximal and distal position  
Block A 
# Item 1 Item 2 This/that CL Demand Fulfillment Condition 
1 bear blouse this zhi this bear this bear Match 
2 rabbit coat this zhi this rabbit that rabbit demonstrative 
3 cat blouse that jian that blouse that blouse Match 
4 bear sweater this jian this sweater this bear classifier 
5 monkey t-shirt that zhi that monkey that t-shirt  classifier 
6 rabbit blouse that zhi that rabbit that rabbit Match 
7 monkey coat this jian this coat this coat Match 
8 rabbit t-shirt that jian that t-shirt this t-shirt demonstrative 
 
Block B 
# Item 1 Item 2 This/that CL Demand Fulfillment Condition 
1 rabbit sweater this jian this sweater this sweater Match 
2 monkey blouse this jian this blouse that blouse demonstrative 
3 cat t-shirt that zhi that cat that cat Match 
4 monkey sweater this zhi this monkey this monkey Match 
5 cat coat that jian that coat that cat classifier 
6 bear t-shirt that jian that t-shirt that t-shirt Match 
7 cat sweater this zhi this cat this sweater  classifier 
8 bear coat that zhi that bear this bear demonstrative 
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Training Block—Experimental Group: Classifier-Cue-Sufficient Context which has an animal 
and a cloth located in proximal and distal position respectively     
# Close Far This/that CL T/F Demand Fulfillment Condition 
1 sweater cat this jian T this (sweater) this (sweater) Match 
2 blouse bear that zhi T that (bear) that (bear) Match 
3 coat cat this jian F this (coat) that (cat) Mismatch 
4 t-shirt monkey that zhi F that (monkey) this (t-shirt) Mismatch 
5 rabbit blouse that jian T that (blouse) that (blouse) Match 
6 bear coat this zhi F this (bear) that (coat) Mismatch 
7 rabbit t-shirt that jian F that (t-shirt) this (rabbit) Mismatch 
8 monkey sweater this zhi T this (monkey) this (monkey) Match 
 
 
Training Block—Control Group: Control Context which has two objects that go with general 
classifiers located in proximal and distal position respectively.    
# Close Far This/that CL T/F Demand Fulfillment Condition 
1 bowl bag this ge T this (bowl) this (bowl) Match 
2 box pillow that ge F that (pillow) this (box) Mismatch 
3 cup bowl this ge F this (cup) that (bowl) Mismatch 
4 pot box that ge T that (box) that (box) Match 
5 plate cup this ge T this (plate) this (plate) Match 
6 clock pot that ge F that (pot) this (clock) Mismatch 
7 pillow clock that ge T that (clock) that (clock) Match 
8 bag plate this ge F this (bag) that (plate) Mismatch 
  
216 
REFERENCES 
"that, pron.1, adj., and adv.". (1912). Oxford English Dictionary: Oxford University Press. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/200177?rskey=vrglnK&amp;result=2&amp;isAdvanced
=false.  
"this, pron. and adj.". (1912). Oxford English Dictionary: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/200894?rskey=GRzYS1&amp;result=2&amp;isAdvanc
ed=false.  
Allan, K. (1977). Classifiers. Language, 285-311.  
Anderson, S. R., & Keenan, E. L. (1985). Deixis. Language typology and syntactic description, 3, 
259-308.  
Arnold, J. E., Brown-Schmidt, S., & Trueswell, J. (2007). Children's use of gender and order-of-
mention during pronoun comprehension. Language and Cognitive Processes, 22(4), 527-
565.  
Aron, A. R. (2007). The neural basis of inhibition in cognitive control. The Neuroscientist, 13(3), 
214-228.  
Arslan, B. (2012). Evidentiality and second-order sociol cognition. (Master of Science), Turkey.    
Astington, J. W. (2000). Language and metalanguage in children's understanding of mind. In J. 
W. Astington (Ed.), Minds in the making: Essays in honor of David R. Olson (pp. 267-
284). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Astington, J. W., & Baird, J. A. (2005). Why language matters for theory of mind: Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. . 
Astington, J. W., & Jenkins, J. M. (1999). A longitudinal study of the relation between language 
and Theory-of-Mind development. Developmental Psychology, 35(5), 1311-1320.  
Bates, E., Benigni, L., Bretherton, I., Camaioni, L., & Volterra, V. (1979). The emergence of 
symbols: New York: Academic Press. 
Beck, S. R., Riggs, K. J., & Gorniak, S. L. (2009). Relating developments in children's 
counterfactual thinking and executive functions. Thinking & Reasoning, 15(4), 337-354.  
Bialystok, E. (1999). Cognitive complexity and attentional control in the bilingual mind. Child 
Development, 70(3), 636-644.  
Bialystok, E. (2010). Global–local and trail-making tasks by monolingual and bilingual children: 
Beyond inhibition. Developmental Psychology, 46(1), 93-105.  
217 
Bialystok, E., & Martin, M. M. (2004). Attention and inhibition in bilingual children: evidence 
from the dimensional change card sort task. Developmental Science, 7(3), 325-339.  
Bialystok, E., & Viswanathan, M. (2009). Components of executive control with advantages for 
bilingual children in two cultures. Cognition, 112(3), 494-500.  
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2009). The role of executive function in perspective taking during online 
language comprehension. Psychon Bull Rev, 16(5), 893-900.  
Burge, T. (1974). Demonstrative constructions, reference, and truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 
71(7), 205-223.  
Carlson, S. M., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2008). Bilingual experience and executive functioning in 
young children. Developmental Science, 11(2), 282-298.  
Cassidy, K. W., Fineberg, D. S., Brown, K., & Perkins, A. (2005). Theory of mind may be 
contagious, but you don't catch it from your twin. Child Development, 76(1), 97-106.  
Chang, H.-H. (2011). Acquisition of structure and interpretation: Cases from Mandarin bare and 
non-bare noun phrases. (Ph.D.), Michigan State University.    
Chen, Y. (2009). Mandarin-speaking children's distal demonstrative in conversational discourse. 
Taiwan Journal of Linguistics, 7.1, 1-26.  
Cheng, L. L.-S., & Sybesma, R. (1998). Yi-wan tang, yi-ge tang: Classifiers and massifiers. 
Tsing Hua journal of Chinese studies, 28(3), 385-412.  
Cheng, L. L.-S., & Sybesma, R. (1999). Bare and not-so-bare nouns and the structure of NP. 
Linguistic Inquiry, 30(4), 509-542.  
Cheung, H. (1992). The acquisition of BA in Mandarin. (Ph.D. ), University of Kansas.    
Chien, Y.-C., Lust, B., & Chiang, C.-P. (2003). Chinese children's comprehension of count-
classifiers and mass-classifiers. Journal of East Asian Linguistics, 12(2), 91-120.  
Choi, Y., & Mazuka, R. (2003). Young children's use of prosody in sentence parsing. Journal of 
psycholinguistic research, 32(2), 197-217.  
Choi, Y., & Trueswell, J. C. (2010). Children's (in)ability to recover from garden paths in a verb-
final language: Evidence for developing control in sentence processing. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 106(1), 41-61.  
Chu, C.-Y., & Minai, U. (2014). Comprehension of demonstrative phrases in Mandarin Chinese. 
Paper presented at the The 2nd East Asian Psycholinguistics Colloquium (EAPC 2), 
University of Chicago, IL.  
218 
Clark, E. V. (1978). From gesture to word: On the natural history of deixis in language 
acquisition. In J. S. Bruner & A. Garton (Eds.), Human Growth and Development (pp. 
85–120). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clark, E. V. (2003). First language acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Clark, E. V., & Amaral, P. M. (2010). Children build on pragmatic information in language 
acquisition. Language and Linguistics Compass, 4(7), 445-457.  
Clark, E. V., & Sengul, C. J. (1978). Strategies in the acquisition of deixis. Journal of Child 
Language, 5(03), 457-475.  
Clark, H. H. (1973). Space, time, semantics, and the child. In T. Moore (Ed.), Cognitive 
development and the acquisition of language (pp. 27-63). New York: Academic Press. 
Clark, H. H., Schreuder, R., & Buttrick, S. (1983). Common ground at the understanding of 
demonstrative reference. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22(2), 245-
258.  
De Cat, C. (2013). Egocentric definiteness errors and perspective evaluation in preschool 
children. Journal of Pragmatics, 56, 58-69.  
Deák, G. O., Ray, S. D., & Brenneman, K. (2003). Children's perseverative appearance–reality 
errors are related to emerging language skills. Child Development, 74(3), 944-964.  
De Mulder, H.-L. N. M. (2011). Putting the pieces together: The development of theory of mind 
and (mental) language. LOT Dissertation Series, 272.  
de Rosnay, M., & Hughes, C. (2006). Conversation and theory of mind: Do children talk their 
way to socio-cognitive understanding? British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 24, 
7-37.  
de Villiers, J., Stainton, R. J., & Szatmari, P. (2007). Pragmatic abilities in autism spectrum 
disorder: A case study in philosophy and the empirical. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 
31(1), 292-317.  
de Villiers, J. G. (2007). The interface of language and theory of mind. Lingua, 117(11), 1858-
1878.  
de Villiers, J. G., & Pyers, J. E. (2002). Complements to cognition: A longitudinal study of the 
relationship between complex syntax and false-belief-understanding. Cognitive 
Development, 17(1), 1037-1060.  
de Villiers, P. A., & de Villiers, J. G. (1974). On this, that, and the other: Nonegocentrism in 
very young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 18, 438-447.  
de Villiers, P. A., & Pyers, J. E. (2001). Complementation and false belief representation. In M. 
Almgren, A. Barrena, M. J. Ezeizabarrena, I. Idiazabal, & B. MacWhinney (Eds.), 
219 
Research on child language acquisition: Proceedings of the 8th Conference of the 
International Association for the Study of Child Language (pp. 984-1005): Somerville, 
MA: Cascadilla Press. 
Devine, R. T., & Hughes, C. (2013). Theory of mind and executive function: Meta-analytic and 
longitudinal findings. Paper presented at the Paper presented at Biennial Meeting of 
Society for Research in Child Development in paper Symposium, April 18-20, Seattle, 
WA.  
Devine, R. T., & Hughes, C. (2014). Relations between false belief understanding and executive 
function in early childhood: A meta-analysis. Child Development, 85(5), 1777-1794. 
Diessel, H. (1999). Demonstratives: Form. function, and grammaticalization. PA: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Diessel, H. (2006). Demonstratives, joint attention, and the emergence of grammar. Cognitive 
Linguistics, 17(4), 463-489.  
Diessel, H. (2012). Deixis and demonstratives. In K. v. Heusinger, C. Maienborn, & P. Portner 
(Eds.), Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning (Vol. 3, pp. 
2407-2432). Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 
Diessel, H. (2014). Demonstratives, frames of reference, and semantic universals of space. 
Language and Linguistics Compass, 8(3), 116-132.  
Dispaldro, M., Ruggiero, A., & Scali, F. (2014). Real-time comprehension of gender and number 
in four-to seven-year-old children: A study of the relationship between Italian clitic 
pronouns and visual picture referents. Journal of Child Language, 1-15.  
Erbaugh, M. S. (1986). Taking stock: The development of Chinese noun classifiers historically 
and in young children. In C. Craig (Ed.), Noun Classes and Categorization (pp. 399-436). 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Fang, F. (1985). An experiment on the use of classifiers by 4-to 6-year-olds. Acta Psychologica 
Sinica, 17(4), 48-56.  
Fillmore, C. J. (1997). Lectures on deixis. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
Gale, E., de Villiers, P. A., de Villiers, J. G., & Pyers, J. E. (1996). Language and theory of mind 
in oral deaf children. In A. Stringfellow, D. Cahama-Amitay, E. Hughes, & A. Zukowski 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 20th annual Boston University Conference on Language 
Development (Vol. 1, pp. 213-224): Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press. 
Gong, J. S. (2010). Chinese classifier acquisition: Comparison of L1 child and L2 adult 
development. (Master), University of Montana.    
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1984). Semantic and cognitive development in 15-to 21-month-
old children. Journal of Child Language, 11(3), 495-513.  
220 
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1986). Relations between semantic and cognitive development in 
the one-word stage: The specificity hypothesis. Child Development, 1040-1053.  
Grinevald, C. (2000). A morphosyntactic typology of classifiers. Systems of nominal 
classification, 4, 50-92.  
Guasti, M. T., Chierchia, G., Crain, S., Foppolo, F., Gualmini, A., & Meroni, L. (2005). Why 
children and adults sometimes (but not always) compute implicatures. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 20(5), 667-696.  
Happé, F. G. E. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of 
relevance theory. Cognition, 48(2), 101-119.  
Harris, P. L., de Rosnay, M., & Pons, F. (2005). Language and children's understanding of 
mental states. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(2), 69-73.  
Hsieh, M.-L. (2008a). The internal structure of noun phrases in Chinese. Taipei: Crane 
Publishing  
Hsieh, M.-L. (2008c). The internal structure of noun phrases in Chinese. Taipei: Crane 
Publishing. 
Hsu, C.-c., Tsai, S.-H., Yang, C.-L., & Chen, J.-Y. (2014). Processing classifier–noun agreement 
in a long distance: An ERP study on Mandarin Chinese. Brain and Language, 137(0), 14-
28.  
Hsu, C.-c. N. (2006). Issues in head-final relative clauses in Chinese: Derivation, processing, 
and acquisition. (Ph.D.), University of Delaware, United States -- Delaware.    
Hu, Q. (1993). The acquisition of Chinese classifiers by young Mandarin-speaking children. 
(Ph.D. 9318205), Boston University, United States -- Massachusetts.    
Huang, C.-R., & Hsieh, S.-K. (2009-2010). Infrastructure for cross-lingual knowledge 
representation ─ Towards multilingualism in linguistic studies: Taiwan NSC-granted 
Research Project (NSC 96-2411-H-003-061-MY3)  
Huang, C. T. J., Li, Y.-H. A., & Li, Y. (2009). The syntax of Chinese: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Huang, S. (1999). The emergence of a grammatical category definite article in spoken Chinese. 
Journal of Pragmatics, 31(1), 77-94.  
Huang, Y. T., & Snedeker, J. (2009). Semantic meaning and pragmatic interpretation in 5-year-
olds: Evidence from real-time spoken language comprehension. Developmental 
Psychology, 45(6), 1723-1739. 
221 
Huettig, F., Chen, J., Bowerman, M., & Majid, A. (2010). Do language-specific categories shape 
conceptual processing? Mandarin classifier distinctions influence eye gaze behavior, but 
only during linguistic processing. Journal of Cognition & Culture, 10(1/2), 39-58.  
Hughes, C. (1998). Executive funcion in preschoolers: Link with theory of mind and verbal 
ability. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 16, 233-253.  
Hughes, C., & Ensor, R. (2007). Executive function and theory of mind: Predictive relations 
from ages 2 to 4. Developmental Psychology, 43(6), 1447-1459.  
Hughes, C., Jaffee, S. R., Happé, F., Taylor, A., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. E. (2005). Origins of 
individual differences in theory of mind: From nature to nurture? Child Development, 
76(2), 356-370.  
Jiang, X., & Zhou, X. (2012). Multiple semantic processes at different levels of syntactic 
hierarchy: Does the higher-level process proceed in face of a lower-level failure? 
Neuropsychologia, 50(8), 1918-1928.  
Jincho, N., Yamane, N., Minai, U., & Mazuka, R. (2008). Effects of visual contrast in pre-
nominal modifier phrase comprehension in Japanese: An eye tracking experiment with 
children and adults. Paper presented at the CUNY Conference on Human Sentence 
Processing, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC. . 
Küntay, A. C., & Özyürek, A. (2002). Joint attention and the development of the use of 
demonstrative pronouns in Turkish. Paper presented at the BUCLD 26: Proceedings of 
the 26th annual Boston University Conference on Language Development, November 2-4. 
Küntay, A. C., & Özyürek, A. (2006). Learning to use demonstratives in conversation: what do 
language specific strategies in Turkish reveal? Journal of Child Language, 33(2), 303-
320.  
Kaplan, D. (1977). On the logic of demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 81-98.  
Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and 
epistemology of demonstratives and other indeixcals. In J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. 
Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan: Oxford University Press. 
Kloo, D., Perner, J., Aichhorn, M., & Schmidhuber, N. (2010). Perspective taking and cognitive 
flexibility in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. Cognitive Development, 
25(3), 208-217.  
Kuo, Y.-c. (2003). Shape salience in English and Chinese: Implications for the effects of 
language on cognition. (Ph.D.), University of Minnesota, United States -- Minnesota.    
Lee, T. H.-T. (1996). Theoretical issues in language development and Chinese child language 
New horizons in Chinese linguistics (pp. 293-356): Springer. 
222 
Levinson, S. C. (2004). Deixis. In L. Horn (Ed.), The Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 97-121). 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Li, P. (1993). The acquisition of the zai and ba constructions in Mandarin Chinese. In J. C. P. 
Liang & R. P. E. Sybesma (Eds.), From Classical Fü to 'Three Inches High': Studies on 
Chinese in Honor of Erik Zürcher (pp. 103-120). Leuven/Apeldoorn: Garant Publishers. 
Li, P., Barner, D., & Huang, B. H. (2008). Classifiers as count syntax: Individuation and 
measurement in the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese. Language Learning & 
Development, 4(4), 249-290.  
Li, X.-P. (2011). On the semantics of classifiers in Chinese. (Ph.D.), Bar-Ilan University.    
Li, Y.-h. A. (1998). Argument determiner phrases and number phrases. Linguistic Inquiry, 29(4), 
693-702.  
Liu, D., Wellman, H. M., Tardif, T., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2008). Theory of mind development in 
Chinese children: A meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and 
languages. Developmental Psychology, 44(2), 523.  
Liu, H. (2008). A case study of the acquistion of Mandarin classifiers. Language Research, 44(2), 
345-360.  
Low, J. (2010). Preschoolers' implicit and explicit false-belief understanding: Relation with 
complex syntactical mastery. Child Development, 81(2), 597-615.  
Lyons, J. (1975). Deixis as the source of reference. In E. L. Keenan (Ed.), Formal Semantics of 
Natural Language (pp. 61-83): Cambridge University Press  
Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics (Vol. 1 & 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Müller, U., Zelazo, P. D., & Imrisek, S. (2005). Executive function and children's understanding 
of false belief: how specific is the relation? Cognitive Development, 20(2), 173-189.  
Mazuka, R., Jincho, N., & Oishi, H. (2009). Development of executive control and language 
processing. Language and Linguistics Compass, 3(1), 59-89.  
McCune-Nicolich, L. (1981). The cognitive bases of relational words in the single word period. 
Journal of Child Language, 8(01), 15-34.  
Miller, C. A. (2006). Developmental relationships between language and theory of mind. 
American Journal of Speech - Language Pathology, 15(2), 142-154.  
Millett, K. R. G. (2010). The cognitive effects of bilingualism: Does knowing two languages 
impact children's ability to reason about mental states? (Ph.D.), University of Minnesota, 
United States -- Minnesota.  
223 
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007). Language and theory of mind: Meta-
Analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief understanding. Child 
Development, 78(2), 622-646.  
Minai, U., Jincho, N., Yamane, N., & Mazuka, R. (2012). What hinders child semantic 
computation: Children's universal quantification and the development of cognitive 
control. Journal of Child Language, 39(5), 919-956.  
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual differences in 
executive functions: Four general conclusions. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 21(1), 8-14.  
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
“frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41(1), 49-100.  
Modyanova, N., & Wexler, K. (2013). Semantic and pragmatic language development: Children 
know 'that' better. Paper presented at the Generative Approaches to Language 
Acquisition North America (GALANA). 
Moore, C., Pure, K., & Furrow, D. (1990). Children's understanding of the modal expression of 
speaker certainty and uncertainty and its relation to the development of a representational 
theory of mind. Child Development, 61, 722-730.  
Morales, J., Calvo, A., & Bialystok, E. (2013). Working memory development in monolingual 
and bilingual children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 114(2), 187-202.  
Murasugi, K. (1986). A study on the acquisition of English demonstratives 'this' and 'that': The 
acquisition of invisibility principle. Descriptive and Applied Linguistics: bulletin of the 
ICU summer institute in Linguistics, 19, 175.  
Myers, J. (2000). Rules vs. analogy in Mandarin classifier selection. Language and Linguistics, 
1(2), 187-209.  
Nilsen, E. S., & Graham, S. A. (2009). The relations between children's communicative 
perspective-taking and executive functioning. Cognitive Psychology, 58(2), 220-249.  
Nilsen, E. S., & Graham, S. A. (2012). The development of preschoolers' appreciation of 
communicative ambiguity. Child Development, 83(4), 1400-1415.  
Noveck, I. A. (2000). When children are more logical than adults: Experimental investigations of 
scalar implicature. Cognition, 78(2), 165-188.  
Özyürek, A. (1998). An analysis of the basic meaning of Turkish demonstratives in face-to-face 
conversational interaction. In S. Santi, I. Guaitella, C. Cave, & G. Konopcynski (Eds.), 
Oralite et Gestualite: communication multomodale, interaction (pp. 604-614). Paris: 
L'Harmattan. 
224 
Paap, K. R., & Greenberg, Z. I. (2013). There is no coherent evidence for a bilingual advantage 
in executive processing. Cognitive Psychology, 66(2), 232-258.  
Papafragou, A., Cassidy, K., & Gleitman, L. (2007). When we think about thinking: The 
acquisition of belief verbs. Cognition, 105(1), 125-165.  
Papafragou, A., & Musolino, J. (2003). Scalar implicatures: Experiments at the semantics–
pragmatics interface. Cognition, 86(3), 253-282.  
Poarch, G. J., & van Hell, J. G. (2012). Executive functions and inhibitory control in multilingual 
children: Evidence from second-language learners, bilinguals, and trilinguals. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 113(4), 535-551. d 
Poulin-Dubois, D., Blaye, A., Coutya, J., & Bialystok, E. (2011). The effects of bilingualism on 
toddlers' executive functioning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 108(3), 567-
579.  
Pyykkönen, P., Matthews, D., & Järvikivi, J. (2010). Three-year-olds are sensitive to semantic 
prominence during online language comprehension: A visual world study of pronoun 
resolution. Language and Cognitive Processes, 25(1), 115-129.  
Qian, Z., & Garnsey, S. M. (2014). A chunk of coffee: an ERP Study on the processing of 
Mandarin classifiers. Paper presented at the The 27th Annual CUNY Conference on 
Human Sentence Processing.  
Rakhlin, N., Kornilov, S. A., Reich, J., Babyonyshev, M., Koposov, R. A., & Grigorenko, E. L. 
(2011). The relationship between syntactic development and theory of mind: Evidence 
from a small-population study of a developmental language disorder. Journal of 
Neurolinguistics, 24(4), 476-496.  
Rauh, G. (1983). Aspects of deixis. In G. Rauh (Ed.), Essays on deixis (Vol. 188, pp. 9-60). 
Resches, M., & Perez Pereira, M. (2007). Referential communication abilities and theory of 
mind development in preschool children. Journal of Child Language, 34(1), 21-52.  
Rosnay, M., Pons, F., Harris, P. L., & Morrell, J. (2004). A lag between understanding false 
belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and 
mothers' mental‐state language. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 22(2), 
197-218.  
Sabbagh, M. A., Xu, F., Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Lee, K. (2006). The development of 
executive functioning and theory of mind: A comparison of Chinese and U.S. 
preschoolers. Psychological Science, 17(1), 74-81.  
Samson, D., & Apperly, I. A. (2010). There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind 
concepts: New directions in theory of mind research. Infant and Child Development, 
19(5), 443-454.  
225 
Schick, B., de Villiers, P., de Villiers, J., & Hoffmeister, R. (2007). Language and theory of mind: 
A study of deaf children. Child Development, 78(2), 376-396.  
Snedeker, J., & Yuan, S. (2008). Effects of prosodic and lexical constraints on parsing in young 
children (and adults). Journal of Memory and Language, 58(2), 574-608.  
Stevens, J., & Zhang, Y. (2013). Relative distance and gaze in the use of entity-referring spatial 
demonstratives: An event-related potential study. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 26(1), 31-
45.  
Tagliaferri, B. (2005). Paradigm: Perception Research Systems, Inc. Retrieved from 
www.paradigmexperiments.com. 
Tai, J., & Wang, L. (1990). A semantic study of the classifier tiao. Journal of the Chinese 
Language Teachers Association, 25(1), 35-56.  
Tang, C.-C. J. (1990). Chinese phrase structure and the extended X'-theory. (Ph.D. ), Cornell 
University, Ann Arbor.  ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Full Text database.  
Tang, C.-C. J. (2007). Modifier licensing and Chinese DP: A feature analysis. Language and 
Linguistics, 8(4), 967-1024.  
Tanz, C. (1980). Studies in the acquisition of deictic terms. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tomasello, M., & Farrar, M. J. (1986). Joint attention and early language. Child Development, 
57(6), 1454-1463.  
Tsai, I. Y. (2008). Acquisition of Mandarin classifiers and categorization in young children. 
(Master), National Chiayi University.    
Tsai, S.-H. (2009). Processing of Chinese classifier-noun agreement: An event-related potential 
study. (Master), National Cheng Kung University.    
Tsang, C., & Chambers, C. G. (2011). Appearances aren't everything: Shape classifiers and 
referential processing in Cantonese. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 37(5), 1065-1080.  
Tse, S. K., Li, H., & Leung, S. O. (2007). The acquisition of Cantonese classifiers by preschool 
children in Hong Kong. Journal of Child Language, 34(03), 495-517.  
Tsou, C.-Z. (2005). Preschoolers' understanding of false belief in Taiwan. Bulletin of Special 
Education, 29, 25-48.  
Wales, R. (1984). Children’s deictic reference: The role of space and animacy. In S. Kuczaj, II 
(Ed.), Discourse Development (pp. 147-166): Springer New York. 
226 
Wardlow, L. (2013). Individual differences in speakers' perspective taking: The roles of 
executive control and working memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(4), 766-772.  
Webb, P. A., & Abrahamson, A. A. (1976). Stages of egocentrism in children's use of 'this' and 
'that': A different point of view. Journal of Child Language, 3(03), 349-367.  
Wellman, H. M. (2010). Developing a theory of mind. In U. Goswami (Ed.), The Wiley-
Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development (pp. 258-284): Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: 
The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655-684.  
Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., Liu, D., Zhu, L., & Liu, G. (2006). Scaling of theory-of-mind 
understandings in Chinese children. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1075-1081. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01830.x 
Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., & Peterson, C. C. (2011). Sequential progressions in a theory-of-mind 
scale: Longitudinal perspectives. Child Development, 82(3), 780-792.  
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Development, 75(2), 
523-541.  
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function 
of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103-
128.  
Woodard, K., Pozzan, L., & Trueswell, J. C. (2014). Mapping the kindergarten-path: Cognitive 
predictors of child sentence processing Paper presented at the The 27th Annual CUNY 
Conference on Human Sentence Processing, Ohio State University. Poster retrieved from  
Wu, F., Kaiser, E., & Andersen, E. (2009). The effect of classifiers in predicting Chinese relative 
clauses. In M. Grosvald & D. Soares (Eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Western Conference 
on Linguistics (pp. 330-339). Department of Linguistics, University of California, Davis. 
Wu, F., Luo, Y., & Zhou, X. (2014). Building Chinese relative clause structures with lexical and 
syntactic cues: Evidence from visual world eye-tracking and reading times. Language, 
Cognition and Neuroscience, 29(10), 1205-1226.  
Yoshida, M. (2006). Constraints and mechanisms in long-distance dependency formation. 
(Ph.D.), University of Maryland, College Park, United States -- Maryland.    
Zelazo, P. D. (2006). The Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS): A method of assessing 
executive function in children. Nature Protocols, 1(1), 297-301.  
Zelazo, P. D., Frye, D., & Rapus, T. (1996). An age-related dissociation between knowing rules 
and using them. Cognitive Development, 11(1), 37-63. 
227 
Zhang, H. (2007). Numeral classifiers in Mandarin Chinese. Journal of East Asian Linguistics, 
16(1), 43-59.  
Zhang, L.-J., & Wu, N. (2011). The relation between verbal Skills and theory of mind in 
preschoolers: A short-term longitudinal study. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 42(12), 1166-
1174.  
Zhang, N. N. (2011). The constituency of classifier constructions in Mandarin Chinese. Taiwan 
Journal of Linguistics, 9(1), 1-50.  
Zhang, N. N. (2012). Numeral classifier structures. National Chung Cheng University. 
Zhao, Y.-J. (2007). Children’s acquisition of demonstrative pronouns in Mandarin Chinese 
Proceedings of the 21st Pacific Asia Conference on Language, Information and 
Computation (pp. 532-541). Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea. 
Zhou, P., Su, Y. E., Crain, S., Gao, L., & Zhan, L. (2012). Children's use of phonological 
information in ambiguity resolution: A view from Mandarin Chinese. Journal of Child 
Language, 39(04), 687-730.  
Zufferey, S. (2010). Lexical pragmatics and theory of mind. PA: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
 
 
